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This thesis consists of five chapters. The three main chapters, chapter 2, 3 and 4 are 
three essays on how a firm can use price and/or advertising to signal its unobservable 
quality. 
Chapter 1 gives a brief introduction of literature on quality signaling and my thesis. 
In chapter 2, we focus on competition between an incumbent and an entrant when 
only the entrant's quality is unknown to (some) consumers. The incumbent may or 
may not know the entrant’s quality. The model reveals an additional separating 
equilibrium when the incumbent is assumed to be informed of the entrant’s quality 
and the proportion of informed consumers is very small. In this equilibrium, the 
incumbent chooses separating prices while the entrant pools. The incumbent’s high 
price signals the entrant’s low quality and the incumbent’s low price signals the 
entrant’s high quality. The incumbent loses all the uninformed consumers when the 
entrant sells a low quality product and all the uninformed and informed consumers 
when the entrant sells a high quality product. The entrant makes a higher or at least 
equal profit to the entrant in the full information benchmark. Thus, entry is facilitated. 
This is in contrast with the result from the setting where the incumbent do not know 
the entrant’s quality. In this setting, there exists a unique separating equilibrium in 
which the entrant’s high price signals high quality but entry is deterred. In addition, 
the informed incumbent’s case generates an additional pooling equilibrium if 
informed consumers are absent. In this equilibrium, the incumbent wins the entire 
iv 
market and the entrant pools at a premium which is charged when the entrant sells a 
high quality product. This is different from the pooling equilibrium in which the 
incumbent wins the whole market when the incumbent is uninformed of the entrant’s 
quality.  
In chapter 3, we re-examine the issue from chapter 2 in a good market in which 
products are horizontally differentiated. The model reveals a separating equilibrium 
where a high price by the entrant can signal its high quality when the proportion of 
informed consumers is at some intermediate values. The case in which the incumbent 
is informed of the entrant’s type leads to two additional equilibria. When the 
proportion of informed consumers is large enough, firms play their price strategies as 
if there were complete information. The entrant’s high price in combination with the 
incumbent’s low price signals the entrant’s high quality. When the proportion of 
informed consumers is at some intermediate values, the incumbent’s high price 
signals low quality of the entrant, while its low price signals high quality of the 
entrant. Further, all these three equilibria are the only equilibra of that type. 
Interestingly, we find entry may be facilitated with incomplete information. 
Chapter 4 explores how firms can use price and advertising jointly as a signal 
of their unobservable choice of quality. Up to now, only price has been used as a 
signal and advertising has not been considered. Recent attempts have been made to 
examine the role of price and advertising as a joint signal of firms’ unobservable 
choice of quality. In particular, In and Wright (2009) (hereafter, IW) have developed a 
general framework for analyzing multidimensional signals of unobservable choices. 
v 
Following the idea in IW, we develop a model in which a firm can use both price and 
advertising as a signal of its unobservable choice of quality. In this chapter, we start 
with the monopoly setting, and support an equilibrium in which the monopolist 
chooses high quality but a higher level of advertising compared to the full information 
benchmark in both settings. We then extend our model to the case with competition of 
two imperfectly competitive firms, and characterize a symmetric equilibrium in which 
both firms choose high quality, set a lower price and a higher level of advertising. In a 
numerical example, we find an equilibrium in which the monopoly or the duopoly 
firm chooses high quality. The equilibrium results show that as competition gets more 
intense from the monopoly, initially prices decrease and the level of advertising 
increases. 
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 CHAPTER 1 
Introduction 
 
Information economics is a branch of microeconomic theory that studies how 
information affects an economy and economic decisions1. The approach of this 
study is based on the premise that one party in a transaction often has better 
information than another2. This information asymmetry may exist between parties 
to a transaction in various markets. For example, in a labor market, workers have 
more information regarding their capability than employers, and in a good market, 
sellers have more information about the quality of their products than buyers. 
Adverse selection (Akerlof 1970) and moral hazard are the two examples of the 
problem related to information asymmetry, and this problem arising from 
information asymmetry has been recognized to be an important consideration in 
the study of marketplace exchanges in the variety of disciplines like labor 
economics, industrial organization, marketing science, accounting, finance. My 
thesis focuses on a market for experience goods in which consumers are often 
uncertain about the quality of a product provided by the sellers before purchase. 
  It is a commonplace observation that in many markets, consumers are often 
unable to make clear quality comparisons among different product brands. This is 
particularly true of the experience goods whose quality is observable to consumers 
only after purchase. One possible solution to this problem is the use of signals, 
                                                        
1 This definition refers to http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Information_economics 
2 See Kirmani and Rao for a review of literature on signaling unobservable product quality. 
                                                                                        1 
which are actions that informed sellers take to reveal their true types to 
uninformed consumers. There are various types of choice variables widely 
examined in the literature on signaling firms’ unobservable product quality, 
including prices, advertising expenditures, reputation, brand name, store name, 
warranty. Signaling posits a rational consumer who expects that a firm would 
make the implicit commitment conveyed through a signal credible. This is 
because it is economically undesirable for the firm to cheat by conveying false 
signals. This signaling approach which involves the incentive of a firm has been 
examined extensively in the literature on quality signaling.  
A huge volume of literature on quality signaling focuses on the relationship 
between prices, advertising expenditures and product quality. Theoretical research 
on how firms can use price and/or advertising to signal unobservable quality 
reveals that high price signals high quality and this price-quality relationship 
weakens overtime in a monopoly or duopoly market3. Repeat purchases or a 
proportion of informed consumers are necessary for the signal of dissipative 
advertising to work (Farrell 1980). This theoretical work can be divided into two 
major streams depending on whether quality is assumed to be exogenously 
determined by nature or whether quality is chosen by firms endogenously.  
The literature on exogenous quality follows the classical signaling models of 
Kihlstom and Riordan (1984), Milgrom and Roberts (1986), Bagwell and Riordan 
                                                        
3 In a perfectly functioning market, one might expect a strong, positive relationship between product quality 
and price. However, empirical studies on the relationship between price and product quality, including those 
of Sproles (1977), Riesz (1978,1979), Geistfeld (1982), show that this positive relationship is product specific 
and weak in general in an imperfect and competitive market. Gerstner (1985) has similar finding and explains 
how quality price relation varies across products. 
                                                                                        2 
(1991), Linnermer (2002), and more recently, Linnermer (2008). For example, 
Kihlstom and Riordan (1984) and Milgrom and Roberts (1986) build a formal 
signaling model to show that dissipative advertising can serve as a signal of 
quality. Kihlstom and Riordan (1984) consider a model of dissipative advertising 
as a signal of quality when firms are price takers. Milgrom and Roberts (1986) 
provide a model in which the monopolist uses prices and dissipative advertising to 
signal quality. Repeat purchases are an essential attribute of the model. They show 
that the advertising-quality relationship is positive and decreases over time. Their 
model is motivated by Nelson (1974), who argues that a firm has more incentives 
to get consumers to try its product if its quality is high because a high quality 
product is more likely to attract repeat purchases. Advertising may expand an 
initial sale, which is more valuable to a high quality firm. Spending money on 
advertising will be a profitable strategy if its quality is high, but not if its quality is 
low because the profit margin in equilibrium may be not great enough to justify 
the advertising for a low quality firm.  
Bagwell and Riordan (1991) adopt the same kind of signaling model of 
incomplete information, but make price the signal rather than advertising4. They 
show that a high quality will be introduced at a high price which will be lowered 
over time toward the full information monopoly price. The high introductory price 
signals high quality because a high cost firm is more willing to restrict sales 
volume than a low cost firm. Furthermore, a low quality firm loses greater sales 
                                                        
4 Bagwell (1992) conducts a related analysis of a monopolist producing a product “line”. 
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volume from a high price, since informed consumers may refuse to buy its 
products at such a price. As information about product quality diffuses and more 
consumers become more informed, it will become easier for a high quality firm to 
signal its quality. Prices for the products sold by the high quality firm thus decline 
as the market matures.  
Linnermer (2002) uses both advertising and prices as signals into one model in 
which he finds that the joint signal of price and advertising is employed when the 
proportion of informed consumers is intermediate5. However, when the proportion 
of informed consumers is low, quality is signaled only through a high price. The 
reason why dissipative advertising can sometimes be a useful signal is that a high 
price makes a less damaging loss with regard to uninformed consumers for the 
high quality firm than for the low quality firm, while it makes a more loss with 
regard to informed consumers for the high quality firm than for the low quality 
firm. This second effect urges for the use of advertising in order to lower the price. 
Linnermer (2008) provides a new explanation of Nelson’s idea that dissipative 
advertising could be a signal of product quality. He considers a monopoly model 
in which the quality of the good and the marginal cost of production are uncertain 
and repeat purchases or a proportion of informed consumers are absent. He show 
dissipative advertising is a necessary signal of product quality due to the 
additional uncertainty in terms of marginal costs. 
While the literature on exogenous quality assumes that nature chooses a firm’s 
                                                        
5 Bagwell (2005) also studies the role of advertising and prices as signals of quality in a static setting, but in 
this model advertising can affect demand directly. See also Bagwell (2007) for a detailed discussion on 
advertising, price and product quality. 
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quality, literature on endogenous quality assumes that a firm chooses its own 
quality. Prominent examples of the endogenous quality literature include Klein 
and Leffler (1981), Sharpiro (1983), Wolinsky (1983), Riordan (1986), Rogerson 
(1988), Bester (1998), Rasmussen (2008), and most recently In and Wright (2009). 
Klein and Leffler (1981) consider a standard endogenous quality setting in which 
the cost of production increases in quality and high quality is more efficient than 
low quality. Repetition with a long horizon is essential to their model. In 
equilibrium a seller with a good reputation can sell at a price above marginal cost. 
Further, the equilibrium price must be high enough so as to make the seller prefer 
high quality and stable profits to low quality and immediate profits. The positive 
profits will persist in equilibrium because buyers would correctly deduce that any 
seller charging a lower price would be irresistibly tempted to produce low quality. 
The long term gain from stable profits would exceed one shot gain from cheating 
on quality. Therefore, the possibility of repeat purchases determines the firm’s 
choices of quality.  
There is a sizeable literature after Klein and Leffler (1981), but only firms’ 
choice of price to signal quality has been studied in this literature, since the role of 
advertising as a signal of quality has not yet been formally developed. For 
instance, Sharpiro (1983) also derives an equilibrium price quality schedule for a 
market for experience goods. In such a market there is an incentive for sellers to 
reduce quality and take short run gains. In order to forestall such quality cutting, 
the price quality schedule involves high quality items selling at a premium above 
                                                                                        5 
their costs. This premium serves the function of compensating sellers for their 
investment in reputation. 
Wolinsky (1983) investigates a search model in which the information in the 
market is imperfect in the sense that the exact quality chosen by a firm is known 
only to the firm itself; some information about the quality of a firm’s product will, 
however, reach its potential customers, even if they do not make any special effort 
to acquire it. Firms are identical in costs if their product quality and quantity are 
the same, and choose their quality levels and prices. Consumers differ in their 
willingness to pay for quality. In equilibrium, prices may serve as signals which 
exactly differentiate the available quality levels. That is, there exists a fulfilled 
expectations equilibrium at which each price signals a unique quality level. 
Moreover, each price signal exceeds the marginal cost of producing the quality it 
signals. Such a markup depends on the nature of the product specific information 
received by consumers. An increase in the quality of information reduces prices.  
Riordan (1986) studies how price signals of quality and repeat purchases jointly 
influence firms’ quality incentives in a monopolistically competitive experience 
goods market where consumers are symmetrically informed prior to purchase. 
Firms commit to price and quality over a period during which consumers make 
repeat purchases. Consumers base initial purchases on observed prices, which 
perfectly signal firms’ quality both in and out of equilibrium. High quality is 
associated with a higher price cost margin. Price successfully conveys information 
to consumers about quality because of its direct impact on firms’ incentive for 
                                                                                        6 
quality provision. Equilibrium quality is less than the efficient quality, which 
would prevail under full information. As repeat purchases become large relative to 
initial purchases, or as firms become small relative to the size of the market, 
equilibrium product quality rises, and the market converges to the full information 
equilibrium.  
Rogerson (1988) studies a market for search goods with imperfect information. 
Advertising only reveals price information, but not quality of a product. He show 
that under equilibrium, prices serve as a signal of quality when price advertising is 
allowed. The key insight here is that under advertising, consumers learn price but 
not quality from advertising. When they search for a quality at a cost and find the 
quality is relative high at a given price, they will have a larger incentive to 
patronize the firm. In the meantime, if price rises above marginal cost, the firm 
would have more incentive to increase quality to capture this benefit. Thus higher 
price signals higher quality in the equilibrium. 
Like Riordan (1986), Bester (1998) considers a market for experience goods 
where the firms initially choose prices and qualities. The consumer learns a 
seller’s quality after the first purchase and then decides about repeat purchases 
from the same seller. Therefore, the seller’s future demand depends positively on 
the consumer’s initial experience. The repeat-purchase effect in combination with 
the quality premium provides an incentive for the seller to produce high quality. 
Rasmussen (2008) uses a formalization of Klein and Leffler (1981) to look at 
the product quality model in a competitive industry. He shows that the idea of 
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quality-maintaining profits is not limited to multi-period models, relying on future 
sales to give the firm an incentive to provide high quality. In his paper, he lays out 
three ways in which profits can arise even in one period setting: consumer error, 
informed and uninformed consumers, weak laws. Therefore, such profits, like the 
future profits in Klein and Leffler (1981) model, would refrain firms from cutting 
quality or price even in a static setting. However, to date, literature on the 
endogenous quality has not considered firms setting both price and advertising as 
possible signals of their unobservable quality. This may have been due to a lack of 
a consistent way to handle out of equilibrium offers of both price and advertising 
levels.  
Most recently, In and Wright (2009) develop a general framework for analyzing 
the signaling of unobservable choices. They illustrate the equilibrium refinement 
with several important applications, one of which is to introduce advertising to a 
setting of signaling where quality is endogenously chosen by firms. This is the 
first time that advertising has been introduced to such a setting and they show that 
dissipative advertising cannot have a signaling role. However, they also point out 
that demand expanding advertising may have a signaling role. 
My thesis explores how a firm can signal its unobservable quality through price 
and/or advertising by assuming that quality is either exogenously determined by 
nature or quality is endogenously chosen by firms. There are three main chapters 
of my thesis.  
In the next two chapters, we study entry and quality signaling when only some 
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consumers are informed of the entrant’s quality. We consider a market for 
experience goods with two firms, an incumbent and a potential entrant. The 
incumbent’s quality is common knowledge, while the entrant’ quality is unknown 
by some consumers. The incumbent may or may not be informed of the entrant’s 
quality. The entrant’s quality is exogenously determined by nature. Firstly, we 
extend the static model of Kyle Bagwell (1990) to allow for an informed 
incumbent and the existence of some informed consumers. The informed 
incumbent will give rise to signaling with common information problem. 
Unprejudiced beliefs by Bagwell and Ramey (1991) are introduced to solve this 
problem. Informational product differentiation as a barrier to entry is also 
examined in the context of common information. Surprisingly, we find that entry 
may be facilitated and the incumbent’s low price signals high quality of the 
entrant while its high price signals low quality of the entrant in an equilibrium 
with an informed incumbent. 
 Secondly, we further extend this model to a horizontally differentiated market 
for experience goods. The two firms compete according to a Hotelling model of 
competition. We examine how the results from our previous chapter vary with 
horizontal differentiation. Our equilibrium results show that this extension 
generates several additional insights. An equilibrium in which the incumbent 
adopts pooling price strategy reveals that the entry of a high quality firm may be 
facilitated under incomplete information and the entrant’s high price signals high 
quality. This is different from the result in previous chapter where the entry of a 
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high quality entrant is discouraged. In addition, we find a no-distortion 
equilibrium in the sense that both the incumbent and entrant firms play price 
strategies as if there were complete information in the informed incumbent case 
when the proportion of informed consumers is beyond some threshold.  
The fourth chapter analyzes how a firm can use advertising, in addition to 
prices, to signal its unobservable choice of quality by assuming quality is 
endogenously chosen by firms. This is the first time that the joint signal of price 
and advertising are formally analyzed in this strand of studies. There are generally 
multiple equilibria for the game we consider. We use Reordering Invariance in In 
and Wright (2009) to find the unique subgame Perfect Bayesian equilibrium. We 
first investigate the idea in In and Wright (2009) that demand enhancing 
advertising may be a signal of quality and find that firms have to increase 
advertising in order to signal high quality when price alone is not sufficient to 
induce high quality in an equilibrium. Then the model is extended to the case with 
two imperfectly competitive firms. Our findings show that when competition 
increases from monopoly level, firms tend to set a lower price and a higher level 
of advertising to signal high quality when price alone cannot be a signal of quality. 
Social welfare analysis and policy implication are also given. The increased level 
of advertising for signaling high quality may lead to a loss in social welfare if 
price alone cannot be an effective signal. However, a ban on advertising may 
make the firm shift from high quality to low quality in the equilibrium when price 
alone cannot be a signal of quality, making the society even worse off. 
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CHAPTER 2 
Entry and quality signaling when only some consumers are 
informed of the entrant’s quality 
 
2.1 Introduction 
During the course of introducing a new brand to a market for experience goods 
which is initially monopolized by an incumbent, an entrant firm may face 
consumers that are informed about the quality of its goods, while others are 
uninformed. If the quality of the pioneering brand of the established incumbent is 
commonly known by all consumers, there is informational product differentiation: 
all consumers know the quality of the incumbent, while only some consumers 
know the quality of the entrant. This situation typically arises when a new firm 
enters a market in which it has to compete against a well known brand. The 
purpose of this chapter is to address the issue of informational product 
differentiation as a barrier to entry and prices as signals of quality in a market for 
experience goods where the incumbent may or may not know the entrant’s quality. 
A tremendous amount of research studies how the entrant firm signals its 
unobservable quality to uninformed consumers and/or how informational product 
differentiation influences the possibility for entry in markets for experience goods 
or search goods6. For example, Bain (1956), Schmalensee (1982), Farrell (1986), 
Bagwell (1990), Paul W.J. de Bijl (1997). Bain (1956) argued that informational 
                                                        
6 The quality of search goods can be determined by inspection prior to purchase, whereas the quality of 
experience goods are not determined by inspection prior to purchase. This distinction was made by Nelson 
(1970). 
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product differentiation can be a barrier to entry for the first time7. Schmalensee 
(1982) investigates a market for experience goods, where an incumbent with a 
well known high quality product competes against an entrant whose quality may 
be either high or low. He shows that the entrant is at disadvantage because 
consumers are uncertain about its product quality. In effect, consumers seek 
insurance and are willing to pay a risk premium for the high quality product 
provided by the incumbent. As a result, the incumbent can deter entry of an 
equally efficient entrant and make a profit.  
  Farrell (1986) also considers a model of entry into a market for experience 
goods, in which there is an incumbent with publicly known quality. The entrant’s 
quality can be either high or low. He shows that consumers’ uncertainty about the 
quality of the entrant’s goods can make entry difficult because rational consumers 
expect that the entrant may cheat by providing goods of low quality to make a 
greater profit. This may enable incumbents to prevent the entrant from entering a 
market for experience goods, maintain excess profits or inefficiency. Therefore, he 
concludes that buyer’s distrust to an entrant creates an entry barrier and a first 
mover advantage even if consumers are supposed to be rational8. 
  Bagwell (1990) extends the paper of Schmalensee (1982) in two important 
directions. The first involves quality distortions. In his model the incumbent is 
supposed to sell a known low quality product, while the entrant’s product quality 
can be either high or low. Only the entrant knows its own quality. Consumers and 
                                                        
7 See also Stigler (1968), Von Weizsacker (1980), for the definition of barrier to entry 
8 Farrell (1986 p. 440) writes “Schmalensee (1982) has examined this problem, but in his model buyer are 
irrational (or at least incorrect) in their fears about the quality of an entrant’s goods.” 
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the incumbent are uncertain about the entrant’s product quality. Further, the high 
quality product is assumed to generate more social surplus than the low quality 
product. He demonstrates that informational product differentiation could be a 
barrier to entry and the efficient high quality entrant is not able to replace the 
inefficient low quality incumbent. The second extension concerns the role of price 
as a signal of quality to consumers. He builds up a model of signaling in which 
consumers form their beliefs about quality from the entrant’s prices and shows 
there exists an equilibrium in which a high price signals high quality, but the 
informational asymmetries result in an entry barrier that prohibits entry of a high 
quality firm.  
However, the literature on experience goods we have discussed so far focuses 
only on the information structure, where the incumbent does not know the 
entrant’s quality. De Bijl (1997) did consider two different informational 
environments in which the incumbent may or may not know the entrant’s quality. 
However, his concern is regarding how search costs and informational product 
differentiation affect entry in a market for search goods. He studied a market for 
search goods in which the incumbent’s quality is commonly known to be low 
while the entrant’s quality is either high or low. Entry is assumed to be costless. 
He demonstrates that when search costs are low, a high price signals high quality 
of the entrant, and entry may be encouraged when search costs are sufficiently low 
or when the incumbent observes the quality of the entrant’s product. The 
reasoning for his findings is that when search costs are low enough, and if the low 
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quality entrant mimics the high quality by charging a high price, consumers who 
find out that the entrant sells low quality goods will switch to the incumbent. The 
low quality entrant who knows this has no incentive to mimic a high quality rival. 
A distinguishing feature of this setup is that the quality of search goods can be 
inspected prior to purchase.   
In a market for experience goods, the incumbent may, however, have more 
inside information than consumers regarding the entrant’s product quality. 
Consider, for instance, markets for technically complicated products, in which 
firms have more expertise than consumers9. Alternatively, consider international 
markets in which a domestic firm starts exporting its product to a foreign country 
where consumers are uninformed of the quality of the good. In this case, the 
foreign firms may be more informed of the quality of the good because firms may 
hire professionals who have knowledge about each other due to a common history 
such as a shared education, a common working experience. Therefore, this is a 
very important aspect when it comes to discuss quality signaling and the effect of 
informational product differentiation as a barrier to entry. One can allow for such 
situations by assuming that the incumbent can observe the entrant’s quality10. This 
would give rise to a situation of signaling with common information: the prices of 
both firms, rather than only the entrant’s price, serve as signals of the entrant’s 
quality to consumers. Surprisingly, there is no paper dealing with this situation in 
                                                        
9 For example, the incumbent may have expertise in assessing competing products, have obtained information 
from common suppliers, or have engaged in industrial espionage in the case of technically complicated 
products (see Matthews and Fertig 1990 p.1). 
10 The assumption is a simplified version of the assumption that firms are more knowledgeable than 
consumers. 
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a market for experience goods whose quality is only learned after purchase.   
In this chapter, we extend the static model of Bagwell (1990) in two important 
ways. Firstly, we assume the incumbent can observe the entrant’s quality. This 
captures the idea that firms may be more informed of its rival’s quality than 
consumers when its rival is new in the market in reality. Therefore, consumers 
could use the incumbent’s price, in addition to the entrant’s price, a possible signal 
of the entrant’s quality as well. This is different from Bagwell (1990). In his static 
model, the incumbent cannot observe the entrant’s quality. Hence, the incumbent 
and the consumer always have common beliefs about nature’s choice of the 
entrant’s quality. Accordingly, only the entrant’s prices serve as a signal of the 
entrant’s quality. Secondly, we analyze a static model wherein some consumers 
are informed of the entrant’s quality. This assumption makes sense in that some 
consumers may have more expertise than others, thereby possessing greater 
information. This is in contrast with Bagwell’s model in which all consumers are 
uninformed of the entrant’s quality.  
To be complete, we will consider the case where the incumbent cannot observe 
the entrant’s quality as well11. But we will focus on the case where the incumbent 
observes the entrant’s quality. Our analysis shows that the presence of some 
consumers informed of the entrant’s quality cannot change the equilibrium result 
that high price signals high quality but the informational product differentiation 
leads to a barrier to entry for a high quality entrant in the uninformed incumbent 
                                                        
11 The seller is likely to be better informed about the quality of its owner products relative to potential buyers 
as well as rival sellers due to their private information about production technology, input quality (see Janssen 
and Roy, 2008).  
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case. However, the informed incumbent case generates several additional sights. 
In an equilibrium where the incumbent chooses separating prices and the entrant 
pools, we find that the incumbent’s high price signals that the entrant sells a low 
quality product and vice versa. Interestingly, entry may be facilitated. 
The structure of this chapter is as follows. We discuss related literature in detail 
in section 2. We begin in section 3 with a description of the model’s basic 
assumptions. This framework follows from Bagwell (1990). Then, we solve the 
static model. First, the equilibrium under full information is derived. Second, we 
define a subgame perfect Bayesian equilibrium in our two settings, where the 
incumbent may or may not be informed of the entrant’s quality. Third, we solve 
for separating and pooling equilibria, respectively. Section 4 concludes. 
 
2.2 Literature review 
There are several strands of literature related to this work. One strand of related 
studies considers the joint signaling role of price and advertising in the context of 
common private information, for example, Hertzendorf and Overgaard (2001), 
Fluet and Garella (2002) and Yehezkel (2006). Hertzendorf and Overgaard (2001) 
consider a two type duopoly model in which one firm sells high quality while the 
other sells low quality. Production costs per unit for the products of different 
qualities are the same. Firms’ qualities are observable to both firms, but unknown 
to consumers. Firms use price and advertising expenditure to signal their qualities. 
Furthermore, there is no horizontal differentiation between the products of two 
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firms. They show that when the degree of vertical differentiation is substantial, 
price alone can signal quality. However, when the degree of vertical differentiation 
is small, the advertising signal will also be used. In particular, if price alone is 
used, prices have to be distorted upwards to signal quality, while if advertising is 
also used, prices may be driven below the complete information level. 
  Fluet and Garella (2002) examine a very similar duopoly model in which firms 
use price and advertising to signal their qualities12. Nature chooses firms’ quality 
which can be either high or low. Consumers do not know the quality of either firm, 
but firms observe nature’s choice. Consumers prefer high quality to low quality 
but are indifferent between goods sold by the firms if their qualities and prices are 
the same. They also find that when the quality differential between brands is small, 
signaling is possible only if advertising is used. Pure price signals can be used, but 
only if there are sufficiently large quality differences. Price rivalry is essential for 
their results. This is because consumers are confronted with the problem of 
interpreting the price-advertising strategies of both firms at the same time. When a 
low quality firm mimics the strategy adopted by its high quality rival, this may 
lead consumers to infer that one firm is cheating. However, consumers do not 
know which one, this potentially has the effect of modifying consumers’ 
perception of both firms. Therefore, this type of mimicking behavior is rather 
different from the one to which the signaling literature in economics is used.  
                                                        
12 Fluet and Garella (1995) provide a unified explanation for different kinds of advertising by firms, for 
example, why firms advertise in the absence of repeat purchases, why firms with brands of long-established 
reputation advertise, and why the low quality firms advertise when they compete against their high quality 
rivals. 
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  More recently, Yehezkel (2006) also studies the effect of price and advertising 
expenditure as a joint signal in a two type duopoly market. Firms have common 
information regarding their quality. He employs the same formulation and 
equilibrium concept as Hertzendorf and Overgaard (2001). But his paper is 
motivated by Bagwell and Riordan’s (1991) seminal paper, and examines how 
competition affects firms’ signaling behavior in the presence of informed 
consumers. He shows that the separating price of a high quality firm is an inverse 
U-shape function of the proportion of informed consumers, while the advertising 
expenditure is declining as the proportion of informed consumers increases. The 
rationale behind this is that the competing low quality firm has two conflicting 
incentives when it mimics the high quality firm. The profit of the low quality firm 
from mimicking increases with the price of the high quality firm because of the 
possible benefit of collusion between the two firms when competing for 
uninformed consumers, while the profit from not mimicking is also increasing 
with the price of the high quality firm because an increase in the price of the high 
quality firm leads to an increase in sales for the low quality firm. The former 
effect becomes weaker the larger the number of informed consumers.  
  There is a strand of studies which examines the use of price and/or advertising 
as signal of quality under the assumption that firms’ quality is their private 
information. For example, Janssen and Roy (2008) study the signaling effect of 
price in an oligopoly market with n firms. His paper is also motivated by Bagwell 
and Riordan (1991). They consider an oligopolistic market where each firm’s 
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product quality is given exogenously and only the firm knows the quality of its 
product. The product quality of each firm can be either high or low. The cost of 
producing high quality is higher than the cost of producing low quality. They 
show that even without horizontal differentiation among the products of the firms 
or other deviations from the perfectly competitive model, signaling occurs. In fact, 
incomplete information endogenously creates sufficient rent and market power to 
allow for signaling. In particular, they characterize symmetric fully revealing 
equilibria where high price signals high quality. 
  Finally, there is also a strand of studies on signaling with common information 
in which quite different issues are investigated. Matthews and Fertig (1990) 
consider dissipative advertising by an incumbent and an entrant in a market for 
experience goods where firms have perfect information about each other’s quality. 
Prices do not reveal their private information. All consumers have the same 
preference and a fraction of them are knowledgeable due to their expertise. They 
provide an explanation as to why established firms of known quality might 
advertise. They argue that incumbent firms possibly advertise in order to inform 
consumers about the product quality of new entrants. Bagwell and Ramey (1991) 
investigate limit pricing by two incumbents, each informed as to the level of an 
industry cost parameter13. Each incumbent chooses a price and the entrant infers 
the industry cost after observing the prices. They find that incumbents are unable 
to coordinate deception, which results in a separating equilibrium in which 
                                                        
13 Harrington (1987) and Orzach and Tauman (1996) also consider limit pricing models in which two or more 
incumbent firms have common private information with regard to production costs and attempt to deter entry. 
In their models, price is used to be a signal of production cost. 
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preentry prices are not distorted. Furthermore, they show that the no-distortion 
equilibrium is the only equilibrium that can be supported by unprejudiced beliefs 
and the intuitive criterion. In our work, we use the same equilibrium concept and 
refinement as those of Bagwell and Ramey (1991). 
 
2.3 Basic assumptions 
Consider a market for experience goods that is assumed to be made up of two 
firms, an incumbent and a potential entrant. Let q  index quality, where 
, and . The quality of a product sold by the incumbent is 
known to be low, denoted by 
{ HLq ,∈ } 0>> LH
L . The entrant’s product quality could be either 
high or low, represented by H  or L . Nature determines the entrant’s actual 
product quality. The actual quality choice by Nature is known by the entrant itself 
as well as by some consumers. However, the incumbent may or may not be 
informed of the entrant’s true quality. Let  denote the ratio of informed to 
uninformed consumers, where 14
x
0≥x . The uninformed consumers believe that 
the entrant sells a high quality product with probability θ  and a low quality 
product with probability θ−1 , where ( )1,0∈θ 15. In other words, θ  is the 
consumers’ prior belief that the entrant sells a high quality product. This prior 
belief is commonly known. 
                                                        
14 This formulation is identical to that used by Bagwell and Riordan (1991). x could be endogenous if the 
entrant firm takes strategic behaviors. If the strategy is at a cost, then the entrant firm has to consider how to 
choose this strategy and price. This is left for our future research. 
15 This is the standard setting in the literature on informational product differentiation as a barrier to entry. De 
Bijl (1997) writes that “A possible motivation for this assumption is that the technology used by the 
incumbent is readily available. However, with some probability, the entrant realizes a successful innovation 
which results in high quality” (footnote 7, p.5). 
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  We focus on the information structure in which the entrant’s quality is known 
by the potential entrant as well as the incumbent. For completeness, we start with 
the full information benchmark, then move on to the incomplete information 
settings. For comparisons, we will start by briefly examining how the presence of 
some consumers informed of the entrant’s quality affects the results presented by 
Bagwell (1990)16. The incumbent and uninformed consumers have common 
beliefs about the entrant’s quality type (setting I). That is, both the incumbent and 
uninformed consumers believe that the entrant is of high quality with probability 
θ  and this belief is common knowledge. In such a scenario, uninformed 
consumers can infer the entrant’s actual quality from the entrant’s price alone. 
This is somewhat standard set-up in the existing literature.  
  We then further expand Bagwell (1990)’s study by assuming that the incumbent 
observes the entrant’s quality as well (setting II). It is common knowledge that the 
entrant and all consumers know that the incumbent is informed of the entrant’s 
quality. Therefore, the prices of both the entrant and the incumbent serve as 
signals of the entrant’s quality to uninformed consumers.  
The number of consumers is normalized to one with each consumer purchasing 
at most one unit. Consumers have the same preferences for the product of the 
same quality. Consumer’s utility function is assumed to have the following form: 
, where ,  and  denotes price. The utility of 
making no purchase is indexed to zero. Given the entrant sells a high quality 
PUPV qq −=)( 0>> LH UU P
                                                        
16 Some consumers are more informed than the incumbent because they may be experts or professionals 
working in the entrant firm or they may buy other relevant products from the entrant firm before. 
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product with probability θ , so we can define LH UUU )1( θθθ −+=  to be the 
uninformed consumers’ reservation price for the entrant’s product. Consumers are 
risk neutral. Consumers maximize their expected utility and will buy one unit of 
the products, provided that the expected utility from the purchase is nonnegative.  
Entry is costless, returns to scale are constant, and the entrant’s product is 
known to be at least as good as that of the incumbent17. Therefore, the entrant is 
assumed to face only informational disadvantage vis-à-vis the incumbent. Firms 
have constant marginal costs. The marginal cost of producing a low quality 
product is , whereas the marginal cost of producing a high quality product is 
, with . We also assume 
Lc
Hc 0>> LH cc 0>−>− LLHH cUcU . That is, higher 
quality generates a higher surplus, and thus high quality is more efficient than low 
quality. 
Qualities and costs are unalterable during the game. The firms compete by 
simultaneously choosing prices  and  which cannot be changed. The 
prices charged by the entrant with product quality of either 
EP IP
L  or H  are denoted 
by  and , respectively. With regard to the incumbent, its prices 
can be defined based on the settings. In setting I, since the incumbent does not 
observe the entrant’s quality,  is independent of the entrant’s quality. However, 
the incumbent is informed of the entrant’s quality in setting II, hence the 
incumbent’s prices could depend on the entrant’s quality. Here, we use  to 
represent the incumbent’s price strategy when facing an entrant of low quality, and 
)(LP E )(HP E
IP
)(LP I
                                                        
17 These are the “pro-entry” assumptions (see Bagwell 1990) 
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)(HP I  to represent the price charged by the incumbent when faced with an 
entrant of high quality.  
Accordingly, we can define profits in these two settings. In setting I, if the 
entrant sells a high quality product, then the profits for the incumbent and 
potential entrant are denoted by ( )( )HPP EIHI ,π , ( )( )HPP EIHE ,π , respectively; if 
the entrant sells a low quality product, then their corresponding profits are denoted 
by ( )( )LPP EILI ,π , ( )( LPP EILE ,π ) , respectively. Similarly, in setting II, we define 
( ) ( )( HPHP EIHI ,π )  to be the incumbent’s profit when it charges  and the 
entrant with quality of 
)(HP I
H  charges . , )(HP E ( ) ( )( )LPLP EILI ,π
( ) ( )( )HPHP EIHE ,π , ( ) ( )( LPLP EILE ,π ) are defined analogously. 
Consumers receive information . Consumers’ beliefs after having 
observed the price pair are denoted by 
),( EI PP
( )EI PPb , , which is the probability 
attached to the event that the entrant’ s quality is H 18. In setting I, consumers 
beliefs will not vary with the incumbent’s prices since the incumbent does not 
observe the entrant’s quality and thus its price cannot convey any information 
about the entrant’s quality to uninformed consumers. In setting II, the incumbent 
possesses information regarding the entrant’s quality choice and this is common 
knowledge. Thus, unlike in setting I, the consumers’ posterior beliefs have to be 
adapted to this change. The uninformed consumers would revise their beliefs after 
observing either the entrant’s or the incumbent’s price. 
The game proceeds as follows. Firstly, Nature selects the quality of the potential 
                                                        
18 The consumers’ belief is independent of incumbent’s price in setting I while it would be updated on the 
incumbent’s price in setting II. 
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entrant which is assumed to be known by the entrant itself as well as by some 
consumers. The incumbent may or may not be informed. Secondly, the incumbent 
and potential entrant simultaneously set their prices that are observed by the 
consumers. Thirdly, consumers, who are perfectly informed about the quality of 
the incumbent, but may be uncertain about the quality of the entrant, form their 
beliefs about the entrant’s quality after observing the prices, and decide whether to 
buy and if so, which firm to buy from. 
 
2.3.1 Full information benchmark 
Suppose consumers perfectly know the product quality of both firms. Our static 
equilibrium concept is then simply a Nash equilibrium in prices. Each firm 
chooses a price to maximize its profit, given the other firm’s price strategy.  
Following Bagwell (1990), in the next two propositions, we will say that a firm 
enters the market if the entrant captures a positive share of the market. Conversely, 
entry deterrence occurs if the incumbent is able to prevent the entrant from 
sharing the market19. Note all proofs are in the appendix. 
 
Proposition 1. Consider the static, complete information game. 
1. If , then in any static equilibrium, the Betrand competition outcome 
obtains: 
Lq =
( ) ( )LPcLP ELI ∗∗ == . Market shares of L  and the incumbent are 
undetermined since consumers are indifferent between the two firms.  
                                                        
19 Strictly speaking, entry would always occur because we assume that the cost of entry is zero. 
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2. If , then the unique static equilibrium prices are , 
. 
Hq = ( ) LI cHP =∗
( ) LLHE cUUHP +−=∗ H  enters and wins the whole market. 
 
2.3.2 Incomplete information 
Separating equilibria 
In the ensuing analysis, we restrict our attention to pure strategy equilibria. The 
notion of perfect Bayesian equilibrium by Fudenberg and Tirole (1991) is used to 
determine the pure strategy equilibria. In our static game, a combination of firms’ 
price strategies and consumers’ beliefs ( ) { }{ }LHqPPbqPqP EIEI ,),,(),(, ∈∗∗  with 
consumers’ strategies as to whether to make a purchase, and if so, which firm to 
purchase from conditional on  constitutes a perfect Bayesian equilibrium 
if each player’s strategy maximizes his payoff, given the equilibrium strategies of 
other players and consumers’ beliefs, and consumers’ beliefs on the equilibrium 
path are consistent with Bayes’ rule and the firms’ price strategies. 
),( EI PP
Formally, the necessary conditions for an equilibrium under incomplete 
information settings are summarized as follows:  
Each firm sets prices to maximize its profit, given the equilibrium strategies of 
its rival and consumers’ behavior. 
If the incumbent cannot observe the quality of the potential entrant (setting I), 
then  
( )( ) ( ) ( )( )LPPHPPP EILIEIHII ∗∗∗ −+∈ ,1,maxarg πθθπ  
( ) ( )( )LPPLP EILEE ,maxarg ∗∗ ∈ π  
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( ) ( )( )HPPHP EIHEE ,maxarg ∗∗ ∈ π  
And if the incumbent can observe the quality of the potential entrant (setting II), 
then 
( ) ( ) ( )( )LPLPLP EILII ∗∗ ∈ ,maxarg π  
( ) ( ) ( )( )HPHPHP EIHII ∗∗ ∈ ,maxarg π  
( ) ( ) ( )( )LPLPLP EILEE ,maxarg ∗∗ ∈ π  
( ) ( ) ( )( )HPHPHP EIHEE ,maxarg ∗∗ ∈ π  
Consumers maximize their expected utility given their beliefs. If the consumers 
are uninformed, then their expected utilities of purchasing from the incumbent, 
purchasing from the potential entrant, and not purchasing are , ILIL PUPV −=)(
( ) ( )( ) EbELEIEHEI PUPVPPbPVPPb −=−+ )(,1)(, 20, and 0, respectively. And if 
the consumers are informed, then their utilities of buying from the incumbent, the 
low quality entrant, the high quality entrant, and not buying are , 
, 
ILIL PUPV −=)(
( )L E L EV P U P= − ( )H E HV P U P= − E , and 0, respectively. 
Consumers’ beliefs on the equilibrium path satisfy Bayes’ rule. In setting I, only 
the entrant’s price can affect consumers’ beliefs21. In an equilibrium, Bayes’ rule 
requires beliefs along the equilibrium path satisfy the following conditions:  
1. if , then ( ) ( )LPHP EE ∗∗ ≠ ( )( ) 1, =∗∗ HPPb EI  and ( )( ) 0, =∗∗ LPPb EI . 
2. if , then ( ) ( )E EP H P L P∗ ∗= = E∗ ( ) θ=∗∗ EI PPb , . 
However, in setting II, the entrant’s quality is assumed to be observable to the 
                                                        
20 ( )( ) 1 ( ) (1 )H E L E H L E bb U P b U P bU b U P U P− + − − = + − − = − E  
21 The incumbent and consumers have exactly the same information, so that in order to rule out implausible 
outcomes, one must require that incumbent’s price cannot affect consumers’ beliefs. This is the 
‘no-signaling-what-you-don’t-know’ condition of perfect Bayesian equilibrium: a player’s deviation should 
not signal information that he himself does not have (see Fudenberg and Tirole, 1991). This condition is 
implied by the consistency requirement of the sequential equilibrium concept of Kreps and Wilson (1982). 
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incumbent as well. This situation gives rise to signaling with common information: 
at least one of the firms’ prices fully signals the actual quality of the entrant to 
uninformed consumers. Separating equilibria occur whenever 
( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( )HPHPLPLP EIEI ∗∗∗∗ ≠ ,, . That is, if ( ) ( )LPHP II ∗∗ ≠  or , 
then 
( ) ( )LPHP EE ∗∗ ≠
( ) ( )( ) 1, =∗∗ HPHPb EI  and ( ) ( )( ) 0, =∗∗ LPLPb EI . Following Bagwell and 
Ramey (1991) in their limit-pricing model with multiple incumbents, this 
definition implies two sorts of separating equilibria: 
One sort of equilibria has ( ) ( )LPHP II ∗∗ ≠ , ( ) ( )LPHP EE ∗∗ ≠ , thus consumers 
learn the entrant’s quality by observing either the incumbent’s price or the 
entrant’s. The other sort of equilibria arises with ( ) ( )LPHP II ∗∗ = , , 
or 
( ) ( )LPHP EE ∗∗ ≠
( ) ( )LPHP II ∗∗ ≠ , ( ) ( )LPHP EE ∗∗ = . In such kind of equilibria, consumers learn 
the entrant’s quality by observing one of the firms’ separating prices.  
In a pooling equilibrium, ( ) ( ) ∗∗∗ == III PLPHP  and ( ) ( ) ∗∗∗ == EEE PLPHP , then 
consumers will revert to their prior beliefs, that is, ( ) θ=∗∗ EI PPb , . The concept 
places no restrictions on beliefs for price combinations off the equilibrium path. 
 
Analysis of setting I 
The equilibrium analysis with all consumers uninformed of the entrant’s quality, 
has been done by Bagwell (1990), and his results are presented in proposition 2. 
 
Proposition 2. Consider the incomplete information game with ( )1,0∈θ , 
1. there exists a separating equilibrium in which L  may or may not enter to 
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share the market with the incumbent, the entry of H  is deterred, and 
, , LI cP =∗ ( ) LE cLP =∗ ( ) LLHE cUUHP +−=∗ . The beliefs on and off 
equilibrium path are given as follows: ( )( ) 1, =∗ HPPb EI , ( )( ) 0, =∗ LPPb EI  for 
all ; IP ( ) 0, =∗ EI PPb  for all ( )E EP P H∗≠ . 
2. pooling equilibria exist only if LLH cUcU −≥−θ 22,  
1) if the incumbent captures the whole market; this class of equilibria is 
characterized by , LI cP =∗ ( ) ( ) LLEEE cUULPHPP +−=== ∗∗∗ θ , with 
beliefs on and off equilibrium path specified as in the following: 
( ),I Eb P P θ∗ =  for all ; IP ( ) 0, =∗ EI PPb  for all E EP P∗≠ . 
2) if the incumbent loses the entire market; this class of equilibrium is 
characterized by  , and 
. The beliefs on and off equilibrium path are given in 
the below: 
∗∗ ≤≤ EIL PPc , LLEH cUUPc +−≤≤ ∗ θ
( ) ( )LPHPP EEE ∗∗∗ ==
( ),I Eb P P θ∗ =  for all ; IP ( ) 0, =∗ EI PPb  for all ∗≠ EE PP  
 
Now consider our setting I. Here note our setting I is similar to Bagwell’s. The 
only difference is that we assume some consumers are informed of the entrant’s 
quality and the informed consumers always buy from the entrant in the 
equilibrium if the entrant sells a high quality product.  
In the following propositions throughout the paper, we will say informational 
product differentiation acts as a barrier to entry if the potential entrant of either 
quality type earns a lower profit with incomplete information than with full 
                                                        
22 If H LU c U cθ − < − L , then pooling equilibria do not exist in this static game (see Bagwell, 1990). 
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information. Conversely, incomplete information does not act as barrier to entry if 
the resulting profit of the potential entrant with incomplete information is higher 
than its profit with full information. 
 
Proposition 3. Consider the above incomplete information game with ( )1,0∈θ , 
1. there exists a separating equilibrium in which  , , 
. 
LI cP =∗ ( ) LE cLP =∗
( ) LLHE cUUHP +−=∗ L  may or may not enter to share the market with the 
incumbent; H  can only attract the informed consumers. In the full 
information benchmark, H wins the whole market. Thus its profit with 
incomplete information is lower than that with full information. Therefore, 
informational product differentiation acts as a barrier to the entry of H . The 
beliefs on and off equilibrium path are given below: ( )( ) 1, =∗ HPPb EI , 
( )( ) 0, =∗ LPPb EI  for all ; IP ( ) 0, =∗ EI PPb  for , ( )HPP EE ∗<
( ) [ ]1,0, ∈∗ EI PPb  for ( )HPP EE ∗> . 
2. pooling equilibria exist if LLH cUcU −≥−θ ,  
1) suppose all consumers are uninformed and if the incumbent captures the 
whole market; this class of equilibria is characterized by , 
, with beliefs on and off equilibrium path 
specified as follows: 
LI cP =∗
( ) ( ) LLEEE cUULPHPP +−=== ∗∗∗ θ
( ),I Eb P P θ∗ =  for all ; IP ( ) 0, =∗ EI PPb  for all 
. E EP P
∗≠
2) if the ratio of informed to uninformed consumers is small enough. This class 
of equilibrium is characterized by  ∗∗ ≤≤ EIL PPc , H E Lc P U U cθ∗ L≤ ≤ − + , and 
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( ) ( )LPHPP EEE ∗∗∗ == . The incumbent loses the whole market in the case of the 
high quality entrant, but loses only all the uninformed consumers in the case 
of the low quality entrant. The beliefs on and off equilibrium path are given in 
the below: ( ),I Eb P P θ∗ ∗ = ; ( ),I Eb P P θ∗ =  for all ; IP ( ) 0, =∗ EI PPb  for all 
 ∗≠ EE PP .
   
Analysis of setting II  
This section investigates setting II in which the incumbent knows the entrant’s 
quality, while some consumers are uninformed of the entrant’s quality. In this 
setting, the prices of both firms can signal to consumers the entrant’s actual quality. 
In a separating equilibrium, at least one of the two firms’ prices fully informs 
consumers of the entrant’s true quality. That is, if 
( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )(,I E I EP H P H P L P L∗ ∗ ∗ ∗≠ ), , then ( ) ( )( ) 1, =∗∗ HPHPb EI  and 
( ) ( )( ) 0, =∗∗ LPLPb EI . Such beliefs are consistent with Bayes’ rule along the 
equilibrium path. The concept imposes no restrictions for beliefs off the 
equilibrium path. 
As suggested by Bagwell and Ramey (1991) in their limit-pricing model with 
multiple incumbents, ‘free riding on the rival’s signal’ is a general problem when 
there is common information. de Bijl (1997) also argue when the two firms try to 
signal common information, the entrant can ‘free ride’ on the incumbent’s signal 
in a search goods model. This may result in unreasonable equilibria. In the 
example below, we will demonstrate that an equilibrium with both firms’ prices 
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separating is not reasonable because of this kind of informational free-riding23. 
 
Example. Free riding on the incumbent’s signal. 
Consider prices ( ) ( )LPHP II ∗∗ ≠ , ( ) ( )LPHP EE ∗∗ ≠ , ( ) ( ) LEI cLPLP == ∗∗ , 
, and HIL cHPc ≤< ∗ )( ( ) ( )HPUHPU EHIL ∗∗ −=− . Also assume all consumers 
buy from the entrant upon observing price pair ( ))),(( HPHP EI ∗∗ . We claim that 
the price strategies proposed above cannot be a perfect Bayesian equilibrium. To 
see this point, notice the assumption that consumers prefer H  to the incumbent 
when observing price combination ( ))),(( HPHP EI ∗∗ . Hence, given H  prices at 
 the incumbent would always have an incentive to reduce its price, win the 
whole market, and make a profit if 
( )HPE∗
( ) LI cHP >∗ . ( ) LI cHP >∗  must hold in the 
proposed equilibrium because ( ) ( )LPHP II ∗∗ ≠  and ( ) LI cHP <∗  are dominated 
strategies. As a consequence, the proposed price strategies cannot form a perfect 
Bayesian equilibrium under the assumption that all the consumers make a 
purchase with the entrant upon observing price pair ( ))),(( HPHP EI ∗∗ . 
Now consider the price strategies proposed above again. That is, prices 
strategies , ( ) ( )LPHP II ∗∗ ≠ ( ) ( )LPHP EE ∗∗ ≠ , ( ) ( ) LEI cLPLP == ∗∗ , 
, and HIL cHPc ≤< ∗ )( ( ) ( )HPUHPU EHIL ∗∗ −=− . But suppose that all the 
uninformed consumers buy from the incumbent, while all the informed consumers 
buy from H  when consumers observe the price pair . Beliefs 
on the equilibrium path are rational with 
( ))),(( HPHP EI ∗∗
( ) ( )( ) 1, =∗∗ HPHPb EI , and 
                                                        
23 In a similar model with the product differentiated vertically and horizontally, we find an equilibrium in 
which both firms choosing difference prices. Further, this is only equilibrium which survives the intuitive 
criterion and unprejudiced refinement in that setting. 
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( ) ( )( ) 0, =∗∗ LPLPb EI . We then show that when the proportion of informed 
consumers is small enough, the above proposed price strategies can be supported 
to be an equilibrium profile with unreasonable beliefs. 
 




( )I LP L c∗ =
( )E LP L c∗ = EP  
Figure 2.1 A separating equilibrium  
 
We first check the entrant H  would not deviate with beliefs specified as in the 
following analysis. Given the incumbent’s equilibrium price of , a 
deviation to any price above 
( )HPI∗
( )HPE∗  makes H  lose all the informed and 
uninformed consumers, and thus such a deviation is not desirable. A deviation to 
any price below  is unprofitable as well if we exploit the arbitrariness of 
beliefs for out of equilibrium prices and impose 
( )HPE∗
( )( ) 0, =∗ EI PHPb  for 
( )HPPc EEH ∗<≤ 24. In other words, if H  lowers its price, the uninformed 
consumers would deduce that the entrant’s quality sells a low quality product. 
With this belief, all uninformed consumers would not buy from H  since 
                                                        
24 H will never deviate to any prices less than Hc , which are dominated strategies. 
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( )L E L IU P U P H∗− ≤ − if 25HI cHP ≤∗ )( . Although all the informed consumers 
still buy from H , there is a loss of profit margin on the informed consumers 
which makes H  worse off. Therefore, H  would not deviate from its 
equilibrium price. Next, we turn to show L  has no incentive to deviate as well. 
Given , if we select extreme beliefs off the equilibrium path with ( ) LI cLP =∗
( )( ) 0, =∗ EI PLPb  for all , there is no profitable deviations available for EP L  
because  is ( ) LE cLP =∗ L ’s best response to ( ) LI cLP =∗  . Now we come to 
analyze the incumbent’s side. If the entrant is L , ( ) LE cLP =∗  and consumers 
have beliefs ( )( ) 0, =∗ LPPb EI  for all , the incumbent could not profitably 
deviate as 
IP
( ) LI cLP =∗  reflects the best price strategy to ( ) LE cLP =∗ ; and if the 
entrant is H , given  with consumers’ beliefs ( )HPE∗ ( )( ) 1, =∗ HPPb EI , for 
, and ( )LPP II ∗> ( )( ) 0, =∗ HPPb EI  if ( )LPP II ∗= , the incumbent cannot make a 
profitable deviation as well. This is because all the informed and uninformed 
consumers would not purchase from the incumbent if ( )HPP II ∗>  and a deviant 
price , with IP ( ) ( )HPPLP III ∗∗ <<  would increase the incumbent’s profit by 
winning all the informed consumers, but reduce the incumbent’s profit margin on 
uninformed consumers. Thus, if the proportion of informed consumers are very 
small, in particular, if all the consumers are uninformed, the former effect is 
dominated by the latter such that the incumbent would not decrease its price to 
, with . Lastly, a price deviation to  makes the 
uninformed consumers believe the entrant sells a low quality product, all the 
IP ( ) ( )HPPLP III ∗∗ << ( )LPP II ∗=
                                                        
25 Otherwise it is possible that  could profitably deviate to a price H EP , where  with the 
purpose of mimicking a low quality entrant, and win all uninformed consumers. 
( , ( ))E H IP c P H
∗∈
                    
34 
informed and uninformed consumers will buy from the incumbent, but the 
incumbent makes zero profit. We thus have verified that no firms can make a 
profitable deviation from their equilibrium strategies given consumers beliefs. 
Accordingly, we can make a conclusion that prices ( ) (LPHP II ∗∗ ≠ ) , and 
, ( ) ( )LPHP EE ∗∗ ≠ ( ) ( ) LEI cLPLP == ∗∗ ,  
 constitutes an equilibrium when the proportion of the 
informed consumer is small enough. The beliefs on and off equilibrium path are 
constructed as follows: 
HIL cHPc ≤< ∗ )( ,
( ) ( )HPUUHP ILHE ∗∗ +−=
( )( ) 0, =∗ EI PHPb  for  , and ( )HPP EE ∗<
( )( ) 1, =∗ EI PHPb  for ( )HPP EE ∗≥ ; ( )( ) 0, =∗ EI PLPb  for all ; EP
( )( ) 0, =∗ LPPb EI  for all , and IP ( )( ) 1, =∗ HPPb EI  for . In such an 
equilibrium, the incumbent can save the whole uninformed consumers and profit 
when the entrant is of high quality. Consequently, one might conclude that 
possessing more information could make the incumbent better off. 
( )LPP II ∗>
However, the beliefs supporting the equilibrium above are problematic. Recall 
that we assume that it is common knowledge that both the entrant and consumers 
know the incumbent is informed of the entrant’s actual quality. Following Bagwell 
and Ramey (1991), an equilibrium with both prices separating implies that 
consumers can learn the entrant’s quality by observing either the incumbent’s or 
the entrant’s prices. Since ( ) ( )LPHP II ∗∗ ≠ , the incumbent’s price remains to be a 
signal of the entrant’s quality type if the entrant deviates. Therefore, the price 
combination  should make consumers deduce that the entrant sells a 
high quality product, i.e., 
)),(( EI PHP
∗
( )( ) 1, =∗ EI PHPb . The key insight here is that 
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consumers can rationalize observation of the price combination  
with either the hypothesis that entrant is 
)),(( EI PHP
∗
H  and a single deviation occurs or the 
hypothesis that the entrant is L  and two deviations occur. Provided that the 
consumers favor the rationalization that requires the fewest number of deviations, 
the price combination  must be associated with the entrant selling a 
high quality product. Under this interpretation, the entrant can ‘free ride’ on the 




H  deviates to a price ( )HPP EE ∗< , the uninformed consumers, who have the 
beliefs the entrant is indeed H , would prefer to buy from the entrant since 
26( ) EHIL PUHPU −<− ∗  . Although H  makes a loss on the informed consumers 
owning to the decreased profit margin, it gains on the uninformed consumers. 
Further, the former effect is dominated by the latter since the proportion of 
informed consumers is very small. Therefore, the entrant H  is able to make a 
profit by slightly decreasing its price, and capturing the whole market. As such, 
the equilibrium proposed above fails. 
The example above illustrates that further refinement may be needed to support 
a unique perfect Bayesian equilibrium when coming to the issue of signaling 
common information. Bagwell and Ramey (1991) formulate a criterion on beliefs 
in an oligopoly limiting price model, where the two incumbent possess 
information regarding production costs that is unobservable to the potential 
                                                        
∗26 Note that  in the proposed equilibrium. ( ) ( )L I H EU P H U P H∗− = −
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entrant27. de Bijl (1997) makes an equivalent formulation of their criterion in a 
search goods model, where the informed incumbent and the entrant signal the 
entrant’s quality to consumers. In the rest of this chapter, we adopt their criterion 
on the belief restrictions, i.e., beliefs in a perfect Bayesian equilibrium have to 
satisfy their criterion for signaling games with common information. However, 
their definitions have to be adapted to our framework. 
 
Definition. Consider an equilibrium with prices ( )qPI∗  and , . 
Let  be a price pair off the equilibrium path.  
( )qPE∗ { }HLq ,∈
( EI PP , )
1) If , [ ]LLI UcP ,∈ [ ]HLE UcP ,∈ , and there exists a  or ( )I IP P L∗=
( )E EP P L∗= , then 0),( =EI PPb 28. 
2) If , [ ]LLI UcP ,∈ [ ]HHE UcP ,∈ , and there exists a  or ( )I IP P H∗=
                                                        
) )27 Suppose  is a disequilibrium price pair in that ( ,I EP P ( ) ( ) (( ), ,I E I EP P P q P q∗ ∗≠  where { },q L H∈ . 
Let ( )N q  denote the number of deviations required to generate ( ),I EP P  if the entrant is of type . Thus q
( )N q  takes value one if there exists a  or , or value two if  and 
. With this we say that beliefs are unprejudiced if for any disequilibrium price pair , 
( )I IP P q∗= ( )E EP P q∗= ( )I IP P q∗≠
( )E EP P q∗≠ ( ),I EP P
( )( , ) 1 0I Eb P P =  if and only if ( ) ( )N H N L< ( ( ) ( )N H N L> ); and ( )( , ) 0,1I Eb P P ∈  if . 
(consumers should not be ‘prejudiced’ in believing that any deviation is infinitely more likely than any 
other).This belief restriction has two effects. First, a minimality rule is implied whereby the consumer is 
required to believe that the entrant is of the type that rationalized the deviant price pair with fewest deviations. 
Second, a further restriction is implied when the number of deviations required to rationalize a deviant price 
pair is the same for the entrant of either type, i.e., 
( ) ( )N H N L=
( ) ( )N H N L= . In this case, the consumer is required to 
exhibit open-mindedness, by not believing that either quality is certain, allowing  (see 
Bagwell and Ramey 1991). Unprejudiced sequential equilibrium: a perfect Bayesian equilibrium with beliefs 
off the equilibrium path unprejudiced. 
( )( , ) 0,1I Eb P P ∈
28 Note that the most basic refinement of equilibria requires that beliefs should put no weight on dominated 
strategies. Since pricing below marginal cost is a dominated strategy, a price below the unit cost of producing 
high quality will be assumed to be a signal of low quality. Likewise, firms producing high quality product will 
not deviate to pricing above consumers’ reservation value for high quality as consumers expect negative 
surplus from purchase and choose not to buy. However, it may be possible that firms producing a low quality 
product charges above consumers’ reservation value for that quality because consumers are uncertain about 
the product quality of the potential entrant and thus the entrant of low quality can pretend to be of high quality. 
Therefore, the following range restrictions will be adopted in our static game, [ ],I L LP c U∈ , 
( ) [ ],E L HP L c U∈ (, . ) [ ],E H HP H c U∈
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( )E EP P H∗= , then 1),( =EI PPb .  
3) If ( )I IP P L∗=  and ( )E EP P H∗= , then ( ) ( )( ) )1,0(, ∈∗∗ HPLPb EI ; and if 
 and ( )I IP P H∗= ( )E EP P L∗= , then ( ) ( )( ) )1,0(, ∈∗∗ LPHPb EI . 
 
This definition explicitly takes in account the nature of signaling common 
information in our setting. A direct application of this refinement to the above 
example results in consumers beliefs, ( )( ),I Eb P H P∗ 1=  upon observing an 
equilibrium price  and a deviating price . With such beliefs out of the 




Next consider the full information equilibrium outcome with 
; ,( ) ( )LPcLP ELI ∗∗ == ( ) LI cHP =∗ ( ) LLHE cUUHP +−=∗ , and L  may or may 
not enter, while H  enters and capture the whole market. We show this outcome 
is not attainable in this setting where the two firms signal common information 
regarding the entrant’s quality. This is because the incumbent pools and separation 
occurs due to  in the equilibrium. Therefore, the informational 
free riding is impossible for the entrant and thus unprejudiced beliefs have no 
force. In other words, the entrant is not able to make use of the incumbent’s 
equilibrium strategy. Suppose after observing 
( ) ( )LPHP EE ∗∗ ≠
( ) LLHE cUUHP +−=∗ , all the 
informed consumers will buy from H . But all the uninformed consumers do not 
know the entrant’s quality. If upon observing ( ) LLHE cUUHP +−=∗ , 
, the uninformed consumers reason the entrant is  ( ) LI cHP =∗ H  and make a 
purchase. It is easy for L  to mimic as ( )I L IP L c P H∗ ∗= = ( )  and the 
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incumbent’s price cannot reveal any information regarding the entrant’s quality. 
L  would always imitate since doing so makes it get all the uninformed 
consumers at a price above its marginal cost and make a positive profit. In fact, as 
long as H  attracts all the uninformed consumers by charging a price above , 
it is always desirable for 
Hc
L  to mimic. As such, H  only wins all informed 
consumers and we cannot achieve the full information equilibrium outcome where 
H  gets the entire market. 
 
Proposition 4. Consider the incomplete information game with ( 1,0∈ )θ , there 
exist two separating equilibria:  
1. there exists a separating equilibrium in which the incumbent’s price is 
uninformative about the entrant’s quality, ( ) ( ) LII cLPHP == ∗∗ , and , 
. 
( ) LE cLP =∗
( ) LLHE cUUHP +−=∗ L  may or may not attract the uninformed consumers 
and makes zero profit, H  keeps all the informed consumers, but all the 
uninformed consumers would not buy from H . The profit of H  in this 
equilibrium is lower than that in the full information equilibrium. Thus incomplete 
information serves as a barrier to entry for H , The beliefs on and off equilibrium 
path are given below: ( )( ) 1, =∗ HPPb EI , ( )( ) 0, =∗ LPPb EI  for all ; IP
( ) 0, =∗ EI PPb  for , ( )HPP EE ∗< ( ) [ ]1,0, ∈∗ EI PPb   for ( )HPP EE ∗> . 
2. there exists a separating equilibrium in which ( ) LLHI cUULP +−=∗ , 
,  and ( ) LI cHP =∗ ( ) ( ) LLHEE cUULPHP +−== ∗∗ , and the proportion of 
informed consumers is small enough. If the entrant is H , it captures the whole 
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market; and if the entrant is L , it attracts all the uninformed consumers but loses 
all the informed consumers to the incumbent. The profit of H  in this equilibrium 
is the same as in the complete information outcome, while the profit of L  in this 
equilibrium is higher than the full information outcome. Thus incomplete 
information is not able to discourage an entry for H . Rather, incomplete 
information facilitates an entry for L . The equilibrium and disequilibrium beliefs 
are specified in the following: ( ) 0),( =∗ EI PLPb , for all ; 
for ; or 
EP ( ) 1),( =∗ EI PHPb  
HE cP ≥ ( ) 0),( =∗ EI PHPb  f HE cP < ; ( ) 1, =∗EI PPb  for ; 
and 
( )LPP II ∗<
( ) 0, =∗EI PPb  for ( )LPP II ∗≥ . 
 
In a pooling equilibrium, ( ) ( )LPHPP III ∗∗∗ ==  and . 
According to Bayes’ rule, prices of both the incumbent and entrant are 
uninformative about the entrant’ quality type, then consumers will revert to their 
prior beliefs, that is, 
( ) ( )LPHPP EEE ∗∗∗ ==
( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( ) θ== ∗∗∗∗ LPLPbHPHPb EIEI ,, . Note that in our 
static game, it must be satisfied that  since HE cP ≥∗ HE cP <  is dominated for 
H . 
 
Proposition 5. Consider the incomplete information game with ( 1,0∈ )θ ,  
pooling equilibria exist only if LLH cUcU −≥−θ  
1. suppose all the consumers are uninformed and if the incumbent captures the 
whole market; this class of equilibria is characterized by , 
, with beliefs specified as follows: 
LI cP =∗
( ) ( ) LLEEE cUULPHPP +−=== ∗∗∗ θ
                    
40 
( )( ) ( )( ) ( ) θ=== ∗∗∗ EIEIEI PPbLPPbHPPb ,,,  for all ; IP ( ) 0, =∗ EI PPb  for all 
 E EP P
∗≠
2. suppose all the consumers are uninformed and if the incumbent captures the 
whole market; this class of equilibria is characterized by 
, ( ) ( ) LIII cLPHPP === ∗∗∗ ( ) ( )E E E H LP P H P L U U c∗ ∗ ∗ L= = = − + , with the 
consumers’ beliefs on and off the equilibrium path specified as follows:  
( ),I Eb P P θ∗ ∗ = ; ( ),I Eb P P∗ 1=  for all ; I LP c> ( ),I Eb P P∗ 0=  for all E EP P∗< ; 
( ),I Eb P P θ∗ ≤  for all E EP P∗≥ . 
3. if the ratio of informed to uninformed consumers is small enough, and the 
incumbent loses the all the uninformed consumers and informed consumers if 
the entrant is H , but win all the informed consumer if the entrant is L ; this 
class of equilibrium is characterized by c , ∗∗ ≤≤ EIL PP
H E Lc P U U cθ
∗< ≤ − + L , where ( ) (LPHPP III ∗∗∗ == )  and 
. The beliefs on and off equilibrium path are given in the 
below: 
( ) ( )LPHPP EEE ∗∗∗ ==
( ),I Eb P P θ∗ ∗ = ; ( ),I Eb P P θ∗ =  for all ; IP ( ),I Eb P P∗ = 0  for all 
. E EP P
∗≠
 
Notice this condition LLH cUcU −≥−θ  must hold for the existence of 
pooling equilibria. In other words, a pooling entrant must give higher expected 
utility than does the incumbent. Otherwise, the uninformed consumers would not 
buy from the entrant. This is equivalent to requiring HLL ccUU ≥+−θ .  The 
reasoning for this requirement is that the entrant cannot credibly pool at any price 
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below  which is dominated for Hc H . In the meantime, the incumbent will price 
as low as  to save the market. Thus the premium the entrant can charge is 
29
Lc
LUU −θ . Therefore, pooling equilibria exist only if HLL ccUU ≥+−θ  is 
satisfied. 
 
2.3.3 Comparison of these two settings 
By comparing settings I and II, we can assess whether the incumbent benefits 
from knowing the entrant’s quality (and the entrant and consumers knowing that 
the incumbent knows, and so forth). If one considers separating equilibria, there 
exists an additional equilibrium when the ratio of informed to uninformed 
consumers is small enough in setting II. In this equilibrium, if the entrant sells a 
high quality product, it wins all consumers, and if the entrant sells a low quality 
product, it still wins all the uninformed consumers, while all the informed 
consumers buy from the incumbent. The entrant of either high or low quality 
enters the market and makes a positive profit. Since in setting I, the entrant of high 
quality cannot capture the uninformed consumers in the equilibrium, an informed 
incumbent may help the high quality entrant enter. In addition, in this equilibrium, 
both the incumbent and entrant make a positive profit when the entrant sells a low 
quality product. If the entrant sells a high quality product, the entrant is better off 
while the incumbent is not worse off. In setting II, there exists one more pooling 
equilibrium without entry. This is due to the large degree of freedom in choosing 
                                                        
29 Consumers are risk neutral.  
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beliefs out of equilibrium path. The results of the analysis imply that the 
incumbent may benefit from observing the entrant’s quality when there exist some 
consumers informed of the entrant’s quality30. Further, the entrant of either high or 
low quality would be better off. The reasoning behind this is that the entrant, 
knowing that the incumbent can observe its type and that consumers realize this, 
has less difficulty in convincing consumers of high quality. When the incumbent’s 
equilibrium prices are separating, consumers will rely on the incumbent’s 
equilibrium prices to infer the entrant’s quality. This is implied by the equilibrium 
concept under signaling common information setting 
 
2.4 Conclusions 
In this paper, I extend the static model by Kyle Bagwell (1990) by assuming that 
the incumbent and some consumers are informed of the entrant’s quality rather 
than in Kyle Bagwell’s case where the incumbent and consumers are uninformed 
of the entrant’s quality. In our case, where the incumbent is informed of the 
entrant’s quality, the situation arises where two firms, i.e., the incumbent and the 
entrant, signal common information regarding the entrant’s unobservable quality 
to uninformed consumers. We find that when some consumers are informed of the 
entrant’s quality, the separating equilibrium proposed by Kyle Bagwell (1990) still 
exists except that the high quality entrant grabs all the informed consumers. The 
entrant’s high price signals its high quality. However, entry deterrence still occurs. 
                                                        
30 Implicitly, we assume that the incumbent cannot buy the entrant’s product and that the consumer 
communicates with the incumbent. Presumably, the entrant would be worse off if its type were known to the 
incumbent (see Bagwell 1990 p.210, footnote 4). 
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This is because the high quality entrant can attract all consumers in the full 
information benchmark as high quality generates a higher surplus. Therefore, its 
profit with incomplete information is lower than that with full information. With 
regards to the pooling equilibria, the presence of some consumers informed of the 
entrant’ quality eliminates one of the pooling equilibria by Kyle Bagwell (1990), 
where the incumbent captures the whole market or all the uninformed consumers. 
The reasoning for the elimination of this pooling equilibrium is that to save the 
whole market, the low quality incumbent has to price as low as its marginal cost. 
However, our assumption that high quality generates a higher surplus than low 
quality implies that the high quality entrant can at least attract all the informed 
consumers by setting a price slightly higher than its marginal cost. In the 
meantime, note that in this pooling equilibrium, the entrant sets a higher price, but 
the incumbent prices at marginal cost, so if the entrant is L , the incumbent can 
raise its price below the entrant’s pooling price, attracting all the informed 
consumers and making a profit. Furthermore, the unique pooling equilibrium 
exists only when the proportion of informed consumers is small enough. In this 
unique pooling equilibrium, the incumbent will still have all the informed 
consumers in case of the low quality entrant and lose the all the informed and 
uninformed consumer in case of the high quality entrant. This is different from 
that of Kyle Bagwell (1990). The reasoning for the unique existence of this 
pooling equilibrium is that a higher deviation price for the high quality entrant has 
two composing effects. On the one hand, the deviating price reduces the high 
                    
44 
quality entrant’s profit with regard to uninformed consumers. On the other hand, it 
raises the high quality entrant’s profit on informed consumers due to higher profit 
margin. If the ratio of informed to uninformed consumers is small enough, the 
high quality entrant would have no incentive to deviate from its equilibrium 
strategy. The same logic goes with the low quality entrant when it prices below the 
incumbent’s equilibrium price. Although it gains from the informed consumers, it 
makes a loss on the uninformed consumers. In this pooling equilibrium, the 
informed consumers should buy from the incumbent since its equilibrium price is 
lower than that of the low quality entrant. 
With the informed incumbent, we have one more separating equilibrium when 
the proportion of informed consumers is small enough. In this equilibrium, the 
incumbent charges a higher price when the entrant’s quality is relative low, and a 
lower price when the entrant’s quality is relatively high. Surprisingly, entry is 
facilitated as the entrant of either high or low quality in the incomplete 
information scenario obtains a higher profit than or at least an equal profit to the 
entrant in the full information benchmark. This result suggests that the high price 
of the incumbent signals low quality of the entrant while the low price of the 
incumbent signals high quality of the entrant. The rationale behind this 
equilibrium is that the entrant can make use of the incumbent’s knowledge of its 
quality. In addition, we have one more pooling equilibrium if all the consumers 
are uninformed. In this equilibrium, the entrant pools at a higher price and charge 
a premium as if the entrant is of high quality. This is in contrast with our result 
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from the previous setting where only the entrant knows its own quality. This 
additional pooling equilibrium results from the large degree of freedom in 
defining beliefs out of the equilibrium path with the informed incumbent. 
                                                                                  
Appendix A: Appendix for chapter 2 
A  Proofs 
Proof of Proposition 1 
Proof of 1. is straightforward. 
Proof of 2. We first show that no firms would deviate from their equilibrium 
prices. Given , then the best response for ( ) LI cHP =∗ H  is 
. A deviation to any price lower than 
 is unprofitable due to a loss on profit margin although 
( ) LLHE cUUHP +−=∗
( ) LLHE cUUHP +−=∗ H  
still gets the whole market. Likewise, a defection to any price higher than 
 is also unattractive since ( ) LLHE cUUHP +−=∗ H  ends up losing all 
consumers to the incumbent and makes zero profit. Now we turn to check the 
incumbent’s side. Given ( ) LLHE cUUHP +−=∗ , if the incumbent charges any 
price which is higher than ( ) LI cHP =∗ , no consumers will buy from it. Any price 
lower than ( ) LI cHP =∗  is a dominated strategy for the incumbent and makes the 
incumbent worse off . The incumbent will make a negative profit at that price if it 
saves the whole market. Therefore, the incumbent has no incentive to deviate from 
 as well. Therefore, the above proposed prices constitute an 
equilibrium. 
( ) LI cHP =∗
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Next, we show that the equilibrium prices ( ) LI cHP =∗ , ( ) LLHE cUUHP +−=∗  
are unique. Notice the assumption 0>−>− LLHH cUcU implies that 
. Thus, if the incumbent sets a price as low as  to 
save the market, 
HLLH ccUU >+− ( ) LI cHP =∗
H  can slightly decrease its price from ( ) LLHE cUUHP +−=∗ , 
win the whole market, and still make a positive profit as HLLH ccUU >+− .  
 
Proof of Proposition 2  
This proposition simply re-presents the results from Bagwell (1990) and thus its 
proof is omitted in our thesis. 
 
Proof of Proposition 3  
Proof of 1. Note that consumers are always indifferent between the incumbent 
and the entrant at the equilibrium prices, but we may require that only all the 
informed consumers buy from the entrant if the entrant sells a high quality product. 
That is, when all the uninformed consumers are indifferent between the incumbent 
and H , they purchase from the incumbent. We show these strategies and beliefs 
constitute an equilibrium. Now we verify that no firms have an incentive to 
deviate, given beliefs on and out of equilibrium path. We first show the entrant has 
no incentive to deviate. Given IP c
∗
L=  and the entrant sells a high quality 
product, a deviation to any price  with  makes all 
consumers believe that the entrant sells a high quality product. But at such a high 
price, consumers would expect less utility from purchasing with 
EP E H LP U U c> − + L
H  than with the 
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incumbent, thus H  is not able to makes sales. Hence, such a deviation is 
undesirable. And if H  deviates to a price such that H E H Lc P U U cL≤ < − + , all 
the uninformed consumers would believe the entrant sells a low quality product 
and will not buy from H  at such a price. With regard to informed consumers, 
they will still buy from H . However, this is not a profitable deviation because 
H  cannot attract all the uninformed consumers by a lower price but loses profit 
margin on all the informed consumers. Therefore, this deviation makes H  worse 
off and H  would prefer the equilibrium price. We then turn to L . Suppose L  
imitates H  by setting its price at ( ) LLHE cUUHP +−=∗ , then all the 
uninformed consumers perceive L  to be of high quality, but they will not buy 
from it. This is because we have presumed that all the uninformed consumers buy 
from incumbent when they are indifferent between the incumbent and the entrant. 
As for the informed consumers, they know the entrant actually sells a low quality 
product and thus will never buy from L  at such a high price. As such, L  makes 
zero profit and this deviation is not able to make it better off. A deviation to a 
price with ( )L E E H Lc P P H U U c∗ L< < = − +  is unattractive as well, since all the 
uninformed consumers would deduce that the entrant is L  and make no purchase 
from it at this price. Again at that price all the informed consumers will not buy 
from L  as well since they obtain more consumers’ surplus if they buy from the 
incumbent. Finally, a deviant price  is also unprofitable. At 
such a high price, the uninformed consumers would believe that the entrant sells a 
high quality product. But all the uninformed and informed consumers will not buy 
E H LP U U c> − + L
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from L  since the purchase with the incumbent will give consumers more surplus. 
To verify the incumbent has no profitable deviation as well, note that any prices 
below  are dominated strategies for the incumbent and thus the 
incumbent would never set a price lower than . If the incumbent deviates 
to a price higher than , it cannot be better off. Such a deviation will help 




( ) LE cLP =∗  if the entrant is L . And if the 
entrant is H , then H  would win all the informed and uninformed consumers at 
. All the informed consumers buy from the entrant due to a 
higher surplus from the purchase with 
( ) LLHE cUUHP +−=∗
H . With regard to all the uninformed 
consumers, they could infer that the entrant sells a high quality product from the 
entrant’s equilibrium prices and would expect a higher surplus from the purchase 
with H . As a result, such a deviation is undesirable too. Therefore, the incumbent 
has no incentive to deviate from its equilibrium price as well. 
We now check whether this equilibrium passes the Intuitive Criterion (Cho and 
Kreps 1987). Any price [ )HLE ccP ,∈  is equilibrium dominated for H , but not 
for L . Thus upon observing [ )HLE ccP ,∈  and , the uninformed consumers 
should believe the entrant sells a low quality product. This is consistent with the 
beliefs given above, i.e., 
∗
IP
( ) 0, =∗ EI PPb  for ( )HPP EE ∗< . As such, this 
equilibrium survives the Intuitive Criterion. 
Finally, we prove that the above proposed equilibrium is the only equilibrium of 
that type. First we show that ( ) LEI cLPP == ∗∗  is necessary for separation, 
observe that  is impossible. If ( )LPP EI ∗∗ ≠ ( )LPP EI ∗∗ < , then L  would undercut 
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if , and the incumbent would raise its price slightly if  (at least 
profit when the entrant is 
LI cP >∗ LI cP =∗
L  ). In the other case, if , then entrant 
would raise its price provided that 
( )LPP EI ∗∗ >
( ) LE ULP <∗ , and if , the 
incumbent would undercut 
( ) LE ULP =∗
L . Thus ( )LPP EI ∗∗ =  must hold. To show 
, suppose , then ( ) LEI cLPP == ∗∗ LI cP >∗ L  would undercut by pricing just 
below , which in turn gives the incumbent an incentive to deviate. Likewise, if 
, the incumbent would undercut by pricing just below , which 
in turn gives 
∗
IP
( ) LE cLP >∗ ( )LPE∗
L  an incentive to deviate. Second, we show that separation occurs 
when H  cannot sell anything to the uninformed consumers. Note that any prices 
with  are dominated strategies for ( )EP H c< H H . But for H  to separate and 
win the entire market, the no mimicking constraints for L  require H  set a price 
below  in the equilibrium, i.e., Lc ( ) HLE ccHP <<∗ . As a consequence, an 
equilibrium in which  and ( )E HP H c∗ ≥ H  wins the entire market cannot arise. 
Since all the uninformed consumers will buy from the incumbent in the 
equilibrium, consumers’ utility maximization requires that 
, i.e., ( )L I H EU P U P H∗ ∗− ≥ − ( )E H LP H U U PI∗ ∗≥ − + . To ensure that the 
incumbent has no incentive to deviate from  (to increase price) and all 
the informed consumers buy from 
LI cP =∗
H , the equality must hold, that is, 
.  ( ) LLHE cUUHP +−=∗
Proof of 2. The class of pooling equilibria listed in 1) is the same as in 
Bagwell’s and thus its proof is omitted here. 
We now prove the class of pooling equilibria listed in 2). Firstly, we verify that 
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each firm has no incentive to deviate from its equilibrium prices given the rival’s 
equilibrium prices strategies and consumers’ beliefs. Given , we 
first show 
∗∗ ≤≤ EIL PPc
H  would not deviate. Note that any prices below  are dominated 
for 
Hc
H . Under the construction of our belief system, any price different from  
would be a signal of low quality to all the uninformed consumers. Thus if 
∗
EP
LLE cUUP +−> θ , then the expected utility of buying from H  is , 
whereas the utility of buying from the incumbent . Since , 
 holds. In other words, the uninformed consumers obtain a 
higher expected utility from purchase with the incumbent than with the entrant. 
Therefore, all the uninformed consumers would not buy from 
EL PU −
∗− IL PU ∗∗ ≥> IEE PPP
∗−<− ILEL PUPU
H . Note that H  
captures the whole market from the incumbent in the equilibrium. Therefore, such 
a deviation would make H  lose a profit of ( ) ( )11E HP c x∗ − +  with regard to the 
uninformed consumers.  On the other hand, such a kind of deviation makes H  
benefit with regard to the informed consumers. The best possible deviation price is 
then to set . The resulting benefit is E H LP U U c= − + L
) )( (1H L L E xU U c P x∗− + − + . If the ratio of informed to uninformed consumers is 
small enough, the loss would outweigh the benefit. Consequently, H  would not 
deviate when the ratio of informed to uninformed consumers is small enough. 
Next, we come to L , when L  deviates to a price L Ec P cH≤ < , the uninformed 
consumers believe that it sells a low quality product. If , all the informed 
and uninformed consumers would not buy from 
∗> IE PP
L , and thus L  makes a loss; 
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and if , all the informed and uninformed consumers will buy from ∗<≤ IEL PPc
L . Thus, L  gains this amount of ( ) ( )1E L
xP c
x
− +  on the informed consumers 
since the incumbent keeps all the informed consumers when the entrant sells a low 
quality product in the equilibrium. In the meantime, L  makes a loss of 
( ) ( )11E EP P x∗ − +  on the uninformed consumers due to the lower profit margin. 
Since the ratio of informed to uninformed consumers is small enough, the gain 
would be not enough to compensate the loss. Therefore, such a deviation is not 
profitable. When L  defects to a price LLE cUUP +−> θ , L  will lose all the 
informed and uninformed consumers, thus making zero profit, but it earns a 
positive profit in the equilibrium since all the uninformed consumer would buy 
from L  at .  Hence, we conclude∗EP L  would not deviate as well when the 
ratio of informed to uninformed consumers is small enough. Lastly, we show that 
the incumbent has no incentive to deviate. Notice that any deviation price with 
 has no effect on consumers’ beliefs regarding the entrant’s type. Prices 
below  are dominated strategies for the incumbent. And if , the 
uninformed consumers would expect that  and will buy from 
entrant whatever quality the entrant has. If the consumers are informed, they 




ILE PUPU −>− ∗θ
L E LU P U P
∗− > − I  when the entrant is L  and 
H E LU P U P
∗− > − I  when the entrant is H . Hence, all the informed consumers 
would not buy from the incumbent as well. Therefore the incumbent earns zero 
profit at such a deviation price. But if the incumbent prices at , it makes zero IP
∗
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profit when the entrant is H  and a nonnegative profit when the entrant is L . 
Consequently, the incumbent would not deviate as well. This equilibrium passes 
the Intuitive Criterion too. For each type of the entrant, no prices are equilibrium 
dominated for one, but not for the other given the incumbent’s equilibrium price 
strategies. Therefore, the beliefs restrictions off the equilibrium path required by 
the Intuitive Criterion should have no force. As such, we say this equilibrium 
survives the Intuitive Criterion. 
Secondly, we prove that these are all the pooling equilibria where the incumbent 
is not able to successfully prohibit the entrant from selling his products to 
uninformed consumers. First note that . Note also that the existence of 
pooling equilibria requires that . We then show that  is a 
necessary condition. Suppose , then 
LI cP ≥∗
HE cP ≥∗ ∗∗ ≤ EI PP
∗∗ > EI PP L  has an incentive to raise its price 
regardless of the consumers’ beliefs, winning the entire market and increasing its 
profit. Lastly, we demonstrate that  is impossible. If 
 and the entrant sells a high quality product, the entrant can 
lose all the uninformed consumers, but may still win all the informed consumers if 
. But this is not profitable for 
LLE cUUP +−>∗ θ
LLE cUUP +−>∗ θ
E H LP U U c
∗ ≤ − + L H  since the proportion of 
uninformed consumers is large enough.   And if  and the 
entrant sells a low quality product, the entrant would lose all the informed and 
uninformed consumers, being worse off. At the same time, the incumbent win all 
the consumers by charging a price 
LLE cUUP +−>∗ θ
L Ec ε P ∗+ <  where ε  is a very small number. 
Therefore,  is necessary to prevent the incumbent from LLE cUUP +−≤∗ θ
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attracting the uninformed consumers and making a profitable deviation.  
 
Proof of Proposition 4  
Note that the first separating equilibrium obtained here is the same as the one 
we derive in the previous setting where we assume that the incumbent does not 
know the entrant’ quality. In this equilibrium, the incumbent charges the same 
price regardless of the entrant’s quality. Hence, the incumbent’s price cannot 
reveal any information to consumers regarding the entrant’s type. Proof of 1. is 
the same as in proposition 3 and thereby is omitted. 
Proof of 2. Firstly, we check no firms have an incentive to deviate. Assume that 
all the informed consumers buy from the incumbent whereas all the uninformed 
consumers purchase from the entrant if the entrant is L  and consumers are 
indifferent between the two firms. But if the entrant is H  and consumers are 
indifferent between H  and the incumbent, then all consumers will buy from H . 
We now verify that H  has no incentive to deviate. Given , and 
consumers beliefs  for ;  for 
 , A deviation to 
( ) LI cHP =∗
( ) 1),( =∗ EI PHPb HE cP ≥ ( ) 0),( =∗ EI PHPb
HE cP < ( ) LLHEE cUUHPP +−=> ∗  makes H  lose the whole 
market and all consumers buy from the incumbent. And if H  deviates to a price 
( ) LLHEEH cUUHPPc +−=<≤ ∗ , all the informed and uninformed consumers 
will still buy from H . But such a deviation is undesirable for H   because it 
lowers profit margin on the informed and uninformed consumers. And any prices 
 are dominated strategies for HE cP < H . Therefore, H  would not deviate from 
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its equilibrium price strategy. We then turn to check L  cannot make a profitable 
deviation as well given ( ) LLHI cUULP +−=∗  and consumers beliefs  
, for all . Suppose ( ) 0),( =∗ EI PLPb EP L  defects to 
, then ( ) LLHEE cUUHPP +−=> ∗ L  will lose all the informed and uninformed 
consumers. However, if L  keeps its equilibrium price level, it will captures all 
the uninformed consumers and make a positive profit. Therefore, this deviation 
makes L  worse off. A defection to ( ) LLHEE cUUHPP +−=< ∗  will enable L  
to win all the informed and uninformed consumers. L  gains with regard to the 
informed consumers by enlarging its market share, but loses with regard to the 
uninformed consumers due to lower profit margin. The loss on the uninformed 
consumer would exceed the gain on the informed consumers when the proportion 
of informed consumers is very small. Therefore, we verify that L  is not able to 
make a profitable deviation as well. Finally, we will check the incumbent’s side. If 
the entrant is L , given ( )E H LP L U U c∗ L= − +  and consumers beliefs 
construction ( ) 1, =∗EI PPb  for ( )LPP II ∗< ; and ( ) 0, =∗EI PPb  for , a 
deviation to  with 
( )LPP II ∗≥
IP ( ) ( )LPPHP III ∗∗ <<  makes all the uninformed consumers 
believe the entrant sells a high quality product and thus all the uninformed 
consumer will not buy from the incumbent. Further, it makes a loss on the 
informed consumers owning to the lower profit margin. Therefore, this is not a 
deviation of worth for the incumbent. If the incumbent deviates to a price 
,  it ends up losing the entire market even if the uninformed 
consumers have the belief that the entrant sells a low quality product. Therefore, 
( )I IP P L∗>
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such a deviation is not desirable as well because the incumbent makes a positive 
profit by attracting all the informed consumers at a price above it marginal cost. 
And if the entrant is H , a deviation to  with IP ( ) LPPHP III ∗∗ << ( )  makes all 
the uninformed consumers believe that the entrant sells a high quality and thus all 
the uninformed consumers will still buy from the entrant. Further, the incumbent 
will lose all the informed consumers. As a result, this deviation is not profitable. A 
deviant price with  makes all the uninformed consumers reason that 
the entrant sells a low quality product, but at such a price, the incumbent is not 
able to make sales to all the uninformed consumers. In addition, the informed 
consumers will keep buying from the high quality entrant, and thus no consumers 
would buy from it. Therefore, the incumbent would not deviate from its 
equilibrium strategy. Notice that for this equilibrium, there is no price strategies 
which is equilibrium dominated for one type of entrant, but not for the other type 
of entrant given the incumbent’s equilibrium price strategies. Thus, the Intuitive 
Criterion would place no restrictions on off-equilibrium-path price strategies. 
Accordingly, we can conclude that this equilibrium passes Intuitive Criterion 
refinement. 
( )I IP P L∗>
Secondly, we demonstrate that the equilibrium suggested above is the only 
equilibrium of this type. Consider prices ( ) ( )LPHP II ∗∗ ≠ , we first show that in 
such a separating equilibrium, ( )HPUHPU EHIL ∗∗ −=− )(  must hold. If 
, ( )HPUHPU EHIL ∗∗ −>− )( H  cannot sell anything, and the incumbent has a 
profitable deviation by slightly raising its price, given that H  sets price at 
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( )HPE∗ . And suppose ( )HPUHPU EHIL ∗∗ −<− )( , then there exists a price 
 such that  Since ( )HPP EE ∗> EHIL PUHPU −≤− ∗ )( . ( ) (LPHP II ∗∗ ≠ ) , the 
observation of the price vector ( ) ),( EI PHP∗  would make all the uninformed 
consumers believe the entrant is H , but not L . Therefore, according to our 
refinement criterion, , all the uninformed consumers would still 
buy from 
( ) 1),( =∗ EI PHPb
H  and H  raises its profit on all uninformed consumer. In addition, 
all the informed consumers will still buy from the entrant H  since consumers 
obtain a higher surplus from purchase with the entrant H  than with the 
incumbent. And H ’s profit increases due to the higher profit margin on the 
informed consumers. Consequently, H can deviate profitably by charging a 
relatively higher price than ( )HPE∗ , provided that the incumbent sets a price at 
.  ( )HPI∗
We then claim that , ( ) LI cHP =∗ ( ) LLHE cUUHP +−=∗ in this separating 
equilibrium. Suppose , then the incumbent has an incentive to prevent ( ) LI cHP >∗
H  from selling anything by slightly decreasing its price, provided that H  
prices at . This in turn gives ( )HPE∗ H  an incentive to undercut.  is 
dominated for the incumbent. Therefore, 
( ) LI cHP <∗
( ) LI cHP =∗ . Since 
 in such a separating equilibrium, it follows that 
 and all the informed and uninformed consumers buy from 
the entrant if the entrant sells a high quality product. 
( )HPUHPU EHIL ∗∗ −=− )(
( ) LLHE cUUHP +−=∗
Lastly, we show that ( ) ( )HPLP II ∗∗ >  and ( ) LLHI cUULP +−=∗  in the 
proposed equilibrium with ( ) ( )LPHP EE ∗∗ = . If  then ( )LPULPU ELIL ∗∗ −>− )( ,
                    
57 
the incumbent can profit by increasing its price. Furthermore, the incumbent has 
an incentive to pretend that it observed a low quality entrant by selecting  
if the entrant’ s actual quality is high. This is because the entrant of either high or 
low quality sets the same price 
( )LPI∗
( ) ( )LPHP EE ∗∗ =  and only the incumbent’s prices 
can convey the information regarding the entrant’s quality type. And if 
, then the entrant can raise its price and profit. It then 
follows that 
( )LPULPU ELIL ∗∗ −<− )(
( )LPULPU ELIL ∗∗ −=− )( , Accordingly, ( ) LLHI cUULP +−=∗ . 
 
Proof of Proposition 5  
Proofs of 1. and 3. are omitted here because these two are the same as in the 
setting I. 
Proof of 2. First, we verify that no firms would deviate from their equilibrium 
strategies given beliefs on and off the equilibrium path specified in the above. 
Suppose , we then show the entrant would not deviate 
from 
( ) ( ) LIII cLPHPP === ∗∗∗
( ) ( )E E E H LP P H P L U U c∗ ∗ ∗= = = − + L
L
. Under our beliefs construction, the 
entrant is perceived to be of low quality if it charges a price lower than 
. So if the entrant is E H LP U U c
∗ = − + H ,  any price deviations  with  EP
H E H Lc P U U c≤ < − + L  is undesirable since all consumer are uninformed and all 
the uninformed consumers have pessimistic disequilibrium beliefs that entrant 
sells a low quality product. As a result, all the consumers would not buy from H  
at such a high price. Furthermore, if the entrant is H , it will never deviate to any 
prices below  since those prices are dominated strategies for Hc H . And if the 
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entrant H  sets a deviant price such that H E H LU P U U c≥ > − + L , such a 
deviation is not able to make H  better off as well. Note all the consumers are 
assumed to be uninformed. Provide the consumers beliefs constructed as 
( ),I Eb P P θ∗ ≤  for all EP PE∗≥ , all the consumers would expect less utility from 
purchase with the entrant. As a consequence, all the consumers will buy from the 
incumbent. We thus conclude that H  cannot sell anything to consumers and 
make itself better if we assume all consumers are uninformed. Hence, H  would 
not deviate from its equilibrium strategy. And if the entrant is L , L  cannot 
make a profitable deviation either. Any price deviations  with 
 make all the consumers believe the entrant is 
EP
L E H Lc P U U c< < − + L L  and thus 
L  can make no sales at this deviating price level. If L  defects to a price  
with , all the consumers expect less utility from purchase with 
the entrant given 
EP
E H LP U U c> − + L
( ),I Eb P P θ∗ ≤  for all EP PE∗≥  and thus will not buy from it. 
Also, L  would have no incentive to set any price below  since such a price 




L  to sell something to consumers but L  makes zero profit at such a 
price level and thus cannot be better off.  Hence, L  could not profitably deviate 
as well. We now turn to check the incumbent’s side. Given that  
 and consumers beliefs ( ) ( )E E E H LP P H P L U U c∗ ∗ ∗= = = − + L
( )( ) ( )( ) ( ), , ,I E I E I Eb P P H b P P L b P P∗ ∗ 1∗= = = L for all . If the incumbent 
deviates to a price 
IP c>
( ) ( ) LIIII cLPHPPP ===> ∗∗∗ , all consumers will believe the 
entrant sells a high quality product and buy from the entrant. Therefore, the 
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incumbent would end up losing the entire market and could not make itself better 
off when the entrant sells a high quality product. But when the entrant sells a low 
quality product, all the uninformed consumers will buy from it and all the 
informed consumers will buy from the incumbent if L I H Lc P U U cL< < − + . As 
such, the incumbent can make a profitable deviation when there exist some 
informed consumers. Provided that all the consumers are uninformed, the 
incumbent would have no incentive to deviate from its equilibrium price strategies. 
This equilibrium passes the Intuitive Criterion (Cho and Kreps 1987). Any price 
 is equilibrium dominated for [ )HLE ccP ,∈ H , but not for L . Thus upon 
observing [ )HLE ccP ,∈  and given , consumers should assign 
probability 0 to the event that the entrant sells a high quality product. This belief is 
consistent with the analysis above, thus 
LI cP =∗
L  would prefer not to deviate from their 
equilibrium price strategy. 
Second, we prove that in a pooling equilibrium where the incumbent could 
prevent the entry of a potential firm and all the consumers are uniformed, this is 
the only class of equilibria given our belief system. The entrant can pool at price 
 because any deviations made by the incumbent would 
make all the consumers believe that the entrant is 
( )E H LP H U U c∗ = − + L
H . This is in contrast with the 
usual belief construction as in setting I, any deviations from the incumbent cannot 
affect consumers beliefs and thus ( )( ) ( )( ) ( ) θ=== ∗∗∗ EIEIEI PPbLPPbHPPb ,,,  for 
all . Next, we argue that IP ( ) ( ) LIII cLPHPP >== ∗∗∗  is impossible. Suppose 
, ( ) ( ) LIII cLPHPP >== ∗∗∗ L  would have an incentive to deviate from its 
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equilibrium price ( ) ( )E E E H LP P H P L U U c∗ ∗ ∗= = = − + L  whatever beliefs 
consumers have out of the equilibrium path, and capture the whole market by 
undercut. This in turn gives the incumbent an incentive to deviate. Thus, 
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CHAPTER 3 
Entry and quality signaling when only some consumers are 




A substantial literature looks at the fundamental problem of how a firm convinces 
consumers of its unobservable quality. Usually, the literature focus on the role of  
repeat purchases, informed consumers, and product differentiation among the 
products of the firms or other deviations from the perfectly competitive model in 
order to allow for signaling. In this chapter, we extend the model in the previous 
chapter to a market which is horizontally differentiated.  
We consider two firms competing in a horizontally and possibly vertically 
differentiated goods market. The setting here is the same as in chapter 2. The 
incumbent’s quality is commonly known to be low, while the entrant’s quality can 
be either high or low. Some consumers are informed of the entrant’s quality while 
others are not. Firms use prices to signal quality to uninformed consumers. The 
incumbent may or may not know the entrant’s quality. The effect of informational 
product differentiation on entry is also discussed in both information structures via 
comparing the equilibrium profits with incomplete information to those with full 
information. 
The game proceeds as in chapter 2. Firstly, Nature selects the quality of the 
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potential entrant which is assumed to be known by the entrant itself as well as by 
some consumers. The incumbent may or may not be informed of the entrant’s 
quality. This quality is fixed during the game. Secondly, the incumbent and 
potential entrant simultaneously set their prices that are observed by the 
consumers.  and  cannot be changed.  can be denoted by  and 
, depending the entrant’s actual quality. Nevertheless, the incumbent’s 
price is represented by  in setting I and  or  in setting II. 
Thirdly, consumers, who are perfectly informed about the quality of the incumbent, 
but may be uncertain about the quality of the entrant, form their beliefs about the 
entrant’s quality after observing the prices, and decide whether to buy and if so, 
which firm to buy from. Consumers receive information . Consumers’ 
beliefs after having observed the price pair are denoted by 
EP IP EP )(LP E
)(HP E
IP )(LP I )(HP I
),( EI PP
( )EI PPb , , which is the 
probability attached to the event that the entrant’ s quality is H . In setting I, 
consumer beliefs will not vary with the incumbent’s price, while in setting II, the 
uninformed consumers would revise their beliefs after observing either the 
entrant’s or the incumbent’s price. 
We find several separating equilibria in our settings. All these equilibria are the 
only equilibria of that type. The results of these equilibria show that the presence 
of some informed consumers is critical under competition.  
In the uninformed incumbent case, we find an equilibrium in which the high 
quality entrant sets a high price to signal quality. This is because the low quality 
entrant has two conflicting incentives in mimicking when competing against a 
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well-known low quality incumbent. On the one hand, the profit of the low quality 
entrant from mimicking the high quality entrant is increasing in the price of the 
high quality entrant because it benefits from a higher profit margin with regard to 
the uninformed consumers. On the other hand, a high price would result in more 
sales loss to the low quality incumbent with regard to the informed consumers and 
this sales loss is more damaging to the lower cost product. This effect becomes 
stronger the greater the number of informed consumers. This suggests that when 
the proportion of informed consumers is beyond some threshold, the entrant’s high 
price can be a signal of high quality.  
However, as more consumers are informed, the profit of the high quality entrant 
will drop, making it unwilling to set such a high price for separation. In particular, 
when the proportion of informed consumers is above a certain level, the high 
quality entrant will deviate to a price under full information equilibrium. The 
equilibrium outcome with an uninformed incumbent shows that informational 
product differentiation does not act as a barrier to entry for a low quality firm. 
Rather, informational product differentiation can facilitate the entry of a high 
quality rival. This is in contrast to our results from a homogeneous goods 
market31.  
With an informed incumbent, we find two additional separating equilibria. In 
the first separating equilibrium, when the proportion of informed consumers is 
greater than some critical value, complete information Nash prices are played by 
                                                        
31 In a homogenous goods market we show that the high quality firm is unable to sell anything to uninformed 
consumers, and thus its entry is deterred by informational asymmetries. 
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the incumbent and the entrant of either type. The entrant of high quality signals 
quality with no distortion at all. As such, informational product differentiation 
does not act as a barrier to entry. The entrant of low quality has no incentive to 
pretend to be of high quality because of the possible huge loss with regard to the 
informed consumers. Intuitively, the greater the number of informed consumers, 
the more loss with regard to the informed consumers, and the less gain with regard 
to the uninformed consumers. As a result, when the ratio of informed to 
uninformed consumers is above some threshold, the low quality entrant would not 
mimic the high quality entrant any more.  
In the second separating equilibrium, the incumbent’s price, rather than the 
entrant’s, is informative, revealing the true type of the entrant to uninformed 
consumers. The low quality entrant by itself cannot mimic the high quality entrant, 
since uninformed consumers can infer from the incumbent’s price that the entrant 
sells low quality. The incumbent charges a relatively high price to signal that the 
entrant sells low quality, and a relatively low price in the opposite case. The 
incumbent’s high price signals the entrant’s low quality because a high price 
would incur more sales loss to the high quality entrant with regard to the informed 
consumers. Therefore, when the proportion of informed consumers approaches 
some critical value, such a loss would be sufficient to prevent the incumbent from 
misleading uninformed consumers into believing that the entrant is of low quality 
when it is actually faced with a high quality entrant. The result of this equilibrium 
implies that the incumbent’s informative strategies raise the profit of the low 
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quality entrant, and may not be able to make the incumbent better off. As a 
consequence, incomplete information with an informed incumbent encourages the 
entry of the low quality entrant. Intuitively, the entrant can take advantage of the 
incumbent’s informative strategies since it is common knowledge that the 
incumbent knows the entrant’s true quality. 
By comparing these two information structures, the following results are obtained. 
If the incumbent knows the quality of the entrant and this is common knowledge, 
it may be worse off. The rationale is that since two firms are trying to signal with 
common information, consumers can learn the entrant’s quality by observing 
either the entrant’s price or the incumbent’s. Therefore, it is possible that the 
entrant makes use of the incumbent’s informative strategies to overcome its 
informational disadvantage. 
  There is a strand of related literature examining how a firm can use price and/or 
advertising to signal quality in a horizontally and vertically differentiated market, 
For example, Daughety and Reinganum (2007a, 2007b), Barigozzi, Garella and 
Peitz (2006).  Daughety and Reinganum (2007a) consider a duopoly model in 
which the quality attribute is safety. Firms have private information regarding 
their quality. Consumers do not know either firm’s quality. Each consumer views 
the products as imperfect substitutes, even if their prices and qualities are the same. 
All else equal, any consumer will prefer a product with a higher level of safety to 
one with a lower level of safety. Thus products of the two firms are both 
horizontally and vertically differentiated. Either firm’s quality is its private 
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information. They characterize an equilibrium in which each firm’s price reveals 
its product quality. Daughety and Reinganum (2007b) examine the interplay of 
imperfect competition and incomplete information in the context of n firms 
producing both horizontally and vertically differentiated products. Firms have 
private information regarding their product quality. They also find that incomplete 
information about quality can be signaled via price. In this chapter, we provide a 
duopoly model in which all consumers know the quality of one firm, while only 
some consumers ascertain the quality of the other firm. The firms’ qualities may or 
may not be private information. 
This chapter is most closely related to the paper by Barigozzi, Garella and Peitz 
(2006), which considers two vertically and horizontally differentiated firms. One 
firm’s quality is publicly known to be high, while the other firm’s is unknown to 
consumers but is observable by the two firms. Such a quality can be either high or 
low. They argue that a high signaling price can be particularly costly because 
consumers can purchase from the rival. This would make the joint signal of 
advertising and price more preferable. They show that advertising in combination 
with price can be a more powerful signal than price alone. Unlike Barigozzi, 
Garella and Peitz (2006), the incumbent’s quality is assumed to be low in this 
chapter. This assumption allows us to examine the effect of informational product 
differentiation on entry. An essential difference is that we employ a quite different 
equilibrium concept and refinement, and show that in the presence of some 
consumers being informed of the entrant’s quality, price alone can signal product 
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quality in a competitive environment. 
The rest of the chapter is presented as follows. In the next section, firstly, we 
describe the basic model with horizontal differentiation. Secondly, the full 
information benchmark is analyzed. Thirdly, we solve for the separating and 
pooling equilibria in our two settings where the incumbent is informed or not 
informed of the entrant’s quality. Lastly, we briefly compare the results from these 
two settings. In section 3, we use a numerical example to illustrate our equilibrium 
results. Section 4 gives a comparison between the markets without horizontal 
differentiation and with horizontal differentiation. Section 5 concludes. 
 
3.2 The model 
The two firms compete according to a Hotelling model of competition. Consumers 
are randomly located in this market according to the standard ‘linear city’ version 
of the Hotelling model, and the two firms are located at the two extremes of the 
unit interval. Consumers draw a  from the y [ ]1,0U  distribution, and incur 
transportation cost of  if they purchase from the incumbent and  if 
they purchase from the entrant. The number of consumers is normalized to one 
with each consumer purchasing at most one unit. All consumers prefer a product 
of high quality and are willing to pay more for the high quality. However, 
consumers may have heterogeneous preferences for the products sold by the two 
different firms due to their relative distance away from the two firms. Therefore, 
here we consider a model with both horizontal and vertical product differentiation. 
ty ( yt −1 )
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Suppose that consumers value the product of low quality at  and the product of 
high quality at 
U
β+U  where t<< β0 . Let P  be the price of the product. A 
consumer located at  buying from the incumbent obtains utility , 
while if she buys from the entrant, her utility can be either  or 
y tyPU I −−
( ytPU E −−− 1 )
( )ytPU E −−−+ 1β , depending on the actual quality of a product sold by the 
entrant. The utility of making no purchase is indexed to zero. Consumers are risk 
neutral. Consumers maximize their expected utility and will buy one unit of the 
products, provided that their expected utility from the purchase is nonnegative. In 
our paper, we assume that the market is fully covered. 
To explore whether incomplete information acts as a barrier to entry, we will 
compare the equilibrium profits with incomplete information to those with full 
information. Accordingly, we will say that entry is facilitated when the potential 
entrant earns a higher profit with incomplete information than with full 
information. Conversely, entry is discouraged when the entrant makes a lower 
profit with incomplete information than with full information. Returns to scale are 
constant. Firms have constant marginal costs. The marginal cost of producing a 
high quality product is , , whereas the marginal cost of producing a 
low quality product is . For simplicity, we can normalize  to 0 without loss 
of generality. We also assume that products of either high or low quality generate 
a positive social surplus and the products of high quality are more efficient than 
those of low quality in terms of the surplus: 
ccH = 0>c
Lc Lc
0>−>−+ LH cUcU β , i.e., 
0>− cβ . 
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 3.2.1 Full information benchmark 
Suppose the product qualities of the incumbent and potential entrant are perfectly 
known by all consumers as well as the two firms, our static equilibrium concept is 
then simply a Nash equilibrium in prices. Each firm chooses a price strategy that 
maximizes its profit, taking its rival firm’s price strategy as given. 
The model can be solved as in the standard Hotelling model. If the entrant sells 
a low quality product, then a consumer located at 
( ) ( )
t
LPLPy IEL 22
1ˆ −+=  is 
indifferent between purchasing from the incumbent and the entrant. Similarly, if 
the entrant sells a high quality product, then a consumer located at 
( ) ( )
t
LPLPy IEH 22
1ˆ β−−+=  is indifferent between buying from the incumbent 
and the entrant. As a consequence, we can write down the incumbent’s demand 
function as 
( ) ( )
t
LPLPy IEL 22
1ˆ −+=  when the entrant sells a low quality product, 
and 
( ) ( )
t
LPLPy IEH 22
1ˆ β−−+=  when the entrant sells a high quality product. 
Since consumers are uniformly distributed along a unit interval between 0 and 1, it 
follows that the entrant’s demand function is 
( ) ( )
t
LPLPy EIL 22
1ˆ1 −+=−  when it 
sells a low quality product, and 
( ) ( )
t
LPLPy EIH 22
1ˆ1 β+−+=−  when it sells a 
high quality product.   
Given the firms’ demand functions and price combination ( ) ( )( )LPLP EI ,  when 
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the entrant sells a low quality product, the profit functions for the incumbent and 
the entrant are as follows:  
( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( )1,
2 2
E IL
I I E I
P L P L
P L P L P L
t
π ⎛ ⎞−= +⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
 
( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( )1,
2 2
I EL
E I E E
P L P L
P L P L P L
t
π ⎛ ⎞−= +⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
 
Likewise, given consumers’ demand for the two firms and the price pair 
 when the entrant sells a high quality product, the profit functions 
for the incumbent and the entrant are specified as follows: 
( ) ( )( HPHP EI , )
( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( )1,
2 2
E IH
I I E I
P H P H
P H P H P H
t
βπ ⎛ ⎞− −= +⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
 







1, βπ  
 
Proposition 1  Consider the static, complete information game. 
1. If , the unique Nash equilibrium prices are: Lq = ( ) LPtLP EI ∗∗ == ( ). Each 
firm gets half of the market and the equilibrium profits for the two firms are 
the same, equal to 
2
t .  
2. If , then the unique static equilibrium prices are Hq = ( )
3
β−+=∗ ctHPI , 
( )
3








1 −+ β , respectively. Furthermore, the equilibrium profits for 
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 Proposition 1 tells us if firms play a static, full information game, then the profit 
of the incumbent is decreasing in the quality of the entrant while the profit of the 
potential entrant is increasing in the quality of the entrant. The high quality entrant 
charging a higher price, still wins a larger market share, and enjoys a higher profit. 
Thus, we draw a conclusion that in the full information benchmark the high 
quality entrant has a better chance to enter the market, since it earns a higher profit 
than the low quality entrant. The reason for the higher profit earned by the high 
quality entrant than the low quality entrant is that we consider competition in a 
differentiated products market, and the high quality firm may have a greater 
portion of inframarginal consumers when setting the same price as the 
incumbent’s. This would result in the high quality entrant raising its price to 
benefit from higher profit margin on the inframarginal consumers. In doing so it is 
willing to lose some marginal consumers to the low quality incumbent.  
 
3.2.2 Incomplete information 
Again in the following analysis, we restrict our attention to pure strategy 
equilibria. To solve for the pure strategy equilibria, we adopt the same definition 
of perfect Bayesian equilibrium given by Fudenberg and Tirole (1991). That is, 
Each firm sets price to maximize its profit, given the equilibrium strategies of its 
rival and consumers’ behavior. Consumers maximize their expected utility given 
their beliefs.  
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Consumers’ beliefs on the equilibrium path satisfy Bayes’ rule. In setting I, 
Bayes’ rule requires beliefs along the equilibrium path satisfy the following 
conditions: if , then ( ) ( )LPHP EE ∗∗ ≠ ( )( ) 1, =∗∗ HPPb EI , and ( )( ) 0, =∗∗ LPPb EI ; and if 
, then ( ) ( )E EP H P L P∗ ∗= = E∗ ( ) θ=∗∗ EI PPb , . In setting II, if , or 
, then 
( ) (LPHP II ∗∗ ≠ )
( ) ( )LPHP EE ∗∗ ≠ ( ) ( )( ) 1, =∗∗ HPHPb EI , and ( ) ( )( ) 0, =∗∗ LPLPb EI . In a pooling 
equilibrium,  and ( ) ( ) ∗∗∗ == III PLPHP ( ) ( ) ∗∗∗ == EEE PLPHP ,  then 
( ) θ=∗∗ EI PPb , .  
 
Analysis of setting I 
In a separating equilibrium, the incumbent’s price is uninformative while that of 
the entrant’s is informative. Hence, we have the following proposition: 
 
Proposition 2  Consider the static, incomplete information game. 
There exists a unique separating equilibrium in which , , 
, with  
tPI =∗ ( ) tLPE =∗
( ) β+=∗ tHPE ( )( )
2
2
2 2t c c t t ct x
c
β β β β
β β
+ − + + −≤ ≤ − . Regardless of the 
quality the potential entrant may have, each firm grabs half of the market. If 
, the equilibrium profits for the two firms are the same, equal to Lq =
2
t ; if 










−+=∗∗ βπ . The beliefs on and off equilibrium path are given 
below: ( )( ) 1, =∗∗ HPPb EI , ( )( ) 0, =∗∗ LPPb EI ; ( ) 0, =∗ EI PPb  for ; ( )E EP P H∗<
( ) 1, =∗ EI PPb  for ; ( )E EP P H∗> ( )( ) 0, =∗ LPPb EI  for all ; IP ( )( ) 1, =∗ HPPb EI  
for all . IP
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 The main insight of this proposition is that a high price signals high quality if 
and only if the proportion of informed consumers is intermediate32. The intuition 
is that under competition between the low quality incumbent and the entrant, if the 
high quality entrant sets a high price to signal quality, the low quality entrant has 
two conflicting incentives. On the one hand, the profit of the low quality entrant 
from mimicking the high quality entrant is increasing with the price of the high 
quality entrant. This is because the low quality entrant benefits from a higher 
profit margin on uninformed consumers when competing with the incumbent. On 
the other hand, setting a high price would lead to a greater loss of sales to the low 
quality incumbent on the informed consumers, and this loss is much more 
damaging to the low quality entrant. Further, this effect is strengthened the more 
consumers are informed. This suggests that when the proportion of informed 
consumers is beyond a certain threshold, a high price could signal the high quality 
of the entrant. However, the separating equilibrium exists only if the proportion of 
informed consumers is below some threshold. The reasoning here is that as the 
proportion of informed consumers increases, the entrant H  will experience an 
increased loss of sales to the incumbent on informed consumers by charging such 
a high price for separation. This loss tends to lower the incentive for H  to 
separate itself by charging such a high price. Thus, if the fraction of the informed 






t c c t t ct
x
c
β β β β
β β
+ − + + −< ≤
−
, this equilibrium cannot pass the intuitive criterion. 
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consumer is above a certain level, the entrant H  may not be willing to charge 
such a high price as the gains from uninformed consumers may exceed the 
resulting loss on informed consumers. Therefore, when the proportion of informed 
consumers is above some threshold, the entrant of high quality would deviate 
from such a high separation price, and the equilibrium breaks down. 
Compared to the full information benchmark, the profit of the low quality 
entrant is unchanged, while the profit of the high quality entrant is higher33. We 
can thus conclude that incomplete information does not act as a barrier to entry for 
a low quality firm. On the contrary, it facilitates the entry of a high quality 
entrant34.  
 
Analysis of setting II 
We now turn to the situation, where the entrant’s quality is known by both the 
entrant and the incumbent, while some consumers are still uncertain. It is 
commonly known that the entrant and consumers know that the incumbent is 
informed of the entrant’s quality. In the following propositions, we first show that 
the informed incumbent scenario may give rise to a separating equilibrium in 
which both firms set separating prices and signaling occurs without any distortion 
to the prices. Rather, Nash equilibrium prices in the case of complete information 
are chosen by the two firms. 





t c t c
t
β β+ − −⎛ ⎞> −⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠ if 3t cβ> − . 
34 This result differs from our analysis in the homogeneous market, where incomplete information could be a 
barrier to entry. However, this is consistent. The assumption of product differentiation plays a crucial role 
here. 
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 Proposition 3  Consider the static, incomplete information game. 










+ − +≥ +
c
, there exists a unique separating equilibrium 
in which , ( ) ( )LPtLP EI ∗∗ == ( ) 3
β−+=∗ ctHPI , ( ) 3
2ctHPE
++=∗ β . If , 
each firm captures half of the market and the equilibrium profits for the two firms 
are the same, equal to 
Lq =
2
t ; if Hq = , then the market shares for the incumbent 








1 −+ β , respectively, and profits for them are 























respectively. The beliefs on and off equilibrium path are given below: 
( ) ( )( ) 1, =∗∗ HPHPb EI , ( ) ( )( ) 0, =∗∗ LPLPb EI ; ( )( ) 0, =∗ EI PLPb  for ; ( )HPP EE ∗≠
( )( ) 1, =∗ EI PHPb  for ( )LPP EE ∗≠ ; ( )( ) 0, =∗ LPPb EI , for all ; IP ( )( ) 1, =∗ HPPb EI , 
for all .  IP
 
In this equilibrium, if the ratio of informed to uninformed is large enough, then 
incomplete information does not act as a barrier to entry, and firms simply behave 
as if they possessed complete information. Prices are not distorted in either 
direction. The key point is that the two firms signal common information and the 
uninformed consumers can learn the quality of the entrant from either the 
incumbent’s or the entrant’s separating prices. Intuitively, with the separating 
prices of the incumbent, H  would never pretend to be of low quality since doing 
so incurs a loss with regard to both informed and uninformed consumers. 
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Therefore, H  selects its equilibrium price. With the informed incumbent, the 
only possible profitable deviation for L  is to pretend to be H  by pricing at the 
high quality equilibrium level. If the proportion of informed consumers is large 
enough, the loss with regard to the informed consumers may exceed the gain with 
regard to the uninformed consumers such that L  simply plays its equilibrium 
strategy. The incumbent cannot cheat consumers into believing that the entrant 
sells a low quality product when faced with an entrant which sells a high quality 
product. This is because the separating prices of the entrant would still inform 
consumers of the entrant’s quality.  
In the ensuing analysis, we focus on another sort of separating equilibrium in 
which one of the two firms pools. In this kind of equilibrium, separation occurs 
because either  or ( ) ( )LPHP EE ∗∗ ≠ ( ) ( )LPHP II ∗∗ ≠ .  
Profit comparison:  As we have seen in the full information case, if , 
the equilibrium profits for the two firms are, 
Lq =
( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( )LPLPtLPLP EILEEILI ∗∗∗∗ == ,2, ππ ; and if Hq = , then the equilibrium 






































ct ββ . This implies that the entrant earns a greater 
profit when it is perceived to be of a high quality, while the incumbent is better off 
when the entrant is perceived to be of a low quality. In other words, with 
uninformed consumers, the incumbent has incentive to convince consumers that 
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the entrant is of a low quality, whereas the entrant would like to get the consumers 
to believe that it sells high quality goods.   
 






2 2t c c t tt x
c
β β β β
β β
+ − + + −≤ ≤ −
c
, there exists a unique separating 
equilibrium, where ( ) ( ) tPHPLP III === ∗∗∗ , ( ) tLPE =∗ , . 
Regardless of the entrant’s quality, each firm grabs half of the market. If , 
the equilibrium profits for the two firms are the same, equal to 
( ) β+=∗ tHPE
Lq =
2
t ; if , the 
equilibrium profits for the two firms are 
Hq =




I =∗∗π , 





−+=∗∗ βπ  , respectively. The beliefs on and off equilibrium 
path are given below: ( )( ) 1, =∗∗ HPPb EI , ( )( ) 0, =∗∗ LPPb EI ; ( ) 0, =∗ EI PPb  for  
; ( ) β+=< ∗ tHPP EE ( ) 1, =∗ EI PPb  for ( ) β+=≥ ∗ tHPP EE ; ( )( ) 0, =∗ LPPb EI  
for all ; IP ( )( ) 1, =∗ HPPb EI  for all .  IP
 
Proposition 5  Consider the static, incomplete information game. 
Prices ( ) ( )
3
2ctPHPLP EEE
++=== ∗∗∗ β , ( ) ( )
3
22 ctLPI
++=∗ β  
( )
3
β−+=∗ ctHPI  constitute a unique separating equilibrium if 
( )
( ) ( )
22 2 2 2 2 2
2 2
3 2 6 2 12 10 2 9 3 6 2 8 8
3 2
t c c t c c t t tc cx
c c
β β cβ β β β β β
β β
− − + − − − + + + − − −≤ ≤+ +
β












1 ++ β , respectively, and the corresponding profits for the incumbent and the 
potential entrant are  follows, 
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( ) ( )( ) ( )2 21 2, 2 6 3LI I E ccP L P L tt ββπ ∗ ∗ ⎛ ⎞++⎛ ⎞= − +⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠ ,  
( ) ( )( ) 1 2 2, 2 6 3LE I E c cP L P L ttβ βπ ∗ ∗ + +⎛ ⎞⎛= + +⎜ ⎟⎜⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎞⎟⎠ ; if Hq = , then the market 








1 −+ β , respectively, and 























βπ .  The beliefs on and off equilibrium path are 
given below: ( )( ) 1, =∗∗ EI PHPb , ( )( ) 0, =∗∗ EI PLPb ; ( )( ) 0, =∗ EI PLPb  for all ; EP
( )( ) 1, =∗ EI PHPb  for all ; EP ( ) 0, =∗EI PPb  for ( ) ( )3 22 ctLPP II ++=≥ ∗ β ; 
( ) 1, =∗EI PPb  for ( ) ( )3 22 ctLPP II ++=< ∗ β . 
 
The above proposition shows that there exists a separating equilibrium in which 
the incumbent’s prices, rather than the entrant’s, reveal the true type of the entrant 
to uninformed consumers. An interesting result is that the incumbent’s high price 
signals that the entrant sells a low quality product, and the incumbent’s low price 
signals that the entrant sells a high quality product when the ratio of informed to 
uninformed consumers lies in the intermediate range35. The reasoning is that if the 
incumbent sets a high price to signal the entrant’s high quality, then the incumbent 
would lose an even larger portion of marginal consumers and enjoy a smaller 
portion of inframarginal consumers. This would cause the incumbent to reduce its 
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35 when ( )( ) ( )
22 2 2 2 2 2
2 2
3 2 6 2 12 10 2 9 3 6 2 8 8
3 2
t c c t c c t t tc c
x
c c
β β cβ β β β β β
β β
− − + − − − + + + − − −< ≤
+ +
β , this 
equilibrium cannot pass the intuitive criterion. 
price to capture a larger share of the market. Conversely, the incumbent would 
prefer a high price to signal low quality of the entrant, since in this case it has a 
relatively large share of the market and has an incentive to capture the high profit 
margin by charging a high price. It, therefore, turns out that the high price of the 
incumbent signals the entrant’s low quality in the presence of some informed 
consumers informed of the entrant’s quality. Intuitively, the greater number of 
informed consumers, the more loss the incumbent would incur by setting a high 
price to mislead uninformed consumers when the entrant’s quality is indeed high. 
Hence, a high price and the existence of some consumers informed of the entrant’s 
quality ensure separation.  
The result of the above analysis illustrates that the entrant of low quality 
benefits from the incumbent’s additional information regarding the entrant’s 
quality. Therefore, the informative strategies of the informed incumbent help the 
low quality entrant enter the market. This is surprising in that the entrant, rather 
than the incumbent, can take advantage of this information. However, this is 
consistent with our equilibrium concept under common information signaling. 
Intuitively, it is common knowledge that the incumbent perfectly knows the 
entrant’s quality. This fact gives the entrant an incentive to make use of the 
incumbent’s informative strategies.  
 
Pooling equilibria 
In this section, we turn to solve for the pooling equilibrium of this model under 
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incomplete information. As before, first, we investigate the case in which the 
incumbent cannot observe the entrant’s quality. Second, we move on to the case 
where incumbent is informed of the entrant’s quality.  
In a pooling equilibrium, the entrant of either quality type plays the same 
strategy,  ( ) ( )LPHPP EEE ∗∗∗ == . Uninformed consumers and the incumbent learn 
nothing from these strategies and have common beliefs that ( ) θ=∗∗ EI PPb , . 
Suppose the uninformed consumers beliefs off the equilibrium path is such that 
( ) θ=∗EI PPb ,  for all ; IP ( ) 0, =∗ EI PPb  for . We then support a pooling 
equilibrium where the entrant of either type pools.  
∗≠ EE PP
 
Proposition 6  Consider the static, incomplete information game. 
( )∗∗ EI PP ,  is a pooling equilibrium profile if ( ) ( )( )0,,,,* LPPPP EILEEILE ∗∗ ≥ πθπ , 
( ) ( )( )0,,,,* HPPPP EIHEEIHE ∗∗ ≥ πθπ  and 2EI t PP βθ
∗
∗ + −=  with consumers beliefs 
on and off equilibrium path specified in the following ( ) θ=∗EI PPb ,  for all ; IP
( ) 0, =∗ EI PPb  for ∗≠ EE PP  
 
Now we turn to the case where the incumbent is fully informed of the entrant’s 
quality. Again, pooling occurs when ( ) (LPHPP III ∗∗∗ == ) , and 
. In a pooling equilibrium, ( ) ( )LPHPP EEE ∗∗∗ ==
( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( ) θ== ∗∗∗∗ LPLPbHPHPb EIEI ,, . Suppose that beliefs off equilibrium path 
are given below: ( ),I Eb P P θ∗ =  for ; ∗≠ II PP ( ) 0, =∗ EI PPb  for . We 
then have pooling equilibria which are the same as in setting I.  
∗≠ EE PP
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 Proposition 7  Consider the static, incomplete information game. 
( )∗∗ EI PP ,  is a pooling equilibrium profile if ( ) ( )( )0,,,,* LPPPP EILEEILE ∗∗ ≥ πθπ , 
( ) ( )( )0,,,,* HPPPP EIHEEIHE ∗∗ ≥ πθπ  and 2EI t PP βθ
∗
∗ + −=  with consumers beliefs 
on and off equilibrium path specified in the following: ( ) θ=∗EI PPb ,  for all ; IP
( ) 0, =∗ EI PPb  for ∗≠ EE PP  
 
However, additional pooling equilibria may exist because of the larger degree 
of freedom in defining consumer beliefs out of equilibrium path. Suppose 
consumers beliefs takes the following fashion: ( ) 1, =∗EI PPb  for ; ∗≠ II PP
( ) 0, =∗ EI PPb  for , then we may be able to find more equilibria where 
both firms pools. 
∗≠ EE PP
 
Proposition 8  Consider the static, incomplete information game. 
If ( ) ( )( )0,,,,* HPPPP EIHEEIHE ∗∗ ≥ πθπ ; ( ) ( )( )0,,,,* LPPPP EILEEILE ∗∗ ≥ πθπ , 
( ) ( )( )1,,,,* ∗∗ ≥ EILIEILI PLPPP πθπ ; ( ) ( )( )*, , , ,1H HI I E I I EP P P H Pπ θ π∗ ∗≥ , then 
( )∗∗ EI PP ,  is a pooling equilibrium profile with consumers beliefs in and out of 
equilibrium path specified in the following: ( ) θ=∗∗ EI PPb , ; ( ) 1, =∗EI PPb  for 
; ∗≠ II PP ( ) 0, =∗ EI PPb  for . ∗≠ EE PP
 
3.2.3 Comparison of these two settings 
As can be seen from the above analysis, the model admits two more equilibria 
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in setting II. When the proportion of informed consumers is intermediate36, there 
exists an equilibrium in which the incumbent chooses separating prices while the 
entrant pools. When the proportion of informed consumer is large enough, the 
entrant would not pool any more, both firms select prices as if they possessed 
complete information. We show that incomplete information is not a reason for 
entry being discouraged. However, in setting II, we find an equilibrium where the 
entry of L , rather than H  is encouraged. One may expect that the incumbent 
can benefit from this kind of private information. But surprisingly, the 
incumbent’s inside information regarding the entrant’s quality is only valuable to 
the entrant, and may even make the incumbent worse off if  is very smallt 37. 
Therefore, it would be better for the incumbent not to use this information when 
the competition is intense. However, this result is implied by our equilibrium 
concept under common information. 
 
3.3 A numerical example 
In this section we analyze the plausibility of our equilibrium results. Suppose 
, 0.1c = 1β = , and , If 10t = Lq = , the unique Nash equilibrium prices are: 
. Each firm gets half of the market and the equilibrium profits 
for the two firms are the same, equal to . If 
( ) ( )10IP L P L∗ = = E∗
5 Hq = , then the unique static 
equilibrium prices are ( ) 9.70IP H∗ = , ( ) 10.40EP H∗ = . The market shares for the 
                                                        
36 Note that when the proportion of informed consumers is very small, pool equilibria occur. 




ββ ⎛ ⎞++⎛ ⎞− +⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠ 2
>  when ( )3 2 2t cβ> + . 
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incumbent and H  are , , respectively. Furthermore, the equilibrium 
profits for the two firms are 
0.49 0.51
( ) ( )( ), 4HI I EP H P Hπ ∗ ∗ = .70
.31
, 
. ( ) ( )( ), 5HE I EP H P Hπ ∗ ∗ =
When , there exists a unique separating equilibrium in which 
, 
64x ≥
( ) ( )10I EP L P L∗ ∗= = ( ) 9.7IP H∗ = , ( ) 10.4EP H∗ = . If Lq = , each firm captures 
half of the market and the equilibrium profits for the two firms are the same, equal 
to ; if , then the market shares for the incumbent and 5 Hq = H  are , 
, respectively, and profits for them are 
0.49
0.51 ( ) ( )( ), 4HI I EP H P Hπ ∗ ∗ = .70
5.31
, 
, respectively. Therefore, their equilibrium profits are 
the same as in the full information benchmark. 
( ) ( )( ),HE I EP H P Hπ ∗ ∗ =
When , there is a unique equilibrium of this type in which 
, 
10 50.58x≤ ≤
( ) ( ) 10I I IP L P H P∗ ∗ ∗= = = ( ) 10EP L∗ = , ( ) 11EP H∗ = . Regardless of the entrant’s 
quality, each firm grabs half of the market. If Lq = , the equilibrium profits for 
the two firms are the same, equal to ; if 5 Hq = , the equilibrium profits for the 
two firms are ( ) ( )( ), 5HI I EP H P Hπ ∗ ∗ = , ( ) ( )( ), 5HE I EP H P Hπ ∗ ∗ = .45  , 
respectively. Here, we can see the profit of the entrant H  or L  in this 
equilibrium is higher than or at least equal to the profit of the entrant H  or L  
in the full information benchmark. Thus, entry of L  is not discouraged and entry 
of H  is facilitated with incomplete information. 
And when , there is a unique equilibrium of this type where 
, 
23.78 27.31x≤ ≤
( ) ( ) 10.4E E EP L P H P∗ ∗ ∗= = = ( ) 10.8IP L∗ = , ( ) 9.7IP H∗ =  If , the market 
shares for the incumbent and entrant are 0.48 , , respectively, and the 
Lq =
0.52
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corresponding profits for the incumbent and the potential entrant are  follows, 
( ) ( )( ), 5LI I EP L P Lπ ∗ ∗ = .18 ,  ( ) ( )( ), 5LE I EP L P Lπ ∗ ∗ = .41 ; if , then the 
market shares for the incumbent and 
Hq =
H  are , , respectively, and the 
profits for the two firms are 
0.49 0.51
( ) ( )( ), 4HI I EP H P Hπ ∗ ∗ = .70
5.31
, 
. Notice that the profit of the entrant ( ) ( )( ),HE I EP H P Hπ ∗ ∗ = H  in this 
equilibrium is the same as in the full information case, but the profit the entrant 
L  obtains is higher than that the entrant L obtains when there is full information. 
Thus, entry of H  is not discouraged and entry of L  is facilitated with 
incomplete information. 
By comparing numerical outcome obtained above, we find that taking 
informative strategies may make the incumbent better off when the incumbent 
face a low quality entrant. In the meantime, the informative strategy may make the 
incumbent worse off when the incumbent face a high quality entrant. 
If we further assume that consumers prior beliefs, 0.5θ =  and consider the 
ratio of the informed to uninformed consumers, 0.8x = , we can have pooling 
equilibria in both settings. In addition, we can obtain additional pooling 
equilibrium in setting II due to the large degree of freedom in defining beliefs out 
of the equilibrium path. 
Our numerical example shows the unique existence of each type of equilibrium. 
When the ratio of informed to uninformed consumers is very small, pooling 
equilibria occur, when the ratio of informed to uninformed consumer is relatively 
large, separating equilibria occur. In some ranges, the different types of equilibria 




3.4 Comparisons: markets without product differentiation versus 
markets with product differentiation 
In the ensuing analysis, we may call markets without horizontal differentiation as 
homogenous goods markets and markets with horizontal differentiation as 
heterogeneous goods markets. 
In setting I, where the entrant and some consumers know the entrant’s quality, 
there exists a separating equilibrium in which L  may or may not enter to share 
the market with the incumbent, but at ( ) LLHE cUUHP +−=∗ , H  can only 
attract informed consumers. Therefore, the profit of H  in this equilibrium is 
lower than with full information. The reason is that the entrant H  wins the 
whole market at  with full information. Therefore, 
informational product differentiation acts as a barrier to the entry of 
( ) LLHE cUUHP +−=∗
H . The 
result of this equilibrium is quite different for what we get from the analysis of a 
heterogeneous market. In a model with horizontal differentiation, we find that the 
entrant of high quality is better off with incomplete information in that the entrant 
of high quality earns a higher profit with incomplete information than with full 
information. Furthermore, our findings reveal that the entrant of low quality 
makes the same profit as in the full information benchmark. Hence, we conclude 
that the entry of high quality is facilitated in a differentiated market for experience 
goods. The insight of this difference is that in a homogenous competition, the low 
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quality entrant firm makes zero profit so that the high quality entrant has to price 
below the marginal cost of the low quality entrant to prevent the low quality 
entrant from mimicking. But the high quality entrant is not willing to set a price 
below its marginal cost, which is higher than the marginal cost of low quality 
entrant. Therefore, the existence of informed consumers could not help in 
preventing mimicking as long as there exist some uninformed consumers. 
Although the low quality loses all informed consumers in case of mimicking the 
high quality entrant, it will benefit from uninformed consumers and makes a 
positive profit by mimicking the high quality to set a price above the marginal cost 
of the high quality entrant. However, if the low quality entrant does not mimic the 
high quality entrant, it may win the entire market but makes zero profit in 
equilibrium. Therefore, the loss on informed consumers really does not matter. In 
contrast, in a differentiated goods market, each firm has some market power, sets a 
price above its marginal cost and makes a positive profit in the equilibrium. The 
existence of some consumers informed of the entrant’s quality and a high price 
help dissuade the low quality rival from mimicking the high quality because the 
loss on informed consumer is more damaging to the low quality entrant than the 
high quality rival. In other words, the low quality entrant will lose more informed 
consumers by mimicking the high quality entrant to set a high price and the loss of 
profit margin on marginal consumers is higher when the entrant’s quality is low. 
Complete information outcome cannot attain with homogenous competition: 
that is, ; ( ) ( )LPcLP ELI ∗∗ == ( ) LI cHP =∗ , ( ) LLHE cUUHP +−=∗ . Market shares 
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of L  and the incumbent are undetermined. H  wins the whole market share. 
However, in a differentiated product market, when the ratio of informed to 
uninformed consumers is large enough, we obtain the full information outcome. 
Again the existence of large amount of informed consumers prevents the low 
quality entrant from mimicking high quality. However, the existence of informed 
consumers should not take any force in a homogenous market as the low quality 
entrant firm price at marginal cost in equilibrium. The low quality entrant firm 
would prefer to mimic the high quality entrant firm by setting a high price anyway 
to gain from uninformed consumers. Further, in this equilibrium, separation 
occurs because ( ) ( )LPHP EE ∗∗ ≠ , the incumbent pools, so informational free riding 
is impossible for the entrant. Therefore, requiring unprejudiced beliefs need not 
have force in such an equilibrium. The entrant has no way to make use of the 
incumbent’s equilibrium strategy. When H  sets a price ( ) LLHE cUUHP +−=∗  
which is above , all informed consumers will buy from Hc H . But if all 
uninformed consumers also buy from H , L  would always have incentive to 
imitate since doing so can make it get all the uninformed consumers and make a 
positive profit. As such, H  only wins all uninformed consumers in this 
equilibrium. Therefore, we cannot achieve the full information equilibrium where 
H  gets the entire market. 
In a homogeneous goods market, there exists a separating equilibrium in which 
the incumbent’s price becomes informative of the entrant’s true quality, 
, ( ) LLHI cUULP +−=∗ ( ) LI cHP =∗ ,  and ( ) ( ) LLHEE cUULPHP +−== ∗∗ , 
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when  the proportion of uninformed consumers is small enough. The profit of 
H  is the same as in the complete information game, while the profit of L  is 
higher than with full information case. Thus incomplete information facilitates 
entry for L , but has no effect on entry for H .  This result is consistent with our 
result from heterogeneous goods market, when  is small, the incumbent may be 
worse off with informative strategies. The incumbent’s high price signals that the 
entrant sells a low quality product, and low price signals that the entrant sells a 
high quality product when the ratio of informed to uninformed consumers is 
intermediate. The reasoning behind this type of equilibrium is that if the 
incumbent sets a high price to signal the entrant’s high quality, then the incumbent 
would lose an even larger portion of marginal consumers and enjoy an even 
smaller portion of inframarginal consumers. This would cause the incumbent to 
reduce its price to capture a larger share of the market. Conversely, the incumbent 
would prefer a high price to signal low quality of the entrant, since it has a 
relatively large share of the market when the entrant sells a low quality product 
and has an incentive to capture the relatively high profit margin by charging a high 
price. It therefore turns out that the high price of the incumbent signals the 
entrant’s low quality in presence of some consumers informed of the entrant’s 
quality. Intuitively, the more informed consumers, the more loss the incumbent 
would incur by setting a high price to mislead uninformed consumers when the 
entrant’s quality is indeed high. Hence, a high price and the existence of some 
informed consumers ensure separation. Tables 3.1 and 3.2 present the equilibria 
t
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characterization with different assumptions on information structure. 
 Nash Equilibrium 
 
Full information 
( ) ( )I L EP L c P L∗ ∗= = , ( )I LP H c∗ = , ( )E H LP H U U c∗ L= − + , market 
shares of L  and the incumbent are undetermined, H  enters and 
wins the whole market. 





∗ = , ( )E LP L c∗ = , ( )E H L L ,  may or may not 
enter the market, attracts only the informed consumers. 
Informational product differentiation acts as a barrier to entry for .
H
H
( ) ( ) ( )I I E LP H P L P L c∗ ∗ ∗= = = , , L .  may or 
may not enter the market,  wins only the informed consumers. 








II ( )I H L LP L U U c∗ = − + , , ( ) ( )E E H LP H P L U U c∗ ∗ L= = − + , 
and the proportion of informed consumers is small enough. 
captures the whole market, while  attracts only the uninformed 
consumers. Informational product differentiation does not act as a 
barrier to entry. 
H
L
 Pooling equilibria 
I LP c
∗ = , ( ) ( )E E E LP P H P L U U cθ∗ ∗ ∗ L= = = − + , all consumers are 






c P P∗ ∗≤ ≤ E , H E Lc P U U cθ∗ L≤ ≤ − + , and ( ) ( )E E EP P H P L∗ ∗ ∗= = , 
the fraction of informed consumers is small enough.  wins the 




∗ = , ( ) ( )E E E L LP P H P L U U cθ∗ ∗ ∗= = = − + , all the consumers 
are uninformed and the incumbent captures the whole market. 
( ) ( )I I L , , consumers 

























L Ic P P
∗ ∗≤ ≤ E , H E L L ,  and 
( ) ( )E E EP P H P L∗ ∗ ∗= = , the fraction of informed consumers is small 
enough, and the incumbent loses all consumers if the entrant is , 
but wins all the informed consumers if the entrant is . 
H
L
P H U U c∗ = − + L
( )E H LP H U U c∗ = − + L
( )I LP H c∗ =
P H P L c∗ ∗= = ( ) ( )E E H L LP H P L U U c∗ ∗= = − +
c P U U cθ
∗< ≤ − + ( ) ( )I I IP P H P L∗ ∗ ∗= =
Table 3.1 Equilibria in a market without horizontal product differentiation 
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  Nash Equilibrium 
Full information ( ) ( )I EP L t P L∗ ∗= = , ( ) 3I
cP H t β∗ −= + , ( ) 2
3E
cP H t β∗ += + .  





∗ = , ( )EP L∗ t= , ( )EP H t β∗ = +  and the proportion of 
informed consumers is at some intermediate values. Informational 
product differentiation does not act as a barrier to entry.  
( ) ( )I EP L t P L∗ ∗= = , ( ) 3I
cP H t β∗ −= + , ( ) 2
3E
cP H t β∗ += +
and the proportion of informed consumers is large enough. 
Informational product differentiation does not act as a barrier to 
entry. 
( ) ( )I I IP L P H P∗ ∗ ∗= = t= , ( )EP L t∗ = , ( )EP H t β∗ = +  and the 
proportion of informed consumers is at some intermediate values. 









( ) ( ) 2
3E E







cP H t β∗ −= +  and the proportion of informed consumers is 
at some intermediate values. Informational product differentiation 
does not act as a barrier to entry. 




( ) ( )( )* , , , ,0L LE I E E I EP P P P Lπ θ π∗ ∗≥ , 
( ) ( )( )*, , , ,0H HE I E E I EP P P P Hπ θ π∗ ∗≥  and 2EI t PP βθ
∗
∗ + −=  
( ) ( )( )*, , , ,0L LE I E E I EP P P P Lπ θ π∗ ∗≥ , 
( ) ( )( )*, , , ,0H HE I E E I EP P P P Hπ θ π∗ ∗≥  and 2EI t PP βθ
∗























II ( ) ( )( )*, , , ,0H HE I E E I EP P P P Hπ θ π∗ ∗≥ ;
( ) ( )( )*, , , ,0L LE I E E I EP P P P Lπ θ π∗ ∗≥ , 
( ) ( )( )*, , , ,1L LI I E I I EP P P L Pπ θ π∗ ∗≥ ; 
( ) ( )( )*, , , ,1H HI I E I I EP P P H Pπ θ π∗ ∗≥  
Table 3.2 Equilibrium in a market with horizontal product differentiation 
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 3.5 Conclusions 
Our analysis shows that in a differentiated goods market, when only some 
consumers are informed of the entrant’s quality with all consumers being 
informed of the incumbent’s quality, high price on the part of the entrant can 
signal high quality whereas low price will signal low quality. In this equilibrium, 
the informational disadvantage on the part of entrant actually encourages entry of 
a high quality entrant but at the same time does not serve as a barrier for entry to a 
low quality entrant. Compared to the full information outcome, the partial 
information outcome, i.e., when only some consumers are informed of the entrant 
quality, is better in that both the entrant with high quality and the incumbent 
achieve higher profits. These results are in contrast with Bagwell (1990), where 
the entry of a high quality entrant is deterred and thus the entrant of high quality is 
worse off by its information disadvantage. The presence of some consumers 
informed of the entrant’s quality is a crucial factor for the unique existence of this 
type of separating equilibrium, in which the incumbent pools and the entrant 
chooses separating prices. Intuitively, when competing against a low quality 
incumbent, a low quality entrant always gains higher profit margin with regard to 
uninformed consumers by mimicking the high quality rival to set a high price. 
However, a high price can dissuade a low quality entrant from imitating high 
quality because a high price makes a low quality entrant lose more sales to the 
incumbent with regard to informed consumers and this sales loss is more 
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damaging to a low quality and low cost entrant. This result also differs from that 
of Bagwell and Riordan (1991), where a sufficiently high price by a monopolist 
can signal its high quality even if all consumers are uninformed. This is because 
the resulting loss of sales volume by such a high price is less damaging to a higher 
cost and higher quality producer. The difference is driven by our restriction that 
the market is fully covered, which implies that consumers’ utilities are 
nonnegative when consumers buy from one of the two firms and thus each 
consumer will buy one unit from one of the two firms. Under this assumption, a 
sufficiently high price and  would not be allowed in our equilibrium.  t
With an informed incumbent, we have two more equilibria. The first 
equilibrium reveals that the full information competitive outcome can be obtained 
when the proportion of informed consumers is large enough. Firms set different 
prices, depending on the entrant’s quality, as if there were full information. 
Furthermore, this is the only equilibrium of this type in which both firms choose 
separating prices. The rationale here is that the two firms are trying to signal 
common information and uninformed consumers can learn the entrant’s quality 
from either the entrant’s price or the incumbent’s. The low quality entrant would 
not pretend to be of high quality as the loss with regard to the informed consumers 
might dominate the benefit with regard to the uninformed consumers when the 
proportion of informed consumers is large enough. Consequently, incomplete 
information with an informed incumbent has no effect on entry when compared 
with full information benchmark. This additional equilibrium is comparable to our 
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analysis in a homogenous goods market, where we do not achieve the full 
information outcome in which the high quality entrant wins the whole market. The 
reason is that in a very competitive environment, the incumbent would price as 
low as its marginal cost regardless of the entrant’s quality to save the market. 
Therefore, unprejudiced beliefs have no force when the incumbent pools at its 
marginal cost pricing. 
The results from the second additional equilibrium show that a low price by the 
incumbent signals high quality of the entrant and vice versa, when a certain 
fraction of consumers are knowledgeable of the entrant’s quality. Intuitively, with 
more informed consumers, a relatively low price is preferable to the incumbent 
when faced with a high quality entrant. Therefore, when the proportion of 
informed consumers approaches some critical value, a high price can prevent the 
incumbent from making consumers believe that the entrant’s quality is low, when 
the entrant’s actual quality is high. Compared to the full information outcome, the 
profit of the high quality entrant is unchanged, while the profit of the low quality 
entrant is higher. This suggests that entry for a low quality entrant is facilitated by 
the incumbent’s informative strategies. In particular, the incumbent may not be 
able to benefit from its private information regarding the entrant’s quality if  is 
a very small number. These are consistent with our results in a homogenous goods 
market. The insight here is that if the competition gets intense, the incumbent 
ought not to use this information advantage because its separating prices would 
help the entrant convince consumers of its high quality.  
t
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 Appendix B: Appendix for chapter 3 
B  Proofs 
Proof of Proposition 1  
Proof of proposition 1 is straightforward. 
 
Proof of Proposition 2  
We first show that no firm has an incentive to deviate and the proposed price 
strategies form an equilibrium. A necessary condition for a separating equilibrium 
is that L  prefers not to mimic the price selected by H . Given , this 


















. ( ) EE PtHP ≥+=∗ β  if β
tx ≥ . 
Hence, if β
tx ≥ , a deviant price  such that EP ( ) β+=> ∗ tHPP EE  is not 
desirable for  even if such a price can cause all uninformed consumers into 




( ) β+=< ∗ tHPP EE ( )E EP P L∗ t≠ =  as well. Any price 
 makes all uninformed consumers believe that it sells a low 
quality product. With this belief, the best price for  is 
( ) β+=< ∗ tHPP EE
L ( ) tLPE =∗ , given the 
equilibrium price of the incumbent. As a result,  has no incentive to deviate 
from its equilibrium price strategy. We now need to verify that no profitable 
deviations are available for 
L
H  as well. Firstly, with reference to Figure 3.1, H  
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would never deviate to any price ( ) β+=> ∗ tHPP EE . Given , suppose all 
consumers are informed of its quality, the optimal price for 
tPI =∗
H  is 
2
ˆ ctPE
++= β  
and the corresponding profit is represented by iso-profit curve . The profit for 1I
H  when pricing at  is represented by iso-profit curve , which 
is lower than , but higher than , the iso-profit curve when 
( ) β+=∗ tHPE 2I
1I 3I H  deviates to 
any price . Hence, ( ) β+=> ∗ tHPP EE H  could not profitably deviate by 
charging a price . Next, we need to show that ( ) β+=> ∗ tHPP EE H  would not 
deviate to any price below ( ) β+=∗ tHPE  as well. Suppose uninformed 
consumers believe that the entrant sells a low quality product upon observing a 
deviant price . If ( ) β+=< ∗ tHPP EE H  deviates to ( ) β+=< ∗ tHPP EE , given 
















1 β  
and the corresponding profit function is 
(11 1
2 1 2 1
E E
E
P Px P c
t x t x



















Therefore, H  would like to choose its equilibrium price as well. It is easily 
verified that the incumbent has no incentive to deviate too with consumers’ beliefs 
( )( ) 0, =∗ LPPb EI  for all ; IP ( )( ) 1, =∗ HPPb EI  for all . In other words, 
consumers can accurately infer the entrant’s quality from its equilibrium prices. 
The incumbent’s price,  reflects its best response to the entrant’s 
IP
tPI =∗
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equilibrium strategies. 
Next, we show this is the only equilibrium of this type. Refer to Figure 3.1 
again, suppose we have a separating equilibrium represented by point A  and B . 
It follows that ( )( ) 0, =∗ LPPb EI  for all . The incumbent would like to deviate 
from point 
IP
A  to point C , knowing that the consumers will nevertheless observe 
the entrant’s quality from the entrant’s separating prices. The discussion above 
indicates that the proposed separating equilibrium associated with point A  and 
B  fails to be an equilibrium. In fact, a similar argument eliminates all these kinds 
of separating equilibria in which , and tPI ≠∗ ( ) ( )HPLP EE ∗∗ ≠ . Consequently, we 














++= β ( ) β+=∗ tHPE
( ) ( )
22




( ) ( )
22
1 tLPLP EI +=
( ) ( )
222
1 β−+= tHPHP EI( ) ( ) tHPLP II == ∗∗





Figure 3.1 A separating equilibrium in setting I 
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2 2t c c t t ct x
c
β β β β
β β
+ − + + −= ≤ −  and 
( )EP H t Pβ∗ = + = E , the proposed equilibrium can pass the intuitive criterion 





2 2t c c t t ct x
c
β β β β
β β
+ − + + −< ≤ −  , then 
















 . Recall that 
L  would never defect to any price  with EP ( )E E EP P P H∗< < , regardless of 
consumers’ beliefs. Hence, any price  with EP ( )E E EP P P H∗< <  is equilibrium 
dominated for L , but this argument is not true for H . According to the intuitive 
criterion, any price observations of  with EP ( )E E EP P P H∗< <  should make 
uninformed consumers believe that the entrant sells a high quality product. This 
indicates a profitable price deviation may exist for H . In fact, any price  
with 
EP
(E E EP P P H∗< < )  around 2ˆ
ctPE
++= β , the profit maximizing price for 
H  when all consumers are informed, are possible profitable deviations. Thereby, 






2 2t c c t t ct x
c
β β β β
β β
+ − + + −< ≤ − . But if 
( )EP H t Pβ∗ = + = E , there is no equilibrium dominated strategies available for 
both L  and H , then the proposed equilibrium can be supported by the intuitive 
criterion. 
 
Proof of Proposition 3  
( )HPI∗  maximizes the incumbent’s profit, given H  prices at  and (HPE∗ )
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consumers have beliefs ( )( ) 1, =∗ HPPb EI  for all ; and if the entrant is , 
 is the best response to 
IP L
( )LPI∗ ( )LPE∗  with consumers’ beliefs ( )( ) 0, =∗ LPPb EI , 
for all . Hence, the incumbent would not deviate. We then show that if the 
entrant is 
IP
H , it would not deviate from its equilibrium price.  is its best 
response to  with consumers’ beliefs 
( )HPE∗
( )HPI∗ ( )( ) 1, =∗ EI PHPb  for , 
thus a deviant price , with 
( )LPP EE ∗≠
EP ( )LPP EE ∗≠  is unprofitable for H . The other 
possible profitable deviation for H  is to mimic the entrant  by offering a 
price 
L
( ) tLPP EE == ∗ . If we exploit the arbitrariness of beliefs out of the 
equilibrium path and impose ( ) ( )( ) 0, =∗∗ LPHPb EI , then given , the market 
share is 
( )IP H∗
1 1 1 2
1 2 6 1 2 6
c x c
x t x t
β β− +⎛ ⎞ ⎛+ + +⎜ ⎟ ⎜+ +⎝ ⎠ ⎝
⎞⎟⎠ . Moreover, 
( )( ) (1 1 1 2, 1 2 6 1 2 6HE I E c x cP H P t cx t x tβ βπ ∗ ⎛ ⎞− +⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞= + + +⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟+ +⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠ )−  gives the 
resulting profit for H . This deviation profit would be greater than 





















Since  is a nonnegative number, such a deviation is undesirable. Therefore, x H  
has no incentive to deviate. Now, we need to check whether when the entrant is 








+ − +≥ +
c
. Given 
, ( ) tLPI =∗ ( )( ) 0, =∗ EI PLPb  for ( )HPP EE ∗≠ , any deviant price  with 
 is not preferable since 
EP
( )HPP EE ∗≠ ( )LPE∗  is the best response for L  within 
that belief construction. Also if L  mimics by offering a price 
( ) 2
3E E
cP P H t β∗ += = + , which would be selected if the entrant is H , such 
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+ − +≥ +
c
. Given  and 
consumers’ beliefs, 
( ) tLPI =∗
( ) ( )( ) 1, =∗∗ HPLPb EI , if L  sets price at , then the 
market share for 
( )HPP EE ∗=
L  is 1 1 1 2
1 2 3 1 2 6
c x c
x t x t
β −⎛ ⎞ ⎛+ + −⎜ ⎟ ⎜+ +⎝ ⎠ ⎝
β + ⎞⎟⎠ . The resulting profit 
is then 1 1 1 2 2
1 2 3 1 2 6 3
c x c ct
x t x t
β β⎛ ⎞− +⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞ ⎛+ + − +⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟ ⎜⎜ ⎟+ +⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠ ⎝⎝ ⎠
β + ⎞⎟⎠ , which is less than or 
equal to 
2








+ − +≥ +
c
. Hence, L  has no incentive to 
deviate as well. 
It remains to show that the equilibrium proposed above can survive 
unprejudiced beliefs38. The minimality rule requires that  ( )( ) 0, =∗ EI PLPb  for 
; ( )HPP EE ∗≠ ( )( ) 1, =∗ EI PHPb  for ( )LPP EE ∗≠ ; ( )( ) 0, =∗ LPPb EI , for 
; ( )HPP II ∗≠ ( )( ) 1, =∗ HPPb EI  for ( )LPP II ∗≠ , and the open-mindedness allows  
( ) ( )( )LPHPb EI ∗∗ ,  to be close to zero, and ( ) ( )( )HPLPb EI ∗∗ ,  to be close to one. 
Therefore, the equilibrium constructed above has unprejudiced beliefs. 
Next, we show this is the only unprejudiced equilibrium of that type. Consider  
equilibrium with ( ) ( )LPHP II ∗∗ ≠ , ( ) ( )LPHP EE ∗∗ ≠ , with , ( ) ( ) tLPLP EI ≠= ∗∗
( )
3
β−+≠∗ ctHPI , ( ) 3
2ctHPE
++≠∗ β . Referring to Figure 3.2, suppose that 
point  corresponds to a possible price pair when the entrant is of low quality 
for a class of equilibrium with 
D
( ) ( )LPHP II ∗∗ ≠ , ( ) ( )LPHP EE ∗∗ ≠ . According to 
unprejudiced beliefs, consumers should have beliefs: ( ) ( )( ) 1, =∗∗ HPHPb EI , 
( ) ( )( ) 0ˆ,ˆ =LPLPb EI ; ( )( ) 0,ˆ =EI PLPb  for ( )HPP EE ∗≠ ; ( )( ) 1, =∗ EI PHPb  for 
                                                        
38 A minimality rule ought to be satisfied under the refinement of unprejudiced beliefs, which implies that 
consumers can infer the entrant’s quality if under that quality the deviant price pair can be rationalized with 
the fewest number of deviations from the equilibrium strategies (see Bagwell and Ramey 1991). 
                    
100 
( )LPP EE ˆ≠ ; ( )( ) 0ˆ, =LPPb EI , for all ; IP ( )( ) 1, =∗ HPPb EI  for all . It is easily 
verified that the equilibrium suggested above fails, since the incumbent could 
profitably deviate to point 
IP
E . This, in turn, gives L  incentive to deviate further. 
The example demonstrates that in an equilibrium with both firms having prices 
separating, each firm can free-ride on the rival’s signaling and make a profitable 
deviation. Moreover, this sort of free-riding is sure to arise if both firms’ prices are 
not their best responses. It follows that the equilibrium proposed above is the only 





















EP( ) tLPE =∗
( ) ( )
22
1 tLPLP EI +=
( ) ( )
222
1 β−+= tHPHP EI
( ) ( )
22
1 tLPLP IE +=







 Figure 3.2 A separating equilibrium in which both the incumbent and 
entrant’ prices are informative 
 
Finally, we need to check whether this equilibrium can be supported by the 
intuitive criterion. We follow the convention of a modified intuitive criterion 
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provided by Bagwell and Ramey (1991)39. As shown in our proof, the point 
 is equilibrium dominated for ( ) ( )( ,I EP H P L∗ ∗ ) H , but not for L , thus we have 
( ) ( )( ) 0, =∗∗ LPHPb EI . Likewise, the point ( ) ( )( ),I EP L P H∗ ∗ is equilibrium 
dominated for L , but not for H , thus we have ( ) ( )( ) 1, =∗∗ HPLPb EI . The beliefs 
described here are the same as the beliefs constructed in the above mentioned 
equilibrium. Thus, this equilibrium can pass the intuitive criterion. 
 
Proof of Proposition 4 
Note that in this equilibrium, the incumbent pools whatever quality type the 
entrant has. Therefore, its price cannot ensure separation. This situation is the 
same as in setting I. As a result, we have the same separating equilibrium as 
proposed in proposition 2. The proof here is therefore omitted.  
 
Proof of Proposition 5 
We first show that each firm has no incentive to deviate in the constructed 
equilibrium. If the entrant is L , ( ) 2
3E
cP L t β∗ += +  is the best response to 
( )IP L∗  with the consumers’ beliefs ( )( ) 0, =∗ EI PLPb ; if the entrant is H , 
( ) 2
3E
cP H t β∗ += +  gives the best response to ( )IP H∗  with the consumers 
beliefs ( )( ) 1, =∗ EI PHPb  for all . Therefore, the entrant of neither type will 
deviate. Now we need to check that the incumbent would not deviate as well. 
EP
                                                        
39 This is designed to strengthen the open-mindness condition without giving rise to prejudiced beliefs. In 
particular, when the minimality rule is inapplicable, we shall have the assumption that consumers place a 
small weight on a quality type when a price is equilibrium dominated for that type (see Bagwell and Ramey 
1991). 
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Firstly, we verify that if the entrant is H , the incumbent has no incentive to 
pretend that it observes L . To eliminate this incentive, the equality 
( ) ( )( ) 2, ( ) , ( ) 12 3L HI I E I I E t cP P H P H P H tβπ π∗ ∗ ∗ −⎛≤ = ⎜⎝ ⎠⎞+ ⎟ must hold, where 
( )
2 2
1 13 3, ( )
2 2 1 2 2 1
I I
L
I I E I




⎛ ⎞+ +⎛ ⎞ ⎛+ − − + −⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟ ⎜= + + +⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟ ⎜ 1 x




22 22 2 4 1
3 1 3 1 3ˆ
2I I
c x c x ct t t
x xP P
β β β β β+ +⎛ ⎞ ⎛+ − + + − − +⎜ ⎟ ⎜+ +⎝ ⎠ ⎝≥ = t
− ⎞⎟⎠ , 
where the critical value  is obtained by solving the inequality above, the 
incumbent would not want to sway uninformed consumers into believing that the 
entrant is 
IPˆ
L  upon observing H . ( ) ( )2 2 ˆ
3I I
c
P L t P
















ββ  , upon observing H , the incumbent 
would not deviate from  to any price with ( )IP H∗ ( )I IP P L∗> , given consumers’ 
beliefs ( ) 0, =∗EI PPb  for ( )I IP P L∗≥ . With ( ) 1, =∗EI PPb  for 
( ) ( )
3
22 ctLPP II
++=< ∗ β , any price ( )I IP P L∗<  with  cannot be a 
profitable deviation either because all consumers believe the entrant is 
( )I IP P H∗≠
H  and 
 is the incumbent’s best response to ( )IP H∗ ( )EP H∗ . We now check that the 
incumbent would not deviate from ( )IP L∗  as well when faced with L . As 
illustrated in Figure 3.3,  indicates the iso-profit curve for the incumbent at 1I




++= β , where all consumers are supposed to know that the entrant is L . 
,  are the respective iso-profit curves for the incumbent when it prices at 2I 3I
( )IP L∗  and . As can been seen, ( )I IP P L∗> 1 2 3I I I> > . Hence, the incumbent 
would not deviate to any price ( )I IP P L∗>  when observing L . Finally, we 
check the incumbent would not defect to any price ( )I IP P L∗<  when observing 
L . Any deviant price ( ) ( )
3
22 ctLPP II
++=< ∗ β  makes all uninformed 
consumers believe the entrant sells a high quality product. Given ( )EP L∗ , the 

























1 βββ  and its consequent profit 
function is 2 21 1
2 6 1 2 6 1
I I
I
P Pc x cP
t t x t t x
ββ β⎛ ⎞++ +⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞− + + − +⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟+ +⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠
1 . The best 







ββ . The resulting 
profit maximum is lower than or equal to ( ) ( )( ),LI I EP L P Lπ ∗ ∗  if 
( )
2 2 2 2 2
2
6 2 12 10 2 9 3 6 2 8 8
3 2
t c c t t tc cx
c
cβ β β β β β
β

















222 2 2 2 2
2 2
3 26 2 12 10 2 9 3 6 2 8 8
3 2
t c ct c c t t tc c c
c c
β ββ β β β β β β
β β




( ) ( )
22 2 2 2 2 2
2 2
3 2 6 2 12 10 2 9 3 6 2 8 8
3 2
t c c t c c t t tc c cx
c c
β β β β β β β β β
β β
− − + − − − + + + − − −≤ ≤+ +
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( ) ( )
22
1 tLPLP IE +=




( ) ( )
22
1 tLPLP EI +=
( ) ( )
222


















 Figure 3.3 A separating equilibrium in which only the incumbent’s prices 
are informative 
 
Next, we show that this is the only unprejudiced equilibrium where the entrant 
pools, while the incumbent separates. With reference to Figure 3.3, suppose we 
have a separating equilibrium represented by point  and . It follows that F G
( )( ) 0, =∗ EI PLPb  for all ; EP ( )( ) 1, =∗ EI PHPb  for all . That is, the entrant 
can rely on the incumbent’s prices to signal its quality. This kind of free-riding on 
the incumbent’s signaling provides 
EP
H  with a profitable deviation. For instance, 
H  would be better off at point M , meaning that H  can raise its price to 
increase its profit, knowing that consumers will nevertheless learn its quality from 
the incumbent’s prices. The discussion above indicates that the proposed 
equilibrium associated with point  and  fails to be an unprejudiced G
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equilibrium. In fact, a similar argument eliminates all separating equilibria in 
which , ( ) ( )HPLP II ∗∗ ≠ ( ) ( ) 3
2ctPHPLP EEE
++≠== ∗∗∗ β . Consequently, this is 
the unique equilibrium of this type that passes unprejudiced beliefs. 
The last step is to show that only if ( )( )
22
2





− − += + , and , 
this equilibrium survives the intuitive criterion. If 
( )Iˆ IP P L∗=
( )Iˆ IP P L∗= , then no strategies 
are equilibrium dominated for the incumbent when faced with H , but not when 
faced with L . Hence, the above proposed equilibrium survives the intuitive 
criterion when 
( )
( ) ( )
22 2 2 2 2 2
2 2
3 2 6 2 12 10 2 9 3 6 2 8 8
3 2
t c c t c c t t tc cx
c c
β β cβ β β β β β
β β
− − + − − − + + + − − −= ≤+ +
β
. However, if ( )( )
22
2





− − +> +  and ( )Iˆ IP P L
∗< , then any price  with IP
( )Iˆ I IP P P L∗≤ <  is equilibrium dominated for the incumbent when faced with H , 
but not when faced with L . Therefore, all uninformed consumers should believe 
that the entrant is L  upon observing any price  with IP ( )Iˆ I IP P P L∗≤ < . Hence, 
any price  with IP ( )Iˆ I IP P P L∗≤ < , nearer to 6
2ctPI
++= β  would probably 
be a profitable deviation when faced with a low quality entrant. Therefore, if 
( )
( ) ( )
22 2 2 2 2 2
2 2
3 2 6 2 12 10 2 9 3 6 2 8 8
3 2
t c c t c c t t tc cx
c c
β β cβ β β β β β
β β
− − + − − − + + + − − −< ≤+ +
β
 and ( )Iˆ IP P L∗< , the proposed equilibrium does not pass the intuitive criterion 
refinement.  
 
Proof of Proposition 6 
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Suppose the entrant is L , given that the incumbent sets  and beliefs 
constructed as in the foregoing analysis, then 
∗
IP
L  will prefer , if ∗EP
( ) ( )( )0,,,,* LPPPP EILEEILE ∗∗ ≥ πθπ . Note here ( )*, ,LE I EP Pπ θ∗  denotes the profit L  




( ) θ=∗EI PPb , . In contrast, ( )( ), ,LE I EP P Lπ ∗ 0  denotes the profit L  
obtains when L  chooses a deviating price  and consumers have beliefs, ∗EP
( ) 0, =∗ EI PPb . This restriction on  means that ∗EP L  cannot make a profitable 
deviation with the pessimistic beliefs out of equilibrium path. In the following 
analysis, we can write down ( )*, ,LE I EP Pπ θ∗  and ( )( ), ,LE I EP P Lπ ∗ 0  in a more 
specific form. Suppose that L  sets , then the informed consumers still can 
observe the entrant’s true quality, while the uninformed consumers believe that the 
entrant has high quality with probability 
∗
EP
θ .  Consequently, we can have the 
demand function for L  as 1 1 1
1 2 2 1 2 2
I E I EP P P Px
x t x t
βθ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗⎛ ⎞ ⎛− −+ + +⎜ ⎟ ⎜+ +⎝ ⎠ ⎝
⎞+ ⎟⎠
 and 





























βθθπ . Suppose 
that L  deviates to , then its demand function is ( ) ∗≠ EE PLP ( )12 2I E
P P L
t
∗ −+  
and profit function is thus ( )( ) ( ) ( )1, ,0 2 2I ELE I E E P P LP P L P L tπ
∗
∗ ⎛ ⎞−= +⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
. Since in 
a pooling equilibrium the entrant of either type sets the same , the same 
argument as above should also go for 
∗
EP
H , ( ) ( )( )0,,,,* HPPPP EIHEEIHE ∗∗ ≥ πθπ . 
Similarly, if H  sets  , we have its demand function of ∗EP
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1 1 1
1 2 2 1 2 2
I E I EP P P Px
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And if H  deviates to ( ) ∗≠ EE PHP , then its demand function is 
( ) ( )1 1 1
1 2 2 1 2 2
I E I EP P H P P Hx
x t x t
β∗ ∗⎛ ⎞ ⎛− + −+ + +⎜ ⎟ ⎜⎜ ⎟ ⎜+ +⎝ ⎠ ⎝
⎞⎟⎟⎠
, and the profit function is 
( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( )1 1 1, ,0 ( ) 1 2 2 1 2 2I E I EHE I E E P P H P P HxP P H P H c x t x tβπ
∗ ∗
∗ ⎡ ⎤⎛ ⎞ ⎛− + −= − + + + ⎞⎢ ⎥⎜ ⎟ ⎜⎜ ⎟ ⎜+ + ⎟⎟⎢ ⎥⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠⎣ ⎦
. In a pooling equilibrium, given  and ∗EP ( ) θ=∗EI PPb ,  for all , then the 
incumbent will set a price to maximize its profit. That is, 
IP
























1,,max βθθπ . Clearly, as long as the above two 
inequalities are met simultaneously, and at the same time the incumbent sets  
to maximize its profit, it is possible to support 
∗
IP
( )∗∗ EI PP ,  to be a pooling 
equilibrium profile. Formally, ( )∗∗ EI PP ,  could be a pooling equilibrium profile if 






∗ + −=  with consumers beliefs specified in the following 
( ) θ=∗EI PPb ,  for all ; IP ( ) 0, =∗ EI PPb  for  . If we solve for the 
condition above further, we obtains 
∗≠ EE PP
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That is, we can find a pooling equilibrium profile ( )∗∗ EI PP ,  by solving the two 
inequalities simultaneously. 
 
Proof of Proposition 7 
Proposition 7 is the same as proposition 6.  
 
Proof of Proposition 8 
In a pooling equilibrium, ( ) ( )( )0,,,,* LPPPP EILEEILE ∗∗ ≥ πθπ  and 
( ) ( )( )0,,,,* HPPPP EIHEEIHE ∗∗ ≥ πθπ  should hold simultaneously given consumers 
beliefs ( ) 0, =∗ EI PPb  for . This part of analysis is similar as in the 
previous setting. In addition, note here the incumbent is informed of the entrant’s 
quality. As such, we can have consumers belief 
∗≠ EE PP
( ) 1, =∗EI PPb  for  , 
given . We then need to further ensure that the incumbent has no incentive to 




( ) ( )( )1,,,,* ∗∗ ≥ EILIEILI PLPPP πθπ  
and ( ) ( )(*, , , ,1H HI I E I I EP P P H Pπ θ π∗ ≥ )∗
)
 should hold simultaneously. Again notice 
that ( *, ,LI I EP Pπ θ∗  is the incumbent’s profit when the incumbent observes that 

































Likewise, ( )( ), ,1LI I EP L Pπ ∗  is the incumbent’s profit when the incumbent deviate 
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to a price with , and the uninformed consumers believe the entrant sells 
high quality, and 
∗≠ II PP




























βπ .  
( ) ( )( )1,,,,* ∗∗ ≥ EILIEILI PLPPP πθπ  says that the incumbent would not deviate from 
 when facing ∗IP L . Note also ( )*, ,HI I EP Pπ θ∗  is the incumbent’s profit when 

































Similarly, ( )( ), ,1HI I EP H Pπ ∗  is the incumbent’s profit when the incumbent faces 
the entrant H  and chooses a deviant price with , which would make the 
uninformed consumers believe that the entrant sells a high quality product, and 
∗≠ II PP





























. ( ) ( )( )1,,,,* ∗∗ ≥ EIHIEIHI PLPPP πθπ  implies that the incumbent would not deviate 
from  when faced with the entrant which sells a high quality product. Clearly, ∗IP
( )∗∗ EI PP ,  can be supported to be a pooling equilibrium profile if 
( ) ( )( )0,,,,* HPPPP EIHEEIHE ∗∗ ≥ πθπ , ( ) ( )( )0,,,,* LPPPP EILEEILE ∗∗ ≥ πθπ , 
( ) ( )( )1,,,,* ∗∗ ≥ EILIEILI PLPPP πθπ ; ( ) ( )( )*, , , ,1H HI I E I I EP P P H Pπ θ π∗ ∗≥  with 
consumers beliefs taking the following fashion: ( ) θ=∗∗ EI PPb , ; ( ) 1, =∗EI PPb  for 
; ∗≠ II PP ( ) 0, =∗ EI PPb  for . In particular, we can find an additional 
pooling equilibrium if the following four inequalities can be satisfied 
simultaneously: 
∗≠ EE PP
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CHAPTER 4 
Signaling unobservable quality choice through price and 
advertising: The case with competing firms 
 
4.1 Introduction  
In international markets, a domestic firm may suffer from informational 
disadvantage when it starts exporting its product to a third (foreign) country where 
consumers are uninformed of the quality of the good. This domestic firm may 
have enjoyed a dominant position in the domestic market. It seems that such firms 
set a lower price and a higher advertising in international markets than the price 
and advertising levels they used to set in the domestic market40. In this chapter, we 
examine the use of both price and advertising to signal a firm’s unobservable 
quality by assuming that quality is endogenously chosen by firms, rather than, 
exogenously determined by nature. In contrast to the exogenously quality 
literature, there exists an extensive literature on endogenous choice of quality. 
Famous examples of this strand of studies include Klein and Leffler (1981), 
Sharpiro (1983), Wolinsky (1983), Riordan (1986), Bester (1998) and more 
recently Rasmussen (2008).  
Klein and Leffler (1981) consider a standard endogenous quality setting in 
which the possibility of repeat purchase disciplines a firm’s choices and in which 
the cost of production increases in quality. There is a sizeable literature after Klein 
                                                        
40 I thank an anonymous examiner for providing this example. 
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and Leffler (1981), but all these studies have focused on firms’ choice of price to 
signal quality, and little attention has been paid to formally develop the role of 
advertising as a signal of quality.41 This is in contrast to the literature on 
exogenous choice of quality, where both price and advertising have been 
considered as possible signals of firms’ quality. Most recently, IW have developed 
a general framework for analyzing the signaling of unobservable choices42. They 
illustrate their framework with several important applications, one of which is to 
consider the use of both price and advertising as a signal of a firm’s unobservable 
choice of quality. This is the first time that the role of advertising, in addition to 
price, as a signal of a firm’s quality has been allowed in the literature on 
endogenous choice of quality. Based on the modified framework of Klein and 
Leffler (1981), their analysis shows that dissipative advertising cannot have a 
signaling role43. This is because advertising is a sunk cost in such a setting and 
does not change a firm’s incentive to supply low quality in the reordered game. 
  This chapter develops a model to consider price and advertising as a joint signal 
of a monopoly firm’s unobservable choice of product quality to analyze IW’s idea. 
Then this model of a monopoly firm is extended to a variation on Hotelling model 
to fit into the case with two imperfectly competitive firms to examine the issue of 
how competition affects firms’ choice of price and advertising jointly to signal 
                                                        
41 In and Wright (p. 30) writes  “to date the endogenous quality literature has not considered firms setting 
both price and advertising as possible signals of their unobservable quality. This may have been due to a lack 
of a consistent way to handle out of equilibrium offers of both price and advertising levels.” 
42 This framework makes it straightforward to handle multidimensional signals (see In and Wright, p. 31). 
43 They also point out that advertising can signal quality when it has a demand expanding effect. 
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their unobservable choice of quality44. Lastly, we discuss how social welfare is 
affected as the level of advertising changes with competition and when there is a 
ban on advertising. Note that advertising has a demand enhancing effect 
throughout this chapter and is assumed to increase the probability that consumers 
will consider repurchase.  
There are generally multiple perfect Bayesian equilibria of the game we 
consider due to the large degree of freedom in defining consumers beliefs out of 
equilibrium path45. We use the equilibrium refinement “reordering invariance” in 
IW that comes from solving the reordered game in which observable actions are 
chosen before unobservable actions. As such, we consider a reordered variant of 
the original game, in which price and advertising are chosen in stage 1 and quality 
in stage 246. This game shares the same reduced normal form as the original game. 
In this reordered game, there is a unique pure strategy subgame perfect 
equilibrium, which is the refined equilibrium outcome of the original game. This 
refinement is called “reordering invariance” in IW. That is, upon observing a price 
and/or advertising level, consumers form expectations of quality based on the 
quality that the firms would want to optimally set given prices and/or advertising 
levels provided that consumer expectations are formed rationally. 
Our results provide an explanation of why a firm prefers a higher level of 
                                                        
44 In the above model, if we consider two homogenous competitors, a problem arises in defining pure strategy 
equilibrium, since if both are active then they compete away all profits but then they should not advertise 
given advertising is a fixed cost. However, without advertising, they will be assumed to be low quality 
providers, and so any firm that advertises will be able to attract the whole market and make a positive profit 
(but then the other firm could undercut) 
45 In our original game, quality is chosen in stage 1 and price and advertising in stage 2. 
46 The order does not matter since the firm makes its choices of unobservable quality and observable price and 
/ or advertising without gaining any new information in between (see In and Wright 2008 p. 1). 
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advertising compared to the full information benchmark in the endogenous quality 
setting. The monopolist sets a higher level of advertising to signal its unobservable 
choice of high quality. As competition gets more and more intense from the 
monopoly, the duopoly firm will choose lower prices and higher levels of 
advertising to signal its unobservable choice of high quality. In addition, our 
analysis of social welfare properties gives some implications for public policy. 
The higher level of advertising set by a firm to reveal its unobservable choice of 
high quality tends to reduce social welfare. If price alone can signal a firm’ choice 
of high quality, a ban on advertising may make the society and the firm jointly 
better off due to the absence of advertising. However, consumers will be worse off 
as a result of higher prices and lower demand due to less advertising. Alternatively, 
if price alone cannot signal a firm’s choice of high quality, a ban on advertising 
may make a firm choose low quality and low price in the equilibrium, which may 
be even worse from the point of view of social welfare. Therefore, our results 
suggest that banning advertising may be more desirable when there is sufficient 
competition and when price alone can serve as a signal of firms’ unobservable 
choice of quality. However, when price alone cannot signal firms’ unobservable 
choice of quality, advertising as a signal should be desirable when there is 
insufficient competition. 
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. In the next section, we analyze 
the monopoly model with demand enhancing advertising. Then, we extend the 
model to the case with imperfect competition of two firms. In section 3, a 
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numerical example is given to illustrate our analysis presented in section 2. 
Section 4 concludes. 
 
4.2 The model 
Our results can be derived from a simple model used for the monopoly case. We 
first solve for the model in both exogenous and endogenously quality and review a 
basic property of equilibrium under monopoly. The model is extended to allow for 
competition in order to emphasize the relationship between signaling strategies 
and market structure.  
 
4.2.1 Monopoly and its welfare properties 
There are four stages. In the exogenous quality version of the model, in stage 1, 
nature determines the quality of the firm (a monopolist) from the set { },t L H∈  
with the probability t  given by H= 0 1ρ< < . In the endogenous quality 
version of the model, in stage 1, the firm (a monopolist) chooses its quality from 
the same set { },t L H∈ . The rest of the game remains the same regardless of how 
quality is chosen. In stage 2, the firm chooses a price (which is unchanged 
for the remainder of the game) and an advertising expenditure 
0P ≥
0,A A⎡∈ ⎣ ⎤⎦  for 
some sufficiently large A . In stage 3, a representative consumer (or a continuum 
of identical consumers) observes these choices but not the quality level and 
decides whether to buy from the firm or not. In stage 4, if the consumer buys, it 
observes the firm’s true quality, and with probability ( )Aφ  decides whether to 
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repurchase or not, where ( )0 Aφ 1≤ ≤ . This probability is assumed to be 
increasing in the firm’s advertising expense47. Such advertising increases the 
payoff to choosing high quality since it strengthens the repeat purchase effect, 
potentially enabling an equilibrium with high quality to arise. In particular, ( )Aφ  
is assumed to be a strictly concave increasing function so that advertising is 
demand enhancing but with diminishing returns. The alternative case in which 
( )Aφ  is constant in the firm’s advertising expense would captures dissipative or 
wasteful advertising.48
Consumers wishing to buy in a period, buy a single unit, receiving utility  
from the good of quality . The unit cost of production is  for the good of 
quality . Assume (1a) 
tv
t tc
t ,H L H Lv v c c> >  (1b) 0H H L Lv c v c− > − > . (1a) says 
high quality gives higher utility but costs more, and (1b) ensures that the net 
surplus is higher for the high quality good. The firm and consumer discount the 
last period payoff by δ  and 10 << δ . 
 
Exogenous quality game 
  Consider first the game with exogenous quality, in which to be consistent with 
the positive role of dissipative advertising in Milgrom and Roberts , we assume 
that (1c) ( ) ( ) ( )HHLHL cvccA −−<δφ  and (1d) ( ) 0' >Aφ  for all . 0≥A
                                                        
47 This approach is motivated by Nelson (1974), advertising helps consumers remember the brand, therefore 
increase the likelihood a buyer will consider a repeat purchase, a role which is more valuable when quality is 
actually high. 
48 In this case, the monopolist would never advertising if it could choose quality endogenously (since 
advertising would be sunk cost which does not help convince consumers it has set a high quality), while it 
may choose a positive level of wasteful advertising when quality is determined exogenously, so as to make it 
unprofitable for a low quality firm to try to pretend to be high quality (see In and Wright, 2009). 
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Define HA
∗  to be the optimal full information level of advertising by type H  
monopolist. That is ( )( )( )arg max 1H H H H HA A v c Aδφ∗ ⎡ ⎤= + − −⎣ ⎦ . Following 
Milgrom and Roberts, we use the standard refinement of sequential equilibria to 
focus on the least cost separating equilibrium outcome. A high quality firm would 
set its price at the monopoly level  and advertising level  to ensure that 




∗ ∗< , 
meaning that HA
∗  is not sufficiently costly to signal high quality. If the low 
quality firm chooses not to mimic, then its quality is revealed. It will optimally 
price at  and choose  to maximize its profit Lv LA ( )( )( )1 L L L LA v c Aδφ+ − − . 
The optimal  is found by solving ∗LA ( ) ( )LLL cvA −= δφ 1' . Note that we actually 
define  to be the optimal full information level of advertising by a low quality 
monopolist. So the low quality firm obtains a profit of 
∗
LA
( )( )( )1 L L LA v c Aδφ ∗ ∗L+ − − . 
Therefore, to prevent the low quality firm mimicking, the high quality firm will 
choose ( ),P A  equal to ( ),Hv A∗ , where 
( )( )( )1H L L L LA v c A v c Aδφ∗ ∗= − − + − + L∗ . So a high quality firm can signal its high 
quality, but in general, this would lead to a higher level of advertising. 
It remains to check that the firm of either quality would not deviate from its 
equilibrium strategy given consumers’ beliefs. Suppose consumers believe that the 
monopolist is a high quality firm if A A∗≥ , a low quality firm otherwise. Now 
we first verify that the low quality monopolist has no profitable deviation. It 
follows from the no mimicking constraint and our belief system that the low 
quality firm would never choose A A∗≥ . And if it deviates to any advertising 
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expenditure such that A A∗<  , then consumers would have correct beliefs that 
the monopolist is a low quality firm, then the best choice of the low quality firm is 
to set L LA A
∗= . We then turn to check that the high quality monopolist would not 
deviate as well. H  would never defect to any A A∗≥ , as HA A∗ < ∗  and  
( )( )( )1 H H H HA v c Aδφ+ − −  is a concave function in HA . If the high quality firm 
pretends to be of low quality, choosing A A∗< , then it chooses 
( )( )( )ˆ arg max 1 L HA A v c Aδφ⎡ ⎤⎦= + − −⎣ ˆ L. Note that . In order to sustain the 
above proposed equilibrium, 
( )( )( ) ( )( )( )ˆ ˆ1 1L H H HA v c A A v c Aδφ δφ ∗ ∗+ − − < + − −  must hold. Thus, we have 
characterized a perfect Bayesian separating equilibrium in which advertising is 
used to signal high quality. 
A A∗<
 
Endogenous quality game 
  Now consider the game where quality is determined endogenously. Initially, we 
keep the same assumptions except at stage 1 the firm chooses quality. We first 
characterize the equilibrium outcome of the reverse ordered game in which price 
and advertising are chosen in stage 1 and quality in stage 2. 
Define the optimal full information level of advertising by a monopolist of 
quality  to be t ( )( )( )arg max 1t t tA A vδφ t tc A⎡ ⎤= + − −⎣ ⎦ , where the price is set at 
the full information level . Note tv H LA A> 49. The monopolist’s maximum profit 
in the full information benchmark is therefore ( )( )( )1 t t t tA v c Aδφ+ − − 50. 
                                                        
49 This is implied by assumption (1b) 
50 Note we have assumed that ( )Aφ  is a strictly increasing concave function. This would be sufficient for the 
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Now consider the reverse ordered game. That is, the firm chooses price and 
advertising in stage 1 and quality in stage 2, and then consumers make their two 
stages of decisions. Suppose  
( ) ( )( )( )1H L H H H Hv c A A v c Aδφ− − > + − − H            (1) 
when HP v= 51. The right hand side of (1) is the firm’s profit if it chooses high 
quality in stage 2, since it will sell in stage 3 and 4. The left hand side of (1) is the 
firm’s profit if it chooses low quality but it is initially thought to have chosen high 
quality. It would only sell in stage 3. (1) therefore implies that HA  will not be 
sufficient to make the firm choose high quality in stage 2 when HP v= . The firm 
still discounts the future too much. To increase the importance of repeat purchases, 
the firm needs to advertise more in stage 1. The minimum level of advertising 
required in stage 1 so the firm will choose high quality in stage 2, is defined by 
, which arises when ( ) ( )( )( )1H L H Hv c A A v c Aδφ∗ ∗− − = + − − ∗ HP v=  (for any 
lower price, an even higher advertising level would be required, which would 
never be optimal52). Assume  
( )( )( ) ( )( )( )1 1H H L LA v c A A v c Aδφ δφ∗ ∗ L L+ − − ≥ + − −          (2) 
Then it is more desirable for the firm to choose ( ),HP v A∗=  and high quality 
than  and low quality. ( ,L LP v A= )
                                                                                                                                                       
  
Proposition 1. There exists an equilibrium in which the monopolist chooses high 
 
existence of the monopolist’s maximum profit . ( )( )( )1 t t t tA v c Aδφ+ − −
51 If HP v≤ , the firm will sell in both periods if its quality is high. The firm therefore maximizes its profit by 
choosing HP v= , the highest price at which consumers will still buy given it will produce high quality. 
52 For any lower price, the firm will choose an even lower level of advertising in order to maximize its profit 
in the full information benchmark. 
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quality and sets HP v= , HA A A∗= > . The corresponding social welfare is equal 
to , which is less than the social welfare achieved by 
the high quality monopolist in the full information benchmark but more than the 
social welfare achieved by the monopolist when there is a ban on advertising. 
( )( )( )1 H HA v c Aδφ ∗+ − ∗−
 
Exogenous quality versus endogenous quality game 
Contrast the exogenous quality game to the endogenous quality game. Clearly the 
expressions for the equilibrium level of advertising in the two approaches are 
quite different. In the classical signaling model, 
( )( )1H L L LA v A v c Aδφ∗ ∗= − + + + L∗  , thus the level of advertising needed to signal 
high quality depends on Hv , ,  and Lc Lv δ . In contrast, in the endogenous quality 





∗ −= − , therefore, quality ensuring level of advertising 
depends on Hv , Hc ,  and Lc δ . Further, A∗  is positively related to Hv  and , 
but negatively related to  and 
Lc
Lv δ  in the exogenous quality setting. However, in 
the endogenous quality setting, A∗  is negatively related to Hv ,  and Lc δ , but 
positively related to Hc . Finally, we find that the monopoly price for a low quality 
firm  does not matter for the level of advertising in the endogenous quality 
model, while it leads to a decrease in the level of advertising in the exogenous 
quality model. However, in the exogenous quality model the cost of the high quality 
Lv
Hc  does not matter, whereas in the endogenous quality model, the level of 
advertising increases in Hc . The insight here is that in the exogenous quality model, 
the no mimicking constraint implies that the profit from mimicking the high quality 
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monopolist by setting Hv  and A
∗  increases in Hv , and at the same time, the 
profit of the low quality monopolist from not mimicking increase in . The former 
effect tends to increase the low quality monopolist’s incentive to mimic, whereas 
the latter effect tends to reduce the low quality monopolist’s incentive to mimic. 
Therefore,  increase in 
Lv
A∗ Hv , but decreases in . In the endogenous quality 
model, to make the firm choose high quality, we need to make sure the firm is better 
off being high quality and selling twice than pretending to be high quality by setting 
a high price if it is actually low quality. To relax the incentive compatibility 
constraint, we have to increase 
Lv
A∗  to make repeat purchases matter. Therefore, 
the increase in Hv  makes the profit from setting high price and selling twice rise 
more than from setting high price, choosing low quality and selling once. The 
decrease in Hc  tends to increase the profit from setting high price and selling twice, 
while the decrease in  tends to increase the profit from pretending to be high 
quality, but actually choosing low quality and selling once. 
Lc
 
4.2.2 The duopoly and its welfare properties  
There are two firms that are maximally differentiated in the standard Hotelling 
fashion. The timing here is the same as before, except now consumers choose one 
firm in stage 3 based on their location on the unit interval, and in stage 4 decide 
whether to repurchase from the firm they have chosen53. Actually, we divide stage 
3 into stage 3a and 3b. Suppose a measure 1 of consumers are uniformly 
                                                        
53 Note we will assume that when setting its price and advertising level, each firm does not know the other 
firm’s choice of quality. 
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distributed on the [ ]0,1  interval. Let a consumer located at  on [x ]0,1  get an 
additional firm-specific utility of ( )1 x σ−  from firm 1 and x σ  from firm 2, 
where σ  measures competition intensity54. The bigger σ , the more intense is 
competition. This additional utility is obtained by shopping at firm  at stage 3a 
regardless of whether the consumer buys anything at firm  in stage 3b. But 
consumers can only shop at one firm and must buy from where they choose to 
shop. This specification ensures that the market will be covered, with all 
consumers buying from one and only one firm, but also at the same time avoiding 
the possibility that a firm can charge above 
i
i
Hv   and still make some sales. Thus 
if both firms charge a price at or below Hv , all consumers will want to shop at 
one of the firms to get the added utility from shopping, and will just be willing to 
buy the good from the firm they choose if they think it is high quality. This 
implies if a firm which is thought to be high quality price above Hv , consumers 
very close to that shop may still shop there, but they will not buy anything, and 
they know that when they make their choice of where to shop. Likewise for a firm 
that prices above  that is thought to be low quality, only consumers very close 
to that shop may still shop there, but they will not buy anything. Thus, although 
the consumer makes two decisions, given the assumption that consumers can only 
buy from where they shop, they actually can make two decisions together, which 
is where to buy from. 
Lv
Now consider the reverse ordered game in which ( ),i iP A  are chosen in stage 1 
                                                        
54 This is not a standard Hotelling model (see Tirole 1988 ). 
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and quality in stage 2, and then consumers make their two stages of decisions. 
 ensures high quality only if  ( ,i iP A )
( )H LH i H i
c cv P c v
Aδφ L
−≥ ≥ + > . 




−+≥  comes from solving 
       ( )( )( ) ( ) iLiiiHiii AcPsAcPAs −−≥−−+ δφ1                     
where  is firm i ’s market share or demand function, dependent on , 
the rival firm’s price and advertising strategy, and consumers’ beliefs. The left 
hand side is firm ’s profit when it is thought to be of high quality and produces 
high quality in stage 2, and consumers buy in both stage 3 and 4. The right hand 
side is firm i ’s profit when it is initially thought to be of high quality but 
produces low quality in stage 2, and consumers only buy in stage 3.  
is ( ),i iP A
i
Note H iv P v≥ > L . This is because if firm i chooses ( ),i iP A  with  in 
stage 1, it would never be optimal to choose high quality in stage 2. Suppose firm 
iP v≤ L
i chooses high quality in stage 2, it makes sales in two stages when  and 
its profit is 
iP v≤ L
( )( )( )1i i i Hs A P cδφ+ − iA− . Conversely, if firm i  produces low 
quality in stage 2, its resulting profit is ( )( )( )1i i i Ls A P cδφ iA+ − −  since 
consumers still make a repurchase in stage 4 with probability ( )iAφ  when 
 even if they find firm iP v≤ L i sells low quality55. Obviously, 
         ( )( )( ) ( )( )( )1 1i i i H i i i i Ls A P c A s A P cδφ δφ iA+ − − < + − − .           
Thus, it is always profitable for firm i to choose low quality in stage 2 when 
                                                        
55 Consumers are not allowed to shift to the other firm in stage 4 when they find out the quality of the firm in 
stage 3 after buying from that firm, they must stick to the firm they have chosen, and decide whether to buy 
again. 
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iP v≤ L . Expecting this, consumers think firm i will choose low quality in stage 2 
upon observing a price such that iP vL≤ . Likewise, firm i will not price above 
Hv  in stage 1 and choose high quality in stage 2. The reasoning is that consumers 
will just want to shop at the firm and will be unwilling to buy from it in this case, 





Note also that the constraint ( )i
LH
Hi  will hold with equality for an 
equilibrium in which a firm produces high quality (given they would always 
prefer less advertising as shown below, if not to signal high quality). Recall our 
previous assumption that ( ) ( )( )( )1 , where the 







56. It directly follows that 
cccP δφ+≥
L H H H H Hv c A A v c Aδφ− − > + − −
)
      ( ) ( )( )( )1L H H H HP c A A P c Aδφ− − > + − −  if .  H
Define ( ),i iP A  to be the optimal full information level of price and advertising 
for each firm , which chooses high quality. For any given  and ,  is 
obtained by solving 
i iP is iA





φ δ= − , which in turn comes from 
( )( )( )1i i i H
i
d s A P c A
dA





φ δ= −  to 





φ δ= − , ( ) ( )' 'i HA Aφ φ>  follows because iP vH≤  and . 
Since 
0 1is≤ ≤
( )' Aφ  is decreasing in A , we then have Hi AA < . Accordingly, 
                                                        
56 With the general function form of ( )Aφ , HA  may take some positive values. Intuitively, this is because 
advertising affects the monopolist’s profit in two different ways. On the one hand, it increases the 
monopolist’s profit by its demand enhancing effect in stage 4. On the other hand, it decreases the 
monopolist’s profit as a fixed sunk cost. 
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( ) ( )( )( )1L H H H HP c A A P c Aδφ− − > + − −  if , and Hi AA <  imply that 
( ) ( )( )( )1L i i HP c A A P c Aδφ− − > + − − i if HP v≤ , and subsequently 
( ) ( )( )( )1i i L i i i i H is P c A s A P c Aδφ− − > + − −  if iP vH≤ . This means  is not 
sufficient to make firm  choose high quality in stage 2 if 
iA
i iP vH≤ . To relax the 
incentive compatibility constraint, firm  needs to advertise more in stage 1. The 
minimum level of advertising required in stage 1 so that firm  will choose high 
quality in stage 2, is defined by 
i
i
( ) ( )( )( )1i i L i i i i H is P c A s A P c Aδφ∗ ∗ ∗− − = + − − . 
Notice that i iA A
∗ > . We thus have shown that firms always prefer less advertising 
for any given price , if not to signal high qualityiP
57. Therefore, if a firm 
produces high quality, the constraint will hold in the following fashion 
( )H LH i H i
c cv P c v
Aδφ
−≥ = + > L .  
HP v≤
 
Proposition 2. In a high quality equilibrium in which the two firms choose high 
quality, they both choose price and advertising such that 
1 2P P
∗ ∗= , 1 2A A∗ ∗= , ( )1 1H LH H L




−≥ = + > , and  
 
( ) ( )( )( )












H L H L














= ⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞− −⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟− + − +⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠
 
                                                        
57 Since ( )Aφ  is a strictly (increasing) concave function,  ( )( )( )1i i i H is A P c Aδφ+ − −   is a strictly 
concave function too for any given is  and . iP iA  is the optimal level of advertising with full information, 
and i iA A
∗ > . Therefore, the profit function of firm  is a strictly decreasing concave function when i
i iA A
∗ > . 
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where i HA A A
∗ ∗≥ > . As competition increases from the monopoly, both firms set 
lower prices and higher levels of advertising to signal high quality. The excessive 
advertising for signaling high quality may result in a loss of social welfare and 
firms’ joint profit. When there is sufficient competition and price alone can reveal 
firms’ unobservable choice of quality, a ban on advertising may make the society 
better, although it will make consumers worse off. However, a ban on advertising 
may make both firms choose low quality and low prices in the equilibrium if 
price alone as a signal of quality is not feasible. 
 
4.3 A numerical example 
Consider an example with (1c) ( )1( ) 1H L H H
H L
c c v c
v v
δ⎛ ⎞ 1− + ≤ −⎜ ⎟−⎝ ⎠ <  and (1d) 
( ) ( )1A A Aφ = + . This satisfies (1) and (2) in our analysis for the monopoly. 
These assumptions imply that 0L HA A
∗ ∗= =  and 0H LA v v∗ = − > in the 
exogenous quality setting. When it comes to the endogenous quality setting, these 
assumptions also imply that 0L HA A= =  and 
( )( )( ) ( )H L H H H LA c c v c c cδ∗ = − − − − > 0 . If we further assume 0.9δ = , 
, , , 1Hv = 0.2Lv = 0.1Hc = 0Lc = , we have  and , and the 
monopoly profit of 0.46 in the exogenous quality setting
0.8A∗ = 1P =
58, whereas  
and , and the monopoly profit of 0.86. The firm chooses high quality, 
0.14A∗ =
1P =
                                                        
58  monopolist can pretend to be of low quality by choosing H A A∗<  and setting price and advertising as 
such ( ), ( 0L Lv A A∗= = ) . The resulting profit is 0.1. However, if  monopolist maintains its equilibrium 
strategy 
H
( ), ( )H H Lv A v v∗ = − , its profit is 0.46. Consequently, we say that  monopolist cannot make any 
desirable deviation as well. 
H
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signals this with a monopoly price and positive advertising, and the consumer 
buys from the firm. Note advertising is set above the full information level so as to 
relax the incentive compatibility constraint for the firm to produce high quality 
such that it can be satisfied at the monopoly price. Advertising relaxes this 
constraint by increasing the likelihood of repeat purchases, which are worth more 
when quality is high (and so the margin is high). Interestingly, the level of 
advertising decreases the more important are future payoffs or repeat purchase (as 
measured, for example, by a higher δ ) since this relaxes the incentive 
compatibility constraint, meaning less needs to be spent on advertising for this 
purpose. So advertising is expected to be higher when firms do not face much 
discipline from repeat purchases. 
Now we extend the example to consider competition. Assume 2σ = . ( ),i iP A  











−≥ ≥ + >⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟+⎝ ⎠
. This constraint will 











−≥ = + >⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟+⎝ ⎠
, given firms would prefer 
less advertising in this example, if not to signal high quality. To see this idea, a 
monopolist would prefer not to advertise if its quality is known to all consumers 
since (1 )H Hv cδ> − . This implies that  ( )1 1H H H H
Av c v c
A
δ⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞ A− > + − −⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟+⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠  
for all . It then follows that 0A > ( )1
1H H
AP c P c A
A
δ⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞− > + − −⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟+⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠  for all 
 and 0A > HP v≤ . Since 0 1is≤ ≤ , we thus conclude that 
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( ) ( )1
1
i
i i H i i H
i
As P c s P c A
A
δ⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞− > + − −⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟+⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠ i H
 for all  and .  0iA > iP v≤
Note the left hand side is the profit for firm  when it chooses zero advertising 
and high quality, and consumers think it chooses high quality, while the right hand 
side is the profit firm  earns when it chooses a positive level of advertising and 





iP ( )1 1 ii ii
As P
A
δ⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞+ −⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟+⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠ H i
c A−   is a strictly concave function. Since zero 







δ⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞ H ic A+ − −⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟+⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠
 is a 
strictly decreasing concave function for all . We thus have shown that firms 
always prefer less advertising to signal high quality.  
0iA ≥
In a high quality equilibrium in which each firm produces high quality, 
consumers think each firm will choose high quality if they observe a price and 











−≥ = + >⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟+⎝ ⎠
 for . 
The indifferent consumer, 
1, 2i =
x , between firm 1 and firm 2 is 
 ( ) ( )1 21 2
1 2
1 1 1
2 2 1 1H H
A Ax v P v P
A A
σ δ δ⎡ ⎤⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞= + + − − + −⎢ ⎥⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟+ +⎢ ⎥⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠⎣ ⎦
,  
which is found by solving 




A Ax xv P v P
A A
δ δσ σ
⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞−+ − + = + −⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟+ +⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠
+ 59.  
Then firm 1 and 2’s demand functions are 1s x= , and 2 11 1s s= − = − x
                                                       
, 
 
59 If advertising is modeled so that consumers do not take it into account in their decision to buy in the first 
place, but it still affects the probability they will repurchase, then the model works in a similar way and we 
get similar results. 
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respectively. Accordingly, we can write down the profit functions for firm 1 and 2: 





π δ⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞= + − −⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟+⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠ ( )c A , .   ( )
2




As P c A
A
π δ⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞= − + − −⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟+⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠
A possible equilibrium with high quality would therefore be found by solving 
1 2 1
1
1 2 11 2
1 2 2
1 1 1 1
2 2 1 1 1
1 1
H L H L
H H H H
A c c A c c Av c v c
A A AA A
A A
σπ δ δ δ
δ δ














π = , then set . The solution has  and 
. Each firm’s profit is 0.16.  
1A A= 2 1 2 0.21A A∗ ∗= =
1 2 0.74P P
∗ ∗= =
To check this is an equilibrium, we need to check a firm cannot do better by 
deviating and choosing a lower price and advertising level, such that it will want 
to set low quality, given that the other firm keeps its ( ),P A  at this level. If firm 1 
did this, that is, 1 1
1 1
1 11 1
H L H L
H H







− −< = + < +⎛ ⎞ ⎛⎜ ⎟ ⎜+ +⎝ ⎠ ⎝
⎞⎟⎠
, consumers believe it 












⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞ −⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟= + + − − + − +⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟+ + ⎜ ⎟⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠ ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟+⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠
c
( ) ( )11 1 1
1
1 0.211051 1
0.211052 2 1 1 0.21105
1 0.21105
H L
L H H L




⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞ −⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟= + + − − + − + −⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟+ + ⎜ ⎟⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟+⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠
c
. It would choose . Note that the low quality monopolist in this example 
would prefer zero advertising to any positive level of advertising as well because 
01 =A
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( ) (1 )H H Lv c v cδ δ> − > − L . We thus have ( )1 1L L L L
Av c v c A
A
δ⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞− > + − −⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟+⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠  
for all . Following the foregoing argument, we have 0A >
 ( )1
1L
AP c P c A
A
δ⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞− > + − −⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟+⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠ L  for all LP v≤  and .  0A >
It then follows that  




As P c s P c A
A
δ⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞− > + − −⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟+⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠ L
 for all 1 LP v≤  and .   1 0A >
Therefore, firm 1 will not advertise if it chooses low quality in stage 2. Substitute 
 to the above demand function for firm 1, then firm 1’s demand function 
simplifies to 
01 =A




c cs v P v cσ δ
δ
⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎛ ⎞ −⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟= + − − + − +⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟+ ⎜ ⎟⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠ ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟+⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠
.  
Then the resulting profit function is 
 




c cv P v c P cσπ δ
δ








 gives . Its resulting profit is 0.04(< 0.16). So firm 1 would not 
deviate to choose low quality, and likewise for firm 2 as this is a symmetric 
equilibrium. We also need to check no firms would deviate to choose a higher 
price and/or a higher level of advertising level. If firm 1 did this, that is, 
1 0.20P =





H L H L
H H







−> = + > +⎛ ⎞ ⎛⎜ ⎟ ⎜+ +⎝ ⎠ ⎝
−
⎞⎟⎠
, consumers believe it is a high quality 
firm. However,  and 1 0.21A = 1 0.74P =  give firm 1’s best response, given 
consumers’ beliefs and the rival firm 2’s equilibrium strategy. Therefore, firm 1 is 
not able to make itself better off by such a deviation, and likewise for firm 2. 
Therefore, we have shown that the proposed strategies constitute an equilibrium 
with both firms choosing high quality. 
Compared with the monopoly solution of  and , 
price is lower and advertising is higher. Consequently, each firm’s profit is lower 
compared to a monopoly profit of 0.86.  
1 2 0.14A A
∗ ∗= = 1 2 1P P∗ ∗= =
As we have shown above, there is a pure strategy equilibrium in which both 
firms choose high quality in this example. If we vary the competition intensity σ , 
keeping all other parameters’ values unchanged, we find that this kind of pure 
strategy equilibrium exists when ( ]15.3,0∈σ , but there is no pure strategy 
equilibrium when 3.15σ > . The case of monopoly corresponds to ( ]1,0∈σ . 
Initially, when the competition effect is weak, the monopoly price and advertising 
level remains an equilibrium outcome. However, there is a loss in the social 
welfare compared with the monopoly situation because two firms serve the whole 
market and advertise the same amount. As the competition effect gets stronger, the 
high quality firms lower their prices and raise their advertising levels as shown in 
figure 4.1. This increase of advertising will lead to a loss in social welfare because 
the sunk cost effect of advertising would further dominate its demand enhancing 
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effect. As competition gets more and more intense, e.g., 3.15σ > , the 
homogenous competition result is obtained. Intuitively, the high quality firms 
would price and advertise till they earn zero profit. At this point, these two firms 
would be indifferent between high quality and low quality. If one firm deviates to 
choose low quality, the high quality firm gets the whole market because 
. If this happens, the high quality firm would raise its price, 
reduce advertising a little bit, and make a positive profit. In that case, the low 
quality firm would like to choose high quality, advertising a bit more, and pricing 
a little lower to win the whole market. Again, when this happens, the two firms 
would undercut each other until their profits are driven to zero. Therefore, when 
the competition effect is very strong, no pure strategy equilibrium exist. 
0H H L Lv c v c− > − >
 





























Figure 4.1 The relationship between price, advertising and competition 
intensity 
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In this example, the welfare maximizing level of advertising under monopoly is 
zero, and the resulting total social welfare is 0.9. With imperfect information, the 
monopolist has to increase advertising to  in order to signal high 
quality, and this reduces total social welfare and the monopolist’s profit to 0.86. 
But if there is a ban on advertising, the monopolist would like to choose low 
quality, price drops and the resulting social welfare would be 0.2. Under duopoly, 
for low 
0.14A∗ =
σ , the monopoly price and advertising level still can be an equilibrium 
outcome. For example, when 1σ = , the monopoly solution  and 
 is obtained but the joint profit of two firms and social welfare is 0.72 
due to the duplicated advertising. If there is a ban on advertising, both firms will 
shift to choose low quality and  in the equilibrium. Their joint 
profit and social welfare is 0.2. As the competition intensity 
1 2 0.14A A
∗ ∗= =
1 2 1P P
∗ ∗= =
1 2 0.2P P
∗ ∗= =
σ  increases to some 
point, the equilibrium price declines and advertising level rises. For instance, 
when 2σ = , the firms have to increase advertising to  and 
decrease prices to . In this case, their joint profit is 0.32 and social 
welfare is reduced to 0.62. If there is a ban on advertising, both firms still choose 
low quality and  in the equilibrium and their joint profit and social 
welfare is 0.2. As competition gets stronger and stronger, firms have to set even 
lower prices and higher levels of advertising to signal high quality, their joint 
profit and total social welfare will be further reduced. For example, when 
1 2 0.21A A
∗ ∗= =
1 2 0.74P P
∗ ∗= =
1 2 0.2P P
∗ ∗= =
3σ = , 
firms have to set the levels of advertising and prices such that  
and , their joint profit is 0.03 and social welfare is reduced to 0.52. 
1 2 0.28A A
∗ ∗= =
1 2 0.60P P
∗ ∗= =
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Compared to firm’s joint profit and social welfare under banning advertising, their 
joint profit is lower, but social welfare is higher. 
 




























 deviating profit π1 
 
Figure 4.2 Firm 1’s profit in the equilibrium changes with competition when 
it chooses high quality or deviates by choosing low quality 
                                      
           
























Figure 4.3 Firm 1’s price changes with competition when it deviates by 
choosing low quality 
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 4.4 Conclusions 
In this paper, we consider how a firm signals its unobservable choice of quality 
through price and/or advertising, and subsequently how the signals of imperfect 
quality information influence social welfare. Here advertising is assumed to 
increase the likelihood of repeat purchase. With a general advertising function, we 
derive a high quality equilibrium under a monopoly and duopoly setting. In the 
high quality equilibrium under monopoly, the firm prices the same but advertises 
more than the optimal full information level. Further, the resulting profit of the 
monopolist and the total social welfare is lower than that obtained in the full 
information benchmark. This is because the effect of advertising as a fixed sunk 
cost dominates its demand enhancing effect as HA A
∗ > . In addition, a ban on 
advertising will make the firm shift from high quality to low quality in the 
equilibrium, which in turn makes the firm and the society worse off.  
In the duopoly situation, when the competition effect is weak, the monopoly 
equilibrium outcome remains. At some point, the competition effect is strong 
enough to lower prices, and at this point the equilibrium advertising level rises. 
For strong enough competition, there may be no pure strategy equilibrium. The 
lower prices simply transfer social welfare from the firms to consumers, and do 
not affect the social welfare as a whole because of the inelastic demand. However, 
the increasing level of advertising owing to the intense competition tends to 
further reduce total social welfare. This is because the welfare maximizing level of 
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advertising under duopoly would be lower than that under monopoly and 
i HA A A
∗ ∗≥ > . A ban on advertising may make both firms choose low quality in 
the equilibrium, which may make the society even worse off. However, if the 
firms only need to use price to signal high quality, banning advertising may make 
society better off while it will make consumers worse off. 
  We have done our analysis focusing on a high quality equilibrium. Also, we 
illustrate our analysis with a specific example. One extension of value is to 
consider other types of equilibria, where both firms choose low quality, or one 
firm chooses high quality while the other firm chooses low quality. Actually, we 
find the other types of equilibria by varying the parameter values in our specific 
example, and the equilibrium evolves from high quality equilibrium, to 
asymmetric equilibrium, then to low quality equilibrium as competition gets more 
and more intense. The main result still holds, that is, strong competition leads to 
lower price and higher advertising in order to signal high quality. The problem 
arises when we vary the competition factor, there are gaps in between where there 
is no pure strategy equilibrium. This makes the problem more complex. A 
different approach that allows for mixed strategy equilibria would be worth 
pursuing, although it would involve allowing price, advertising and quality to be 
chosen from probability distributions (which may not be symmetric across firms), 
which in the context of the current model would be technically challenging.  
 
Appendix C: Appendix for chapter 4 
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C  Proofs 
Proof of Proposition 1 
Suppose the firm chooses HP v=  and A A∗=  in stage 1 and high quality in 
stage 2, its resulting profit is ( )( )( )1 H HA v c Aδφ ∗ ∗+ − − . Alternatively, the firm 
can choose a lower price and/or advertising level in stage l. This will make it 
prefer low quality in stage 2. If its price remains above , the consumer will 
never buy from it, and so it will obtain no profit. If it sets 
Lv
LP v≤ , the consumer 
will be willing to buy from it in both rounds, so its profit in this case will be 
maximized by choosing its full information price and advertising level. Its 
resulting profit is ( )( )( )1 L L L LA v c Aδφ+ − − . So to sustain an equilibrium where 
the firm chooses high quality therefore requires it prefer to set the higher price and 
advertising level; i.e. ( )( )( ) ( )( )( )1 1H H L LA v c A A v c Aδφ δφ∗ ∗+ − − ≥ + − L L−
∗−
. 
If the firm chooses high quality, then total social welfare equals to the firm’s 
surplus less the fixed cost of advertising as consumers’ surplus is zero, i.e., 
. This is the same as the high quality monopolist’s 
profit in the equilibrium, but is lower than the high quality monopolist’s profit and 
total social welfare in the full information benchmark, 
( )( )( )1 H HA v c Aδφ ∗+ −
( )( )( )1 H H H HA v c Aδφ+ − −
                                                       
60 . Therefore, imperfect information generates an 
inefficient outcome. This is because the advertising expenditure has two 
composing effects. One the one hand, it reduces social welfare as a fixed sunk cost. 
On the other hand, it raises consumers’ demand for the firm in the next period and 
 
60 Note HA  is defined to be the optimal full information level of advertising when the monopolist chooses 
high quality and sets price HP v= . 
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thus the firm’s profit and social welfare. Further, the former effect dominates the 
latter when HA A> . Note HA A∗ > , therefore the higher level of advertising to 
signal quality lead to a loss of social welfare. This suggests that the institutions, 
e.g., the government could have the option of taking less costly measures to 
inform consumers of the firm’s quality to avoid the increased advertising for 
signaling quality and improve social welfare. In the meantime, a ban on 
advertising may not be recommendable when less costly alternatives are not 
available. This is because banning advertising will make the monopolist to choose 
low quality in the equilibrium, since . Therefore, social welfare and 
the monopolist’s profit is 
0HA A
∗ > ≥
( )( )( )1 0 L Lv cδφ+ − , which is lower than or equal to 
( )( )( )1 L L L LA v c Aδφ+ − − 61. This implies that an effective ban on advertising may 
lead to a Pareto-worsening in the allocation of resource. If 
( ) ( )( )( )1H L H H H Hv c A A v c Aδφ− − > + − − H  is not valid, meaning advertising 
cannot take a signaling role, a ban on advertising may reduce social welfare as 
well when . 0HA >
 
Proof of Proposition 2 
We now characterize a symmetric equilibrium in which both firms choose high 
quality. In this equilibrium, consumers think firm  chooses high quality if they 
observe a price and advertising pair 
i
( ),i iP A  such that  
                                                        
61 Note LA  is defined to be the optimal full information level of advertising when the monopolist chooses 
low quality and sets price . LP v=
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( )H LH i H i
c cv P c v
Aδφ
−≥ = + > L  for each firm 1, 2i = . A consumer is indifferent 
between firm 1 and firm 2 if 
       ( )( )( ) ( )( )( )1 1 2 211 1H Hx xA v P A v Pδφ δφσ σ−+ − + = + − + .          
Thus all those consumers to the left of x  will buy from firm 1 and to the right of 
x  will buy from firm 2, where 
        ( )( )( ) ( )( )(( )1 1 21 1 12 2 H H )2x A v P A v Pσ δφ δφ= + + − − + − .          
Since consumers are uniformly distributed on the unit interval, firm 1’s market 
share is 1s x= , which is also firm 1’s demand function. Accordingly, firm 2’s 
market share or demand function is 2 11 1s s x= − = − . We then can write down the 
profit functions for firm 1 and 2:  
( )( )( ) ( )( )( )( ) ( )( )( )1 1 1 2 2 1 11 1 1 12 2 H H 1HA v P A v P A P c Aσπ δφ δφ δφ⎛ ⎞= + + − − + − + − −⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
( )( )( ) ( )( )( )( ) ( )( )( )2 1 1 2 2 2 21 1 1 12 2 H H 2HA v P A v P A P c Aσπ δφ δφ δφ⎛ ⎞= − + − − + − + − −⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
Substituting ( )H Li H i
c cP c
Aδφ
−= +  into firm i ’s profit function for each firm , 
a possible equilibrium with high quality would therefore be found by solving 
1, 2i =
( )( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )1 1 2 11 2
1 1 1 1
2 2
H L H L H L
H H H H
c c c c c c
1
1
A v c A v c A
A A
σπ δφ δφ δφδφ δφ δφ








π = , then set  since this is a symmetric equilibrium. We obtain 1A A= 2
          
( ) ( )( )( )












H L H L














= ⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞− −⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟− + − +⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠
.  
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A sufficient condition for a positive relationship between the competition intensity 
σ  and the level of advertising needed for firm  to signal its high quality is i
                   ( )( )10 '2 H HA v c 1δ φ ∗< − ≤ ,                       (3) 
where
( )








H L H H
A
c cc c v c
AA A
φ
δ σ δφδφ δφ
∗
∗∗ ∗
= ⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞−⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟− − + + −⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠
. 
Substituting the expression of ( )1' Aφ ∗  into ( )( )10 '2 H HA v c 1δ φ ∗< − ≤  results in 
     ( )





H L H H
v c
c cc c v c
AA A
σ δφδφ δφ∗∗ ∗
−< ≤⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞−⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟− − + + −⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠
.   
Rearranging this inequality further leads to the following condition: 
( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )21 11
0 1
1 1 11 1
H H
H L H H H L
v c
c c v c c c
A AA
σ σδφ δφδφ∗ ∗∗
−< ≤⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟− − + + − + −⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠
1
, which ensures that firms will increase their advertising expenditure in order to 
signal their high quality as competition gets stronger in a high quality equilibrium. 
In the high quality equilibrium above, each of the two firms chooses high 
quality, the same level of price and advertising, and shares the market equally. The 
total social welfare thus generated is ( )( )( )11 2H H 1A v c Aδφ+ − − , which comes 
from  
( )( )( ) ( )( )( )( ) ( )( )( ) ( )( )( )( )1 1 1 2 21 11 1 1 12 2H H H H H H H H 2A v P A P c A A v P A P c Aδφ δφ δφ δφ+ − + + − − + + − + + − −
 As can be seen, prices do not affect social welfare but only transfer between the 
consumers’ surplus and producers’ surplus. However, advertising can have an 
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effect on social welfare by enhancing consumers’ demand in the last period and 
reducing the society’s resource as a fixed sunk cost. The social welfare 
maximizing level of advertising would be found to be lower than HA . Since 
620i HA A A
∗ ∗≥ > ≥ , advertising tends to reduce social welfare in the equilibrium. 
Furthermore, as competition goes up, advertising will become more aggressive 
and thus social welfare will be further reduced. In this scenario, banning 
advertising may improve social welfare. Suppose there is a ban on advertising, 




( ) ( )( )( )1 0i i L i i Hs P c s P cδφ− > + −   when iP vH≤ . That is, if there is a ban 
on advertising, firms will switch from high quality to low quality in the 
equilibrium. Accordingly, prices will drop. Then the resulting social welfare 
would be ( )( )(1 0 )L Lv cδφ+ −
12
, which may be higher than 
( )( )( )11 H HA v c Aδφ+ − − , depending on how excessive the advertising is in the 
high quality equilibrium. The more competitive the market, the more aggressive 
the advertising, the less the social welfare in the high quality equilibrium. 
Therefore, it is more likely that banning advertising raises social welfare when 
there is sufficient competition.  
However, the conclusion drawn above is based on the assumption that 
( ) ( )( )( )1H L H H H Hv c A A v c Aδφ− − > + − − H  , which requires firms increase their  
advertising expenditure in order to signal their unobservable choice of high quality. 
But if ( ) ( )( )( )1H L H H H Hv c A A v c Aδφ− − < + − − H
                                                       
, then there is a possibility that 
 
62 This is because ( )H Li H i
c cP c
Aδφ
−= + , and i HP v≤ . 
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firms will choose a high price and high quality in the equilibrium when 
advertising is banned. In this case, firms’ joint profit is ( )( )( )1 0 i HP cδφ+ − . 
When there is sufficient competition, this is likely to be higher than 
( )( )( )11 H H 12A P c Aδφ+ − −
)
, the profit firms jointly earn without a ban on 
advertising. Therefore, a ban on advertising may make the firms jointly better off. 
On the consumers’ side, their total surplus in the equilibrium is 
( )( )(1 0 H iv Pδφ+ −
)
 when there is a ban on advertising, and 
( )( )(11 H HA v Pδφ+ −
)
 when there is no ban on advertising. Note that  
( )( )(1 0 H iv Pδφ+ −  is lower than ( )( )( )11 H HA v Pδφ+ − H because  and 
. With regard to social welfare, it would be 
iP P>
1 0A > ( )( )( )1 0 H Hv cδφ+ −  if there is 
a ban on advertising and ( )( )( )11 H H 12A v c Aδφ+ − −  if there is no ban on 
advertising. ( )( )( ) ( )( )( )11 0 1 2H H H Hv c A v c Aδφ δφ+ − > + − 1−  when there exists 
an excessive advertising. This is because advertising as a fixed sunk cost has a 
dominant negative effect on social welfare. Therefore, a ban on advertising may 
improve social welfare and price alone as a signal of quality may be 











In chapter 2 and 3, we study how an entrant firm signals its unobservable quality 
to consumers and how informational product differentiation affect entry of a new 
firm when competing against a well known incumbent in a market for experience 
goods. The entrant’s quality is determined by nature. Some consumers are 
informed of the entrant’s quality while others are not. We consider two 
information structures where the incumbent may or may not be informed of the 
entrant’s quality but focus on the case in which the incumbent is informed of the 
entrant’s quality as well. In chapter 2, we investigate a market for experience 
goods without horizontal differentiation by expanding Bagwell’s model in two 
ways: some informed consumers and the informed incumbent. This may involve 
the incumbent and entrant signaling common information of the entrant’s quality. 
By applying the unprejudiced refinement from Bagwell and Ramey (1991), we 
find an equilibrium in which the incumbent’s low price signals the entrant’s high 
quality and high price signals the entrant’s low quality. Further, the entry of a new 
firm is facilitated in this equilibrium. This is because the entrant firm can rely on 
the incumbent’s separating prices strategies to signal high quality. 
In chapter 3, we extend the model from chapter 2 by introducing horizontal 
product differentiation. This leads to some additional insights. We find that the 
entrant’s high price signals high quality and entry could be encouraged by 
incomplete information even if the incumbent has no private information 
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regarding the entrant’s quality. This is in contrast with the result from a market for 
experience goods without horizontal differentiation, where the entrant’s high price 
signals high quality but entry is deterred. The informed incumbent case results in 
two more equilibria. We reveal a separating equilibrium in which the incumbent 
and entrant play strategies as if there were full information when the proportion of 
informed consumers is large enough. In other words, no distortion equilibrium 
exists when the ratio of informed to uninformed consumers is sufficiently large. In 
an equilibrium, where the incumbent sets separating prices and the entrant pools, 
the incumbent’s high price signals the entrant’s low quality while the incumbent’s 
low price signals the entrant’s high quality. Consistent with the results from a 
market for experience goods without horizontal differentiation, entry is facilitated. 
In chapter 4, we study how a firm can use price and advertising jointly to signal 
its unobservable choice of quality. Quality is endogenously chosen by firms. We 
consider a two-period model. We first study the classical signaling model under 
monopoly. Then, we consider the monopoly model in the endogenous quality 
setting. Lastly, we extend the monopoly model to the case with two competing 
firms. This is the first time that price, in addition to advertising, is formally 
examined in the endogenous quality literature. To solve for multiple equilibria 
problem, we use the refinement of “reordering invariance” in In and Wright 
(2009). That is, we consider a reordered game in which observable price and 
advertising pairs are chosen before unobservable quality. We find a unique perfect 
Bayesian equilibrium, where firms set a higher level of advertising compared to 
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the optimal full information level of advertising to signal its high quality if price 
alone is not enough to serve as a signal of high quality. Further, we find that as 
competition increases from the monopoly, the firms tend to set lower prices and 
higher levels of advertising to signal high quality. Social welfare is reduced as a 
result of the higher level of advertising for signaling high quality if price alone 
cannot be used as a signal of high quality. As competition gets stronger, social 
welfare will be further reduced due to the even higher level of advertising if price 
alone cannot be a signal of high quality. 
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